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This  thesis  is  a  defence  of  theological  determinism (TD)  as  it  is  expressed  in  a  Reformed  or
Calvinistic  context.  TD is  the  doctrine  that  God determines  everything that  occurs.  It  is  not  a
popular view amongst theistic philosophers at the present time—most theists are libertarians. That
is to say, most contemporary theistic philosophers think that moral responsibility is incompatible
with  determinism  (they  are  incompatibilists),  and  that  man  is  a  morally  responsible  creature.
Theological determinists, on the other hand, are typically compatibilists. They agree that man is a
morally responsible creature, but they think this claim is consistent with determinism.
My task in this thesis is to defend TD against the two signal classes of objection that have been
brought  against  it:  (i)  arguments  for  incompatibilism that  urge  that  TD removes  human moral
responsibility, and (ii) arguments to the effect that that TD calls into question the goodness, love and
paternity of God on account of the closer connection between God and evil that TD posits.
The structure of the thesis is as follows.
In Part 1 I set the stage. In chapter 1 the different proposed analyses of determinism are laid out,
and I offer my preferred understanding. I suggest that the standard definitions of determinism are
inadequate. The crucial notion is not entailment, as the standard definitions suppose, but some some
sort of metaphysically prior, explanatory determination The various terms of the free-will debate
(compatibilism, incompatibilism, libertarianism, etc.) are explicated in chapter 2.
Chapter 3 is given over to a historical centring of the debate. I don’t want to discuss theological
determinism in  the  abstract,  but  in  the  light  of  the  Reformed  or  Calvinist  tradition.  The  two
opposing schools of thought in this regard are Calvinism and Arminianism. I survey the history of
the debate starting with Luther and Erasmus’s dispute over free will, and trace the formation of the
two opposing points of view all the way up to the Westminster Confession. My contention is that
Calvinism should be understood as a compatibilistic and deterministic viewpoint, in contrast to the
incompatibilistic and indeterministic system of Arminianism. The great objections the Arminians
have traditionally made are also presented.
In Part 2 I begin to respond to those objections. Part 2 is given over to arguments against TD
that are premised on arguments against compatibilism. Chapter 4 is my response to the Ability
Argument against determinism, which has it that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral
responsibility and that determinism removes that ability. I respond by suggesting that the relevant
‘could have done otherwise’ language might refer to compossibility, not ability, and the relevant
compossibility  is  simply that  of one’s desire-set  with a different  decision (intention).  Thus,  the
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Calvinist  may  carry  on  assuming  ‘could  have  done  otherwise’ language  is  relevant  to  moral
responsibility.
Chapter 5 concerns the Manipulation Argument. This argument is a recent development, and it
appeals to the intuition that if an individual causes you to do something (even if through a long and
distant chain of causation), then you are not responsible for what you were thus caused to do. But
TD therefore implies that no human being is morally responsible, because God is the ultimate cause
of all our actions. I respond that manipulation cases don’t show us an absence of responsibility, they
show us an uncertainty on the given facts, but that uncertainty can be embraced by the Calvinist, for
he can appeal to divine testimony, a further fact, to justify his belief that human beings are morally
responsible. I also turn the tables and offer my own manipulation argument for compatibilism.
Part 3 is devoted to the Arminian accusations that Calvinism calls into question the goodness
and justice of God. Chapter 6 is a discussion of the justice of Hell.  Issues of predestination to
damnation were revealed in chapter 3 to be of central concern in the debate. To that end, chapter 6
responds to the suspicion that Hell is unjust because it is disproportional: infinite punishment for
finite sins. I rebut the charge by way of three suggestions: that the damned may continue to sin in
Hell and thereby accrue more punishment; that human beings can be plausibly considered guilty for
counterfactual  sins,  sins  they  would  have  done,  and  these  are  infinite;  and  I  also  defend  the
Anselmian suggestion that sins against an infinite being are of infinite gravity.
Chapter 7 presents a Calvinist theodicy of Hell. If God determines everything, why would God
determine a large portion of humanity to reject Christ and go to Hell? In this chapter I rely heavily
on the work of Jonathan Edwards, and I suggest that the reason why God predestines many to such
a fate may be on account of the a greater sense of God’s justice, power, and greater thankfulness
and appreciation for their salvation the elect in Heaven have by being part of the elect few, and
defend the view against objections.
Chapter 8 deals with the question of divine paternity. It is objected by certain of Calvinism’s
critics that for God to deterministically predestine an individual to damnation is inconsistent with
God’s status as father. In this chapter I motivate Calvin's suggestion that God is the father only of
the elect. I argue that if God is the father of all, then he is often in a sort of emotional paralysis, for,
in any conflict between human beings, paternal duty and affection precludes him from identifying
with (supporting) the interests of one party over the other.
The conclusion, chapter 9, offers some suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 1—What is Theological Determinism?
1.1 Species of Determinism
This thesis is a defence of theological determinism. So what is theological determinism? Reflection
on the term indicates that it is a species of determinism. Very well. What, then, is determinism?
Charlotte Werndl defines it as follows:
A system is deterministic just in case the state of the system at one time fixes the state of the system
at all future times. (2017: 669)
But this  is not a good definition of determinism. For one thing,  the condition suggested is  not
necessary. Determinism can obtain without it. Consider a world, w1, where there were no laws of
nature, so no past state of affairs entails (relative to laws of nature) any future state of affairs, or
even makes it more or less likely. But God (necessarily) exists in w1, and God (necessarily) causes,
directly, every state of affairs in w1’s history moment by moment. This would be a world which is
clearly deterministic, but not one that would satisfy the above definition. It is a world where the
future is determined, but not determined by the past: it is a world where everything (apart from
God) is determined by God.
This might seem an unfair objection. One might say that the above author wasn’t offering a
definition  of  determinism  per  se,  but  really  a  definition  of  a  certain  species  of  determinism.
Nomological determinism, perhaps. Well, if that is so, then it is better if that is made clear. But does
the definition given work as a definition of nomological determinism? ‘Nomological’ here should
be  understood  to  mean  ‘relating  to  the  laws  of  nature’.  The  thought  behind  nomological
determinism is that the  laws of nature will determine a unique future. Suppose we assembled a
complete description of the natural world at the present time, t1. If nomological determinism is true,
then, relative to the laws of nature, only one future can possibly succeed t1. This seems to capture
well what Werndl was getting at, and we might therefore offer to define nomological determinism
(ND) as follows:
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(ND1) A world, wx, is nomologically deterministic iff there is a time tx in wx such that a complete
description of tx in conjunction with the laws of nature at wx entails the state of wx at any time ty
later than tx.
But  this  definition is  not quite  adequate.  It  can be counterexampled in  the following way,  and
thereby shown to be insufficient for ND. Suppose there is a universe with a history of 100 moments.
The first moment, t0, given the laws of nature, is sufficient to fix all moments after that  up to t50.
What things will look like in t51 is not determined by t50. There are two possible futures: t51a—t100a
and t51b—t100b. There will therefore be two possible worlds: one for each future. Let wa be the world
which  contains  t0 to  t100a be  wa,  and  the  world  containing  t0 to  t100b,  wb.  Neither  wa or  wb are
deterministic worlds. But they satisfy (ND1). t51a and t51b are both times, in wa an wb respectively,
that are such that a complete description of that time in conjunction with that world’s laws (and w a
and wb have the same laws) entails the state of the universe at any later time.
Definitions  of  determinism  offered  by  other  authors  are  adequate  to  accommodate  this
possibility, however. Here is van Inwagen on determinism:
Determinism may now be defined: it is the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically
possible future. (1983: 3)
Here is Kadri Vihvelin:
More precisely, determinism is the thesis that for every instant of time t, there is a proposition that
expresses the state of the world at that instant, and if P and Q are any propositions that express the
state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of P together with the laws of nature entails
Q. (2013: 3)
We therefore need to modify the definition:
(ND2) A world, wx, is nomologically deterministic iff for any time tx in wx, tx is such that a
complete description of tx in conjunction with the laws of nature at wx entails the state of wx at any
time ty later than tx.
This captures van Inwagen’s suggestion. Vihvelin’s suggestion is different. Her definition is time-
invariant, as follows:
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(ND3) A world, wx, is nomologically deterministic iff for any time tx in wx, tx is such that a
complete description of tx in conjunction with the laws of nature at wx entails the state of wx at any
other time ty.
Vihvelin’s account has the commitment that the laws of nature permit us to infer the state of the past
from the state of the future. She frames matters this way because she thinks that ‘it is a feature of
the  physical  theories  known  to  be  deterministic’ (2013:  239).  I  don’t  think  it  is  wise  for  the
nomological determinist to commit quite yet to the ability of the future to determine the past, so I
will prefer (ND2) as the better formulation of ND. (ND2) looks weighty enough to generate all the
problems that determinism is typically supposed to generate. At any rate, by insisting that any past
time (with the laws of nature) must entail all future times, (ND2) avoids the problem with (ND1).
But how does it help us define theological determinism (TD)? It does offer us an idea of how
relevant kinds of determinism are to be understood. Nomological determinism, if (ND2) is right,
concerns the entailment of one set of facts concerned with what we do (facts about future times) by
another  set  do with  the laws of  nature (the  past  in  conjunction  with the  laws of  nature).  This
suggests  a  general  schema:  X-ological  determinism will  be  the  entailment  of  one  set  of  facts,
typically concerned with human action,  by another set  of facts  concerned with X.1 Theological
determinism,  therefore,  will  be  the  entailment  of  a  set  of  facts  concerned with  the  actions  we
perform by a set of facts about God. This understanding of the determining in determinism therefore
reduces  it  to  the  entailment  relation.  This  conception  is  endorsed  by  Carl  Hoefer:  ‘Logical
entailment,  in  a  sense  broad  enough  to  encompass  mathematical  consequence,  is  the  modality
behind the determination in “determinism.”’ (2016).
1.2 Is Determination Entailment?
I think this is fairly significant mistake in the understanding of what determination amounts to. I
think that to determine something is to do more than to entail it, and determination is more than
entailment. I think determining something demands some form of explanatory priority from the
determiner, and entailment does not supply that. Here follow some considerations to help us see that
the central relation at play in determinism must be more than mere entailment.
1 Throughout, I use ‘fact’ in a loose sense that isn’t at pains to distinguish between true propositions and the parcels
of terra firma reality to which true propositions usually refer. Context and charity should help the reader decide in
each case the most appropriate understanding.
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(i) If determination is entailment, then everything determines itself. For entailment is a reflexive
relation. P entails itself: P entails P. We are all, therefore, self-determiners. Every act we perform is
self-determining. But no one, I think, wants to say that. This suggests determination is something
different.
(ii) Entailment is non-symmetric (so sometimes A entails B and B entails A), but determining, as
it functions in metaphysical discussion, is intuitively asymmetric. That is to say, intuitively, if A
determines B, then B does not determine A. If the course the boat takes is determined by the way
the captain steers the wheel, then it isn’t the case that the course the boat takes determines the way
the  captain  steers  the  wheel.  To  get  an  asymmetric  relation,  we  will  have  to  move  beyond
entailment.
There are also considerations from particular cases.
(iii) Some people think there are truths about the future now. In fact, they might think that there
are comprehensive truths about the future. They might think that everything I will do on May the 1 st
2030 is presently true. In other words, propositions of the form, <I will mow the lawn on May the
1st, 2030> are presently true. Perhaps they are persuaded by an argument from bivalence. Either it is
true that you mow the lawn on May the 1st, 2030, or it is false. It must be one or the other. But many
of those who think that the are present truths about future actions will deny being determinists. But
this is curious if determining is entailment. If the threat of determinism is the threat of entailment,
then entailment of their actions seems to hold. The present truth of <I will mow the lawn on May
the 1st, 2030> entails that I will mow the lawn on May the 1st, 2030. They wouldn’t,  I believe,
happily say they are alethic determinists about the future. They would deny being determinists of
any sort. That suggests determining is more than entailing.
(iv) In a similar vein, lots of theistic philosophers think determinism is false. They think so
because because they believe it would rule out free will and moral responsibility. But they also
think that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. God therefore knows every action every
human being will perform in the future. And if God knows that p, then it follows that p. So, suppose
that God foreknows that <Jones will mow the lawn on May the 1st, 2030>. The fact that God knows
it entails that Jones will do it. But, again, even though such philosophers grant that God’s knowing
entails that the relevant action will happen, they will deny being determinists—of any sort. They
won’t  even  grant  that  they  are  ‘foreknowledge  determinists’.  They  will  deny  that  God’s
foreknowledge  determines.  This,  again,  suggests  that  determination  must  be  something  more
substantial than mere entailment.
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1.3 Is Determination Causation?
Perhaps  we  might  say  that  determination  is  causation?  The  causation  relation  is  intuitively
irreflexive and asymmetric. It also handles the alethic and foreknowledge cases. Truths about the
future (whether  freestanding or  known by God) do not  cause the free actions  that  those truths
describe. So, perhaps it is the spectre of causation that those concerned to deny determinism whilst
accepting entailment are eager to banish. This is plausibly Jonathan Edwards’ understanding:
By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the
act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined,
when,  in  consequence of  some action,  or  influence,  its  choice is  directed to,  and fixed  upon a
particular object. As when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of
the body to be in such a direction, rather than another. (1977 [1754]: 141)
To determine something, for Edwards, is to cause it to be some way rather than another. But this is
not an ideal account of what it is to determine. The chief problem with it is that it rules out the
possibility  of  non-causal  determination.  But  a  few  thinkers  have  either  felt  inclined  to  be
determinists  of  a  non-causal  type,  or  have  at  least  advocated  the  possibility  of  non-causal
determination.
Stewart Goetz, for instance, has defended the notion of teleological determination. Insisting,
along with Anscombe (1957) and Wittgenstein,2 that  reasons are  not causes,  and therefore that
reasons-explanation is  a different kettle  of fish from causal  explanation,  he moves that  we can
therefore envisage two ways in which an action can be determined: determined by reasons, and
determined by causes. Although he believes that human actions are determined in neither manner,
he claims he finds it more plausible to believe that human actions are teleologically determined than
causally determined. Goetz writes, ‘were I to become convinced that noncausal libertarian agency is
either  impossible  or  too  problematic,  I  would  embrace  some  form  of  noncausal  teleological
compatibilism in which our free actions, though determined, are ultimately explained teleologically
by purposes.’ (2008: 3–4).
Hugh McCann holds to a teleological determinism of precisely that sort, though he holds that
the reasons or purposes that determine human actions are God’s, not ours. He agrees with Goetz that
‘we can give noncausal explanations of decisions in terms of the agents’ reasons without fear of
invoking an underlying causal explanation.’ (1995: 584). However, McCann wants to preserve the
2 See Queloz 2017 for historical overview and commentary on Wittgenstein’s position.
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principle of sufficient reason (PSR). He therefore wants it to be the case that there is sufficient
explanation for why it is that an agent freely acts one way rather than another. He thinks that such
an explanation is to be found in God’s mind: 
There is, however, a solution which if successful would allow us to have things both ways [preserve
free will and the PSR]. Suppose that God, as creator, is directly responsible for each of my decisions.
If so, then even though my decision to vacation in Colorado was not determined by the rest of my
nature, it still has an accounting—an accounting in terms of God's plans, of the good He sees in my
deciding as I do. That is to say, what fully accounts for my decision is not my reasons for it, but
God's. (1995: 585)
He appears to grant that ‘whether we choose to call it nomic [nomological] or not, we still seem to
have a brand of determinism’ (1995: 593), viz. divine determinism, but insists that ‘God's creative
determination  of  my  decisions  does  not  rule  out  their  being  free’ (1995:  593),  because  God’s
determining our decisions is a fundamentally different kind than the causal determination that was
held to be threat to free will—as I read McCann, God teleologically determines our free choices.
McCann understand God’s determining in the following way:
[God’s] relationship to us is not analogous to that of the puppeteer to his puppet—which would
indeed destroy our  freedom—but  rather  to  that  of  the  author  of  a  novel  to  her  characters.  The
characters do not exist as an event-causal consequence of anything the author does. Rather, their first
existence is in her creative imagination, and they are born and sustained in and through the very
thoughts in which she conceives them, and of which they are the content. (2005: 146)
God’s  determination  is  outside  the  causal  chain.  It  is  a  determination  of  reasons,  purposes,  or
teleology.
I’m not sure I believe that reasons-explanation is not causal explanation, but we can put that
point to the side. It would be unfortunate if the definition of ‘determinism’ committed one to the
falsity of views like Goetz’s and McCann’s.
It should also be noted that there are relations which, though not causal, might nevertheless be
considered to be fit candidates to play a determining role. Much talk has been made in recent years
of the ‘grounding’ relation. This is supposed to be a form of ontological dependence that can play a
large and varied role. Much of our ‘in virtue of’-talk is held by some to refer to this grounding
relation.  ‘The  wall  has  the  shape  it  does  by  virtue  of  the  placement  of  the  bricks’ can  be
informatively rendered as ‘The shape of the wall is grounded in the arrangement of the bricks’; ‘By
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virtue of being persons, we have a right to life’ can be informatively rendered as ‘Our right to life is
grounded in our personhood’; ‘the existence of the singleton set {Socrates} exists by virtue of the
existence of Socrates’ can be analysed as ‘the existence of {Socrates} is grounded in the existence
of Socrates’; and so on.3 In all those cases we don’t want to say the relation is causal—Socrates
doesn’t cause the existence of {Socrates}, nor does our personhood cause our right to life—it is a
relation, it appears, of non-causal determination. (The truth-making relation, that purportedly holds
between reality and a true proposition, also looks to be non-causally determining. The truth of <the
Pope is male> appears determined by the Pope’s being male.)
At any rate, whether it be grounding or teleological determining, these are putative cases of non-
causal determination that a definition of ‘determinism’ should accommodate. If someone were to
insist  that all  human action had God as a sufficient ground, or that every aspect of the human
decision-making process is teleologically determined by some superbeing, but deny that there were
any  causally  sufficient  conditions  in  play,  then  they  would  look  like  they  were  a  determinist.
Perhaps they are muddle-headed, but it is better not to assume so. The determining relation must be
taken to be broader than mere causation, therefore. Even if it is not.
So,  we  need  a  relation  broad  enough  to  encompass  causing,  teleologically  determining,
grounding and any other intuitively determining candidates. I think the best thing we can say is that
determination should be taken to be a metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ relation, a form of metaphysical
explanation.  We  use  the  ‘in  virtue  of’ locution  to  cover  instances  of  causing  (‘the  avalanche
occurred in virtue of last night’s snowfall’), teleologically determining (‘he choose to φ in virtue of
the  strength  of  his  reasons  to  φ’),  and grounding (‘the  statue’s  shape  obtains  by  virtue  of  the
arrangement of the lump of clay’). We seem to see in all those cases a shared aspect or common
nature to the relation that makes it intuitively correct to speak of them all as ‘in virtue of’ relations.
Now, I’m not sure that there are instances where we would use the ‘in virtue of’ expression to
denote  a  relation  of  non-metaphysical explanation,  but  if  there  are  then  I  don’t  want  to  be
committed to thinking of those cases as determining cases. The way I understand the ‘in virtue of’
relation is such that the following inference is valid: <A holds in virtue of B>; therefore, <B is
metaphysically prior to A>. This won’t hold, I take it, if there are true non-metaphysical instances of
‘in virtue of’.
It is important to note that the metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ cannot be identified with relations of
metaphysical priority or posteriority. To return to the mereological case, it is intuitive to think that
the parts are metaphysically prior to the whole, such that for any P that is a part of a whole W, P is
metaphysically prior to W. Let’s assume our intuitions are right here. But it doesn’t follow that
3 See Raven 2015 for an overview.
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every aspect of the whole holds in virtue of every part. Suppose the whole in question is a statue of
a soldier wielding a curved sword. All the parts of that statue are prior to the whole, but the parts of
that statue that are located in the feet are not those parts in virtue of which the sword is curved. It is
the parts of the statue located in the sword by virtue of which the sword is curved.
Of course, the metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ is an irreflexive and asymmetric relation. Nothing is
the case in virtue of itself, nor can A hold in virtue of B whilst B holds in virtue of A. This ensures
that the metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ avoids the problems afflicting the standard understanding of
determining as entailment. It also provides a satisfactory explanation for why it is that (libertarian)
foreknowledge theists  and those who believe that  there are  determinate future truths about  our
actions  do  not  consider  themselves  determinists:  it  is  because  in  neither  case  is  God’s
foreknowledge or truths about the future that in virtue of which the future action will occur. They
might entail it, but they aren’t what will bring about your future action.
The  metaphysical  ‘in  virtue  of’  therefore  appears  the  best  candidate  for  identifying  the
determining relation in determinism. When I use the term ‘determining’, it should be understood
hereon to refer to this metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ relation. So understood, I take the determining
relation to be irreflexive, asymmetric,  and transitive.  One should also note that the determining
relation  should  be  taken  to  entail  entailment.  In  other  words,  that  it  is  not  possible  for  A to
determine B without it being the case that A entails B. Although the determining relation can’t be
identified with entailment, it does imply entailment.
We are familiar, therefore, with what it is for one fact to determine another fact. That, I hope, is
clear from the foregoing illustrations and explication. Thus armed, we can now amend ND2 in order
to get a better understanding of nomological determinism:
(ND4) A world, wx, is nomologically deterministic iff for any time tx in wx, tx is such that the set
of facts that includes (i) all facts in  wx that hold at  tx, and (ii) the laws of nature at  wx (strictly
redundant given (i)), determines the state of wx at any time ty later than tx.
This evidently raises concerns about free will and moral responsibility, for any decision we perform
will be at a time, and, if ND4 is true of our world, then our decisions, and every aspect of our
decision-making processes, will be fully determined by prior facts in our universe’s history.
1.4 Stating Theological Determinism
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All well and good. But how, then, are we to define theological determinism? Here is one way:
(TD1) The set of all divine facts determines the set of all non-divine facts.
Divine facts are simply facts that make reference to, or somehow involve, God. The set of all divine
facts would include God exemplifying his properties and God’s actions. It would include God’s
foreknowledge. Even something like ‘God’s being pleased that Jones decided to ϕ at  tx’ can be
included. Although it entails that Jones decides to ϕ, it doesn’t determine that fact. However, there
will be some other fact (or set of facts) about God that do, if the theological determinist is right.
There  are  some  problems  with  TD1,  however.  The  big  one  concerns  abstract  objects.  The
relation of God to abstract objects is a matter of some dispute among theists.4 Abstract objects are
often held to be necessarily existent, immaterial, non-spatial entities. In this category lie things like
numbers, properties, moral values, and sets (though sets are, when they hold contingently existing
members, contingently existent). Some philosophers will insist that God determines even the nature
and existence of abstract objects (indeed, I fancy myself amongst that number); others (such as
Craig (2016)), seeking to preserve divine sovereignty, will conclude that abstract objects aren’t as
real as we think they are; but some will say the realm of abstracta includes necessarily existing
entities that God had no hand in creating or affecting. van Inwagen (2009) is such a one.
We  should  try  to  accommodate  views  such  as  van  Inwagen’s.  But  TD1 does  not  do  that.
Necessarily existing abstract objects are non-divine, but God does and cannot determine either their
existence or their nature, on van Inwagen’s view. It is a bad consequence that anyone taking van
Inwagen’s view is ipso facto precluded from being a theological determinist. We can get around this
by amending TD1:
(TD2) The set of all divine facts determines the set of all non-divine concrete facts.
Concrete  entities  stand  opposed  to  abstract  entities.  Concrete  objects  are  particular,  causally
efficacious, and rooted in terra firma. God himself is therefore a concrete object. But we don’t want
everything about God to be determined (that would imply circularity), hence TD2’s restriction to
‘non-divine’ concrete facts.5
4 See the edited volume, Gould 2014.
5 TD2 still  leaves  open  the  question  of  God’s  relation  to  contingently existing abstract  objects,  such as  sets  of
contingent  things.  However,  I  think  that,  for  those  who  follow van  Inwagen’s  view,  God  can  only  partially
determine the existence of such objects: God will determine the existence of the contingent concrete objects which
are members of these sets, but the necessary metaphysical law that generates the existence of these sets from the
existence of the member or members is something that God could not have brought about, nor have any control
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Some distinctions  between  types  of  theological  determinism remain  to  be  drawn,  however.
Consider what we might call ‘absolute determinism’:
(AD) For every fact, there is a fact that determines that fact.
Given  how  we  defined  ‘determining’,  AD  would  issue  in  an  infinite  regress.  That  is  surely
problematic,  and  a  good  reason  to  reject  AD.  There  must  be  some  fact  or  facts  that  are
undetermined,  therefore.  The  naturalist,  with  his  nomological  determinism,  would  take  the
undetermined facts to be the existence and state of the universe at the first moment in time (and the
laws of nature, if such laws are not determined by the initial state of the universe). The theist, on the
other hand, with his theological determinism, will naturally take the undetermined fact or facts to be
something concerned with God—at the very least, God’s existence.
There will therefore be different varieties of theological determinism that will take different
aspects of God to be undetermined. How determined does the theological determinist want the set
of divine facts to be? A very strong variety of TD would run as follows:
(TD3) God’s existence determines every concrete fact.
This view claims that the mere existence of the divine nature is sufficient to determine every other
(concrete) fact,  including facts about what God decides to do. Those who take this view would
likely say there is only one undetermined fact: God’s being there. Everything else that happens is
just the necessary, inevitable outworking of the divine nature. The striking commitment of this view
is this: that God’s free decisions are also determined—determined by his nature. Some theists might
take issue with that commitment. Some theological determinists might think that in order for God’s
action’s to be free in the way that divine perfection requires, it must be that they are undetermined. I
think such theological determinists should weaken TD3 to
(TD4) The set of God’s decisions determines every non-divine concrete fact.
This is sufficient to have the whole history of the world, with all the human acts contained therein,
from the noblest to the most wretched, determined by God’s decree, all the while leaving it open
whether or not God’s own free choices are determined.
over, on van Inwagen’s view.
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I am more sympathetic to TD3 than merely TD4, but my defence of theological determinism here
shall be, for the most part, equally applicable to either variety. TD2 is the umbrella view that covers
both.
1.5 Other Issues
One other  important  relation  I  believe  one  should  be attentive  to  is  what  I  shall  call  ‘fixing’.
Suppose you have a situation where some fact F1 is metaphysically prior to another fact F2, and F1’s
being the case entails that F2 will be the case, but F1 does not determine (even partially determine)
F2. In such cases, we can say that F1 fixes F2. This issue is arguably of importance in the freedom
and foreknowledge debate.6 God’s foreknowledge of a future free action of  mine  entails that  I
perform that action, but does not determine it. Moreover, it is metaphysically prior to my act, or at
least it appears to be so (doesn’t the present come before the future, not merely temporally, but in
order  of  explanation?).  God’s  foreknowledge  therefore  fixes  my  future  choice.  One  pertinent
question is whether rejecting that God determines my free decisions is enough to preserve free will
when  it  remains  the  case  that  my  free  decisions  are  fixed.  This  is  a  question  libertarian
foreknowledge theists must answer.
We must also remember that theological determinism is a claim distinct from necessitarianism.
We can define necessitarianism as follows:
(N) For any fact that is the case, that fact is the case necessarily.
TD3 looks like it entails N. God’s existence, even if not determined, obtains necessarily, in the view
of most theists. God, as the greatest possible being, cannot merely exist contingently, by mere good
fortune  as  it  were.  But  God’s  existence  determines  everything  else  given  TD3,  and  if  God
necessarily exists and that existence determines everything else (including truths about what that
existence determines), then it looks like everything else will hold necessarily as well. TD4, on the
other hand, is not committed to N. It leaves open the possibility of divine properties that do not hold
of necessity. In particular, the chief attraction of this view is, as one might expect, that it permits the
theological determinist to hold that God’s decisions do not hold of necessity. And, if God’s decision,
6 Indeed, the term ‘fixing’ was one inspired by discussions of this very issue, which often involve reference to the
‘fixity of the past’. See Fischer and Todd 2015 for an overview.
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say, to create the world, holds contingently, then the world will also have its existence contingently,
not necessarily. This might be thought a claim desirable to secure.
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Chapter 2—The Free-Will Debate
2.1 Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
Thus  armed  with  sensible  understandings  of  determinism,  both  nomological  and  theological,  I
proceed to central issues of dispute in the debate over ‘free will and determinism’ or, to use the
traditional terminology, ‘liberty and necessity’ (van Inwagen, 1999: 341).
These  are  the  central  terms  that  need  defining:  ‘compatibilism’,  ‘incompatibilism’,
‘libertarianism’, and ‘hard determinism’, although I will suggest revision to the terminology.
Compatibilism and incompatibilism are modal theses. We can define them as follows:
Compatibilism =df  it  is  possible  that  an  agent  makes  a  decision,  that  every  aspect  of  that
decision-making process is determined, and that the agent is non-derivatively morally responsible
for that decision.
Incompatibilism =df it is not possible that an agent makes a decision, that every aspect of that
decision-making process is determined, and that the agent is non-derivatively morally responsible
for that decision.
Here follow some points of clarification: 
2.2 Point of Clarification (i):  The Sort of Possibility at Issue
The sort of possibility referred to is metaphysical or broadly logical possibility. This is the sort of
possibility that is considered as lying in between mere logical possibility (what the laws of logic
permit) on the one hand and nomological possibility (what the laws of nature permit) on the other.7
A state of affairs that is logically possible but broadly logically impossible would be something like
a ball’s being red at every point and green at every point. We can see that it is something that cannot
happen, but we also see that the impossibility of its happening isn’t grounded in the laws of logic
(<‘red all over’(a) & ‘green all over’(a)> is not a logical contradiction), and neither is it grounded in
7 Cf. Plantinga: compare ‘David’s having travelled faster than the speed of light and Paul’s having squared the circle.
The former of these last two items is causally or naturally impossible; the latter is impossible in that broadly logical
sense.’ (1974: 44).
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the laws of nature (they don’t seem to cover matters this fundamental). Consider that even if the
laws of nature were different, it still wouldn’t be possible for a ball to be red at every point and
green at every point. The source of the impossibility of such a thing is therefore best described as
being found in the ‘laws of metaphysics’. Hence, metaphysical possibility.
2.3  Point  of  Clarification  (ii):  Derivative  and  Non-derivative  Moral
Responsibility
The distinction between non-derivative and derivative responsibility  can be understood through
illustration. Suppose I decide to get recklessly drunk. In such an inebriated state, I might make
many unfortunate decisions. Suppose I decide to vandalise someone’s property. It would do no good
to plead before the magistrate that  I  cannot  be blamed for defacing the poor fellow’s property
because such actions were performed ‘under the influence’—while I didn’t have full control of my
faculties. It will be responded that I was quite myself when I decided to get drunk in the first place,
and I can thereby be held responsible for any mischief I decide to engage in as a result of the
drunkenness I knowingly decided to inaugurate. I am therefore derivatively morally responsible for
vandalising the gentlemen’s house, and non-derivatively responsible for deciding to get drunk. My
responsibility  for  the  act  of  vandalising  is  somehow  parasitic  upon—derived  from—my
responsibility for getting drunk initially. Clearly, it is non-derivative moral responsibility that the
free-will debate is chiefly concerned with.
2.4 Point of Clarification (iii): The Nature of Decision
An explication of what it is to decide is not demanded by the definition, but is helpful regardless. I
take a decision to be the forming of an intention. This understanding is standard. McCann states
contemporary orthodoxy on the matter: ‘Unlike intending, which is a state, deciding is an event. It
is the mental act by which, in cases of fully deliberate action, reasons and intention are linked.
Decisions are acts of intention formation, and so terminate in states of intending.’ (1998: 133). It is
also  of  note  that  it  is  intention  formation that  is  understood to  comprise  decision-making.  For
forming an intention is different from acquiring an intention. To form an intention requires some
sort of active contribution from the agent. To acquire an intention is simply to have it obtain in one’s
mind. One naturally associates acquiring an intention with passivity, though such passivity is not
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essential to the idea. After all, by forming an intention one thereby acquires one. The converse is
false, however. In brief, forming an intention is actional; acquiring one is not. See Mele (2017: 9–8)
for discussion. Mention of agential contributions brings me to my next point.
2.5 Point of Clarification (iv): Agent Causation
I phrased the above definitions using the expression ‘every aspect of the decision-making process’.
This was done deliberately, because there is debate amongst incompatibilists about where exactly to
the  indeterminacy  has  to  go  to  get  morally  responsible  decision-making.  If  I  had  said  that
compatibilism was the view that it is possible for an agent’s decisions to be determined yet for that
agent to be non-derivatively morally responsible for them, then most incompatibilists would have
agreed.  That  is  because  most  incompatibilists  think  that  morally  responsible  decision-making
requires  ‘agent  causation’.  Agent  causation  is  a  species  of  substance  causation,  and  substance
causation  is  typically  placed  in  opposition  to  event  causation.  In  brief,  substances  are  the
independent bearers of properties, and events are the exemplifications of a property at a time. Agent
causalists hold that it is an inadequate account of what it is for an agent to decide to do something to
make it a matter entirely of events. Suppose an agent’s deciding were a matter of event causation.
What would the event be that caused the instantiation of the intention in the agent? It would be
some  psychological  property  or  state.  A certain  set  of  beliefs  or  desires,  perhaps.  Or  maybe,
fundamentally, some sort of neurological property, such as an oscillation in brain waves or what
have you. Agent causalists don’t like this sort of picture; they like to complain of ‘the disappearance
of  the  agent’  (Pereboom  2014:  32).  If  all  that  happens  when  an  agent  decides  is  that  one
psychological event causes another, then it seems like the agent has vanished. Surely it isn’t the case
(in morally responsible decision-making) that psychological processes cause my decisions; surely it
is I, it must be me, that causes the intentions to form. And I am not an event. I am a substance. A
simple argument of the form
(1) Non-derivative morally responsible decision-making requires the agent to form the intention
in question.
(2) Event causalists hold that everything causally relevant to the formation of intentions can be
understood in terms of events.
(3) If everything causally relevant to the formation of intentions can be understood in terms of
events, then the agent isn’t forming an intention.
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(4)  Therefore,  event  causalism  is  incompatible  with  non-derivative  morally  responsible
decision-making.
can be held to capture the basic thought.8 Agent causalists believe that the agent qua agent must
be  responsible  for  the  decision,  and  this  requires  him  to  cause  as  a  substance—occurrent
instantiations of properties aren’t enough.
I am broadly sympathetic, and am inclined to hold to agent causation both as a matter of fact
and as necessary for morally responsible decision-making. But I am not concerned to settle the issue
as  part  of  this  thesis.  One  can  be  a  theological  determinist  and  either  accept  or  reject  agent
causation9—it is a dispute orthogonal to the one I am engaged in. The point to be noted here is just
this: that agent causalists hold morally responsible decisions to be caused—caused by the agent. If
the agent causalist is an incompatibilist, then he will say that indeterminacy is required. But he will
typically say that the indeterminacy must consist of this: that the agent’s causing of the decision is
undetermined.  The  agent  must  act  as  an  undetermined  determiner,  a  first  mover,  and  the
indeterminacy is  thereby placed at  the beginning of the process of decision-making, not in the
middle.10 The  compatibilist  agent-causalist,  however,  will  hold  that  the  agent’s  causing  of  the
decision can be determined and this is no threat, in itself, to moral responsibility for the decision
made, and in that way my definitions of compatibilism and incompatibilism accommodate agent-
causal compatibilists and agent-causal incompatibilists.
2.6 Point of Clarification (v): The Nature of Moral Responsibility
I also use the expression ‘moral responsibility’. What is that? We speak of morally responsible
agents, and speak of people being morally responsible for certain actions or events. Of these two, I
think  we should take  the  latter  as  the  more  fundamental  notion.  Once we have  what  it  is  for
someone  to  be  morally  responsible  for  some  piece  of  behaviour,  we  can  define  a  morally
responsible person as ‘someone able, by and large, to engage in morally responsible behaviour’. So
what is it to be morally responsible for a piece of behaviour? Fischer and Ravizza have a good
description of the phenomenon in question:
8 For an argument of this nature, see Franklin (2016: 1120–1121).
9 See Sehon 2016 for a defence of agent causation that doesn’t require indeterminism.
10 Not  every  incompatibilist  is  happy  with  indeterminacy  exclusively  at  the  start  of  the  process.  Goetz  (2008)
complains loudly that is one’s  decisions that must be uncaused; it is no good at all if they are determined, even
determined by the agent himself.
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When we accept  that  someone is  a moral  agent,  this  […] entails  a  willingness  to  adopt  certain
attitudes toward that person and to behave toward him in certain kinds of ways. (1998: 1)
What sort of ways?
When we regard someone as a responsible agent, we react to the person with a unique set of feelings
and attitudes – for example, gratitude, indignation, resentment, love, respect, and forgiveness. (1998:
5)
Strawson calls such attitudes the reactive attitudes. They seem to be attitudes that it is only ever
appropriate to direct towards persons, and in cases of attitudes like gratitude and indignation, only
ever appropriate to direct toward somebody on account of a particular piece of behaviour from
them. But such behaviour must issue in a morally responsible fashion. Strawson gives the following
illustration:
If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute
than if he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish to injure
me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind and degree of resentment that I shall not feel
in the first. (1993 [1962]: 49)
That is because someone who steps on your hand accidentally while trying to help you has his
moral responsibility for the act considerably diminished. He did not know, nor have any expectation
(we can suppose) that his action would hurt you. To be sure, there is a sense in which they remain
morally responsible: we are accountable to someone for unintentionally causing them pain—we
might  owe  them  some  remuneration,  say—but  the  point  remains  that  diminished  moral
responsibility  (‘It  wasn’t  really  his  fault!’)  leads  to  diminished  indignation,  that  is  to  say,  a
diminishing of the relevant reactive attitudes.
The  sort  of  reactive  attitudes  that  are  central  to  moral  responsibility  are  arguably
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To praise someone for what they have done and to blame
someone for what they have done are the two central activities that moral responsibility centres
around. When I talk of moral responsibility, these are the reactive attitudes that should be brought to
the reader’s mind. One might, if one wishes, replace ‘non-derivatively morally responsible for that
decision’ in  the  definitions  given,  with  ‘non-derivatively  praiseworthy or  blameworthy for  that
decision’.
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There  is  also  the  phenomenon  of  being  obliged,  or  obligated.  The  language  of  duty  is  an
important part of our moral discourse. We speak of what one ‘ought’ to do. But I don’t intend to
include obligation or being obligated under the rubric of moral responsibility. This is because one
can arguably  obtain  without  the  other.  Suppose  I  promise  to  meet  a  friend at  noon.  However,
someone poisons my morning coffee and I am rendered comatose until 1 o’clock. I was not morally
responsible for missing my appointment with my friend. I could not be blamed for it. But I was
arguably still under an obligation to meet my friend at noon, even when I was in a coma at 11:59. It
is strange to say that the obligation vanishes when I become comatose, though one might say it. The
more natural thing to say, it seems to me, is that I failed in my duty, but that I was not blameworthy
for  this  failure.  The unfortunate  catatonia  removes my responsibility  for  my failure  in  duty,  it
doesn’t remove the duty. For that reason, I think that obligation, and the conditions necessary and
sufficient for that phenomenon, should be treated differently from the conditions necessary and
sufficient for moral responsibility.
There are typically two conditions which are suggested as necessary for moral responsibility for
some piece  of  behaviour  (Rudy-Hiller,  2018):  (a)  the  epistemic  condition,  and (b)  the  control
condition. Absence of either diminishes (if not removes) responsibility for the behaviour.
We can understand the need for an epistemic condition by considering a certain type of excuse
that we use to respond to accusations of fault. If someone unintentionally treads on Strawson’s hand
and Strawson becomes indignant at this, then it is natural for the accused party to reply ‘But I didn’t
expect that to happen’. Likewise, if I unwittingly run over my neighbour’s cat, then I would be
likely to deal with my neighbour’s distraught accusations by replying ‘But I didn’t see it’. In both
cases,  the impression  of  blameworthiness  is  sought  to  be undermined by a  claim to a  lack  of
knowledge.  Since this strategy is acknowledged as acceptable in principle—no one responds by
saying, ‘I don’t care that you didn’t know. You are still just as blameworthy’—, this acceptation
pushes us towards positing an epistemic condition on moral responsibility. One must be, in some
sense, aware of what one is doing to be responsible for what one does.
Next there is the control condition. It is over this condition that the free-will debate takes place.
In order to be responsible for one’s actions—in order to do them freely—one must have control
over  one’s  actions.  Or  so  the  thought  goes.  I  think  that  the  control  condition  is  really  better
understood as a cluster of putative conditions. The language we use here is very varied. We speak of
our actions being performed ‘freely’ or ‘not freely’; of being ‘able’ to do something, and ‘unable’ to
do it; of our choices being ‘up to us’, and their not being ‘up to us’; of being ‘in control’ of our
actions, and our actions being ‘out of our control’.
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However, I think that many of these can come apart. I am not alone in thinking this. John Martin
Fischer (2010), for instance, thinks that ‘able’-talk isn’t strictly relevant to moral responsibility. It is
natural to think there is an ‘able’ condition on moral responsibility because we use inability to
defeat blame. We say things like ‘But I wasn’t able to do anything about it!’ in order to justify
ourselves, which practice apparently presupposes that ability is necessary for moral responsibility.
But Fischer thinks that what we are really interested in when we use such expressions is whether or
not we have the right control over the relevant behaviour. Fischer therefore dismisses ‘able’-talk in
favour of ‘control’-talk and goes on to identify the free-will dispute as being over what sort of
control is required for moral responsibility. ‘Is it a control that requires the falsity of determinism,
or is it not?’ (And Fischer says it is not.) We will return to Fischer’s position in ch. 4.
It isn’t my intention to sort through all our variegated moral-responsibility-talk, neither do I
wish to offer a comprehensive account of the nature of moral responsibility. I will only comment on
the relevant species of talk if it is brought up as a plank in an argument that moral responsibility is
incompatible with determinism, or if it is otherwise germane to do so. As it turns out, there is an
important  species  of  argument  that  circles  around  ability  ascriptions  and  a  supposed  tension
between such ascriptions and determinism. Again, that matter will be covered in ch. 4.
2.7 Libertarianism and Hard Determinism
With  an  understanding  of  compatibilism  and  incompatibilism,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to
understand libertarianism and what is called ‘hard determinism’.
Libertarianism =df Incompatibilism is true, and human beings are (in typical cases) morally
responsible for their decision-making.
Hard  Determinism  =df  Incompatibilism  is  true,  and  every  aspect  of  our  decision-making
processes is determined.
Unlike  the  incompatibilism-compatibilism  distinction,  this  distinction  is  not  a  modal  one.  The
former distinction was about what is compossible with what. But this latter distinction is about what
is actually the case. Is determinism actually true or not? Are we actually morally responsible or not?
The  ‘in  typical  cases’ qualification  present  in  libertarianism  indicates  that,  of  course,  the
libertarian  does  not  think  that  every  piece  of  decision-making  we make is  made in  a  morally
responsible  fashion.  The libertarian  is  not  committed  to  thinking the  decisions  we make when
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sleeping or under compulsion are morally responsible decisions. Nothing revisionary is intended;
there are everyday situations in which we are inclined to hold people responsible for their decisions
and  situations  where  we are  not;  the  libertarian  takes  us  to  be  indeed  typically  responsible  in
situations of the former sort, and adds that such responsibility is incompatible with every aspect of
the decision-making process being determined.
Hard determinism gets its ‘hardness’ from its denial that human beings are morally responsible
creatures.  Unlike  libertarians,  hard  determinists  are  therefore  committed  to  a  revisionary
understanding  of  when  human  beings  are  responsible  for  what  we  do.  The  common-sense
understanding  is  that  human  beings  are  frequently  responsible  for  their  behaviour;  the  hard
determinist understanding is that they never are! Hard determinism is often associated with Derk
Pereboom (2001). The hard determinist typically comes to his counterintuitive position because he
is persuaded on the one hand by the arguments for incompatibilism, but is not persuaded on the
other hand that indeterminism is present in our decision-making. Or at least  not persuaded that
whatever indeterminism is present in the decision-making process is present at the right point. This
latter possibility suggests an improved understanding of hard determinism:
Hard  Determinism* =df  Incompatibilism is  true,  and those  aspects  of  our  decision-making
processes by virtue of which we would be morally responsible are determined.
2.8 Revision to the Terminology
I mentioned that I would revise the terminology. This is because ‘hard determinism’ doesn’t quite
match up to the debate. We can leave it as we have defined it, but I move it should be replaced with
‘hard incompatibilism’ when it comes to the initial statement of the various views. The two most
important questions at issue in partitioning off the various positions one can take in the free-will
debate are these: (I) Are we morally responsible for our decisions? (II) Does moral responsibility
(MR) for decisions require indeterminism? A typical tabulation of the responses looks like this:
MR requires indeterminism MR does not require indeterminism
We are morally responsible Libertarianism Compatibilism
We are not morally responsible Hard Determinism ???
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But ‘Hard Determinism’ is not suited to occupy the box in which it is placed. For one thing, the
conjunction of the claims <moral responsibility requires indeterminism> and <we are not morally
responsible>  are  perfectly  consistent  with  the  features  of  our  situation  that  rule  out  our  moral
responsibility  having nothing  to  do  with  determinism.  Perhaps  we are  not  morally  responsible
because we never satisfy the epistemic condition.
For another thing, the term ‘Hard Determinism’ could apply equally well to the bottom-right
box. The conjunction of <moral responsibility does not require indeterminism> and <we are not
morally responsible> can obtain just as well there too. Indeed, those who hold to such a position are
probably  likely  to  be  determinist-friendly,  simply  because  they  think  moral  responsibility  is
compatible with it. One suspects that, while granting determinism, or being inclined to, they will
rule out moral responsibility on other grounds that have nothing to do with determinism.
In short, the problem in both cases is that the ‘determinism’ in ‘hard determinism’ isn’t really
doing any work as far as that table goes. If we want an answer to fit in that square (and that would
be a helpful thing to want), then some revision is necessary. I propose the following:
MR requires indeterminism MR does not require indeterminism
We are morally responsible Libertarianism [Soft] Compatibilism
We are not morally responsible Hard Incompatibilism Hard Compatibilism
Replacing ‘Hard Determinism’ with ‘Hard Incompatibilism’ solves the issue.11 The occupant of that
box  is  indisputably  incompatibilist,  because  he  holds  that  moral  responsibility  requires
indeterminism,  and  he  is  indisputably  hard,  because  he  denies  human  beings  are  morally
responsible.  Nothing  is  said  about  the  grounds  for  our  non-responsibility.  Likewise  for  ‘Hard
Compatibilism’.
At any rate, such are the terms, and that is what I take each of them to mean. There remain two
issues  with the  revised table  of  views.  First,  there is  no commitment  to  the  truth or  falsity  of
determinism (save in the case of libertarianism). I grant that, but I believe that must be considered,
strictly, a separate issue. Secondly, the term ‘Compatibilism’ is most accurately used when used as I
have defined it at the initial stage in this chapter, as the simple compatibility of moral responsibility
with determinism. But it is often used more loosely than that because of the requirement to have a
view to contrast with libertarianism. ‘Compatibilism’ so employed is taken as the conjunction of
11 Pereboom has already deployed the expression ‘hard incompatibilism’, and he takes it to be the claim that human
beings are not responsible regardless of whether or not determinism is true (incompatibility on both fronts) (2001:
xix). But he acknowledges that his use is revisionary (2001: 127), and I so I don’t feel much pressure to follow him
on this point, and I find his suggested meaning too misleading in any case. I think a better term for his view would
be ‘double incompatibilism’, for he thinks moral responsibility is incompatible twice over: with determinism and
with indeterminism.
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compatibilism and the belief that human beings are morally responsible. Such a position is of course
something  more  than  mere  compatibilism,  however.  The  best  term  for  it,  on  account  of  its
affirmation of man’s moral responsibility, must be ‘Soft Compatibilism’. However, it is difficult to
go against the grain, and my language will suffer some imprecision of usage. I will sometimes write
‘compatibilism’ and mean by that ‘soft compatibilism’. That is why I placed the ‘Soft’ in square
brackets. The reader will have to judge from the context which expression is meant.
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Chapter 3—The Free-Will Debate and Reformed Theology
3.1 Introduction
So much for the terms and the philosophical debate about free will. But I am not concerned merely
to deal with these doctrines in the abstract and to study their various entailments or implications. I
want the issue to be historically concretised. In particular, I want to tie the issue to a debate that has
continued  for  centuries  in  Protestant  Christianity  (especially  in  evangelical  circles):  the  debate
between Calvinists and Arminians.
On the usual understanding, Calvinists  are theological determinists  (and soft compatibilists),
and Arminians are libertarians. Here is John Anderson on the first point:
It  should  be  conceded  at  the  outset,  and  without  any  embarrassment,  that  Calvinism is  indeed
committed to divine determinism: the view that everything is ultimately determined by God. I will
not argue this point—it can be amply documented from representative Calvinist sources—but will
simply take it for granted as something on which the vast majority of Calvinists and their critics
agree. (2016: 204)
Though  whether,  historically,  Calvinism  has  indeed  been  deterministic  has  been  recently
challenged. The volume  Reformed Thought on Freedom, edited by van Asselt, Bac, and te Velde
(2010), challenges the idea, as does Fesko (2014). I side very much with Anderson on this point,
and in this chapter I shall argue from a historical survey of representative sources of Reformed
thought that the Reformed tradition is a deterministic tradition. I shall begin at the dawn of the
Reformation,  with  Martin  Luther’s  Bondage  of  the  Will,  his  response  to  Desiderius  Erasmus’s
Diatribe,  and I  try  to  cover  all  salient  developments  up to  the  Westminster  Confession, finally
concluding with John Wesley’s and William Channing’s fierce attacks against Calvinism.
3.2 The Luther-Erasmus Exchange
Martin Luther (1483–1546) was born in Germany of humble stock, yet in 1512 was awarded a
doctorate in theology, and received a chair in theology at the University of Wittenberg. His refusal
30
to bow to the authority of the papacy over the matter of indulgences led to his excommunication
from the  Catholic  church  in  1521,  and thus  began the  Reformation.  Once Luther  had  become
established as one of the leaders of the Reformation, he became embroiled in various controversies.
But the great controversy of relevance to my purposes is that which he had with Erasmus over the
freedom  of  the  will.  Desiderius  Erasmus  (c.  1469–1536)  was  a  famous  Renaissance  scholar,
humanist,  and wit.  In 1516 he published his  Greek New Testament,  and thereby made no small
contribution to the process of Reformation. But he refused to join with the Reformers. He took issue
with much of what Luther said and how he said it. Among other things, he was not prepared to
accede to Luther’s proclamations about the impotence of the human will.
The work that kicked off the dispute with Erasmus was Luther’s Assertio written (and published
in its final, german version in March 1521) in response to a bull of admonition by the Pope, and in
the thirty-sixth article of that Assertio, Luther penned the following:
Since the fall of Adam, or after actual sin, free will exists only in name, and when it does what it can,
it commits mortal sin. This article ought to be clear enough from those that precede because St Paul
says, in Romans 14:23, “Everything that is not of faith is sin.”
Though the earlier, Latin version of the Assertio from December 1520 contains stronger remarks:
I was wrong in saying that free choice before grace is a reality only in name. I should have said
simply: “free choice is in reality a fiction, or a name without reality.” For no one has it in his own
power to think a good or bad thought, but everything (as Wyclif’s article condemned at Constance
rightly teaches) happens by absolute necessity.12
It was this earlier Latin version that Erasmus read and engaged with. He published his Diatribe on
Free Will in 1524, intending to check Luther’s intemperate remarks about free will with something
more reasonable. Erasmus defines free will as
[A] power of the human will by which a man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal
salvation, or turn away from them. (1969 [1524]: 47)
And his overall position is that though man’s will is, in man’s fallen state, a feeble thing, yet it has
its own contribution to make to man’s salvation. He writes,
12 As quoted by Marlow and Drewery in Erasmus (1969 [1524]: 13).
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Nor in the meanwhile does our will achieve nothing, although it does not attain the things that it
seeks without the help of grace. But since our own efforts are so puny, the whole is ascribed to God,
just as a sailor who has brought his ship safely into port out of a heavy storm does not say: “I saved
the ship” but “God saved it.” And yet his skill and labour were not entirely entirely useless. ( 1969
[1524]: 79)
And he objects to Luther’s view as follows. Speaking of Paul’s vigorous language in the epistles, he
writes,
It  seems to me difficult  to associate the  words “contest,” “crown,” “righteous judge,”  “giving,”
“fighting,” when all  things happen from mere necessity with our will  doing nothing, but merely
passive. (1969 [1524]: 62)
And
What is the point of praising obedience if in doing good or evil works we are the kind of instrument
for God that an ax is to a carpenter? But such a tool are we all if Wyclif is right. All things before and
after grace, good equally with ill, yes even things indifferent, are done by sheer necessity.  (1969
[1524]: 63–64)
It was therefore Luther’s appeal to a doctrine of absolute necessity that Erasmus zoned in on, and I
suspect that Luther modified that part of Assertio because he felt it wasn’t quite to the point. Further
down in the thirty-sixth article Luther says this:
Again, Moses says in Genesis 6:3 and Genesis 8:21, “Everything that the heart of man thinks and
desires is only evil at all times.” Hearken to that, dear papists; Moses opens his mouth against you,
what will you say in reply? If there is a good thought or will in men at any time, then we must accuse
Moses of lying, for he calls all the times, all the thoughts, all the desires of the human heart evil.
What kind of freedom is it that is inclined only to evil?
This makes it plain that Luther was grounding the supposed non-existence of free choice in the
great wickedness of man’s heart. The doctrine that God determines all that comes to pass (though
Luther appears to hold to it, judging by his endorsement of Wyclif) was not, at that point, what he
wanted to draw attention to. Luther’s central contention was that, after man’s fall the corruption of
man’s nature was so great that he is unable to will anything good. That is why Luther claims in the
32
1521  Assertio that  when a fallen human being,  such as  you or  I,  do the best we can,  morally
speaking, all we will end up committing are mortal sins.
He argues for this position at length in his  Bondage of the Will, published in 1525—his great
response to Erasmus’s Diatribe. The work continues to garner for itself great praise. Godwell Chan
says of it that ‘Luther’s work, a masterpiece, is irrefutable.’ (1996: 1) and Lee Gatiss opines that ‘If
modern evangelicals have lost Luther’s clarity and faithfulness to Scripture on this issue of free
will, we will have lost something very precious and foundational indeed.’ (2009: 203).
Luther writes in this acclaimed book that
‘free-will’ without God’s grace is not free at all, but is the permanent prisoner and bondslave of evil,
since it cannot turn itself to good. (1957 [1525]: 104)
and
we do everything of necessity, and nothing by ‘free-will’; for the power of ‘free-will’ is nil, and it
does no good, nor can do, without grace. (1957 [1525]: 105)
In such passages it looks like Luther reaffirms that our actions are necessitated, and that this is
grounded our evil, fallen nature. That’s why we don’t have ‘free will’. But he doesn't merely affirm
that the absence of free will follows from our wicked nature, however. He also at points reaffirms
the Wycliffian doctrine that all things happen of necessity, and this on account of the nature of God.
Luther writes against Erasmus,
For if you hesitate to believe, or are too proud to acknowledge, that God foreknows and wills all
things, not contingently, but necessarily and immutably, how can you believe, trust and rely on His
promises? (1957 [1525]: 83–84)
and
It  is,  then,  fundamentally necessary and wholesome for Christians to know that  God foreknows
nothing  contingently,  but  that  he  foresees,  purposes,  and  does  all  things  according  to  His  own
immutable, eternal and infallible will. This bombshell knocks ‘free-will’ flat, and utterly shatters it
(1957 [1525]: 80)
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This looks like a forthright statement of theological determinism: everything that occurs has been
determined, or ‘necessitated’, by the intentions and purposes of God. Luther therefore appears to
think there are two sources which are sufficient to demonstrate that there is no ‘free will’: (i) man’s
native depravity and (ii) the infallible decrees of God.
But later remarks Luther makes are in tension with the determining power of the second of the
those sources. In Luther’s Table Talk, we find him saying the following about ‘free will’:
I confess that mankind has a free will, but it is to milk kine, to build houses, etc., and no further; for
so long as a man is at ease and in safety, and is in no want, so long he thinks he has a free will, which
is able to do something; but when want and need appear, so that there is neither meat, drink, nor
money, where is then free will? It is utterly lost, and cannot stand when it comes to the pinch. (1857:
120)
But this appears to undermine his earlier claim that the decrees and plans of God were sufficient to
necessitate or determine everything. For God’s decrees extend no less to the milking of kine and the
building of houses than they do to the spiritually pleasing to God (Luther insisted above that ‘all
things’ happen according to God’s immutable will). How, then, can man be free even to milk kine?
He will milk kine because God has decreed that he will milk kine. Therefore, according to the logic
Luther presented before against Erasmus, man will not be free in his milking of kine.
Luther  here appears  to  be  drawing a distinction between spiritual  matters  and non-spiritual
matters. Man has free will in the latter case (milking kine, etc.), it appears, but not in the former
(trusting in Christ, etc.). That Luther has in mind such a distinction is borne out by other remarks in
his Table Talk:
This is my absolute opinion: he that will maintain that man’s free will is able to do or work anything
in spiritual  cases,  be  they  never  so small,  denies  Christ.  This  I  have  always maintained  in  my
writings, especially in those against Erasmus, one of the learnedest men in the whole world (1857:
119–120)
From such remarks one again gets the impression that Luther would be happy to grant man free will
in  non-spiritual  cases—only  to  hold  to  free  will  in  spiritual  matters  involves  one  in  grave
theological error.
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3.3 Soteriological Calvinism and Deterministic Calvinism
The Augsburg Confession of 1530, drawn up by Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), and approved
of  by  Luther,  captures  the  convictions  of  the  early  Lutheran  church,  and  it  too  stresses  the
importance of the distinction between spiritual and non-spiritual matters vis-à-vis free will. Here is
content from Article 18, ‘Of Free Will’:
Concerning free will, they [the Lutherans] teach that man's will hath some liberty to work a civil
righteousness, and to choose such things as reason can reach unto; but that it hath no power to work
the righteousness of God, or a spiritual righteousness, without the Spirit of God; because that the
natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii. 14). But this is wrought in the
heart when men do receive the Spirit of God through the Word. (Schaff, 1977: 18)
We are therefore left with two distinct suggestions about what it is that cancels out human free will:
it is either (i) man’s wicked fallen nature, which determines him to refrain (at least) from choosing
the spiritually good, or (ii) God’s decrees, will, and foreknowledge, which determines every event
in  history,  including  every  action  of  man.  They  both  appear  to  be  sources  that  determine  or
necessitate human action, and thereby rule out libertarian free will. But by the time of the Augsburg
Confession, it appears that the emphasis was given to (i) over (ii).
This distinction between human action being necessitated by bondage to sin or by being the
effect  of divine decree has  led to two sorts  of  Calvinism being discussed.  Daniel  Johnson has
accordingly  distinguished  between  what  he  calls  ‘Calvinist  soteriology’  and  ‘Calvinist
determinism’.  Calvinist  soteriology is  the claim that ‘fallen man is  unable to turn to God with
saving faith, because man is unwilling to turn to God (and is therefore responsible for his rebellion).
Every believer is infallibly brought to faith, sustained in faith, and sanctified by the omnipotent
power of the Holy Spirit.’ (2016: 20), and Calvinist determinism being the claim that ‘God is in
control of everything, and has from eternity ordained ordained all that has come to pass and will
come to pass. At the same time, human beings are genuine agents and are responsible for their
actions.’ (2016: 21).
He is not the only one to draw this distinction. William Cunningham has written about what he
terms the  philosophical doctrine of  necessity  and compared it  to  what  he calls  the  theological
doctrine of necessity. The philosophical doctrine of necessity is effectively theological determinism,
and the theological doctrine consists of the affirmation that
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The necessity, or servitude, or bondage, which [the early Reformed] ascribed to the will of fallen
man, consisted in the loss of the liberty [...], and in the actual prevailing tendency of his moral nature
to evil because of the depravity which had overspread it, so that he could no longer will good but
could only will  evil. The liberty which they thus ascribed to man in his original condition, they
regarded as entirely lost by the fall, and as having now no existence in men in their natural condition,
or until restored, in some measure, by divine agency in regeneration. (1862: 505)
Cunningham therefore laments the
injurious tendency and consequences of this assumed identity or necessary connection of the two
doctrines,—the  theological  and  philosophical.  It  tends  to  throw  into  the  background  the  true
scriptural, theological doctrine of necessity,—the doctrine of the servitude or bondage of the will of
fallen man,—man as he is,—to sin because of the depravity which has overspread his moral nature.
(1862: 514)
There is indeed an important difference between these two doctrines. But I intend to show here that
the  Reformed tradition,  as  exemplified  in  its  great  confessions  and the  theology of  its  leading
figures,  is  indeed  committed  to  more  than  merely  the  theological  doctrine  of  necessity;  it  is
committed to the philosophical doctrine of necessity, to the view that God’s decrees necessitate all
things, that is to say, to theological determinism.
3.4 Luther on the Ability Requirement for Moral Responsibility
But before we proceed  with that, we would do well to note how Luther responded to Erasmus’s
earlier complaint, ‘What is the point of praising obedience if in doing good or evil works … All
things before and after grace, good equally with ill, yes even things indifferent, are done by sheer
necessity[?]’ (63–64). It appears Erasmus believes that some sort of ability to do otherwise must be
present for the sort of praise and blame we associate with moral responsibility to obtain. Luther’s
response to this sort of objection to his position is very striking:
‘Who’ (you say) ‘will try and reform his life?’ I reply, Nobody! Nobody can! God has not time for
your practitioners  of self-reformation,  for  they are  hypocrites.  The elect,  who fear  God, will  be
reformed by the Holy Spirit; the rest will perish unreformed. […] 
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‘Who will believe’ (you say) ‘that God loves him?’ I reply, Nobody! Nobody can! But the elect shall
believe it; and the rest shall perish without believing it, raging and blaspheming, as you describe
them. (1957 [1525]: 99)
Luther wholeheartedly embraces the inability of man to do otherwise than he in fact does. But also
insists, on account of plain fact that Christian doctrine states man’s guilt for his unbelief, that man is
indeed responsible for not believing. This sort of objection to the Reformed position will occur
again and again. We will see it in Calvin’s dispute with Pighius and Georgius, and we will see it
from the pen of Wesley. For the most part, the later Reformed were not willing to fully endorse the
extremity of Luther’s rhetoric in this matter.
3.5 Calvin’s Doctrine of Predestination
The next great figure we encounter in Reformed history is John Calvin (1509–64). Calvin is famous
for his doctrines of predestination; in particular, his account of election and predestination. He did
not invent the terms, but the account he gave of them is widely considered, rightly or wrongly, the
distinctive feature of his thought. Calvin summarises matters in this way:
By  predestination  we  mean  the  eternal  decree  of  God  by  which  He  determined  with  Himself
whatever He wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but
some are preordained to eternal  life,  others to eternal  damnation. Accordingly,  as each has been
created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.
(Institutes 3.21.5)
We can see that Calvin’s convictions expressed here naturally comport well with the supposition
that  Calvin  was  of  a  theologically  deterministic  mindset.  The  opening  sentence  is  not  readily
squared with a libertarian perspective. If God has the power to determine whatsoever he wishes to
happen to any man, then God has the power to, one presumes, bring it about that a man should fall
into  sinful  patterns  of  behaviour,  or  that  a  man should perform a  great  and noble  act  of  self-
sacrifice. But how can God have such control over the morally responsible actions of his creatures
if  libertarianism  is  true?  He  cannot  cause  or  determine  their  decisions,  because,  on  the
incompatibilist assumptions of the libertarian, that would make them unfree—actions for which the
agent is not morally accountable. But if compatibilism is true, then it appears quite possible for God
to deterministically cause all of man’s actions yet for him to be accountable for them.
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Calvin also mentions that some are predestined to eternal life, and others to eternal damnation.
These are the decrees of election and reprobation, respectively. God elects an individual when he
decides, and brings it about, that that individual will meet the conditions for salvation, and therefore
enter into Heaven upon death. God reprobates an individual when he decides, and brings it about,
that that individual will fail to meet the conditions for salvation, and therefore enter into Hell upon
his death. 
What is striking about Calvin’s doctrine of election and reprobation is that he believes that both
are  unconditional.  He  denies,  firstly,  that  prescience  (that  is,  foreknowledge)  is  the  ground of
election or reprobation:
The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life and adjudges others to eternal
death, no man who would be thought pious ventures simply to deny; but it is greatly caviled at,
especially  by  those  who  make  prescience  its  cause.  We,  indeed,  ascribe  both  prescience  and
predestination to God; but we say that it  is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former.
(Institutes 3.21.5)
Election is not therefore based on what God foreknows about an individual. God does not peer
through the corridor of time, and, because he perceives that a person will be receptive to the gospel
in the future (or some possible future), decide to predestine that person to receive it. But, more than
that, election is not based on anything to do with the elected person at all. It based grounded simply
in  God’s  free  pleasure.  Here  is  more from Calvin  on the reasons why God decides  to  bestow
electing grace:
If you ask the reason[,] the apostle gives it, “For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will
have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion” (Rom 9:15). And what,
pray,  does  this  mean?  It  is  just  a  clear  declaration  by  the  Lord  that  He  finds  nothing  in  men
themselves  to  induce  Him to  show kindness,  that  it  is  owing entirely  to  His  own mercy,  and,
accordingly, that their salvation is His own work.  (Institutes 3.22.6)
Commenting on Ephesians 1:4–5, which reads as follows, 
According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy
and without blame before him in love: Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by
Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will (AV)
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Calvin comments on Paul’s  last  expression there,  ‘according to  the good pleasure of  his  will’,
giving it the following interpretation:
Then, if a higher cause is asked, Paul answers that God so “predestined,” and predestined “according
to the good pleasure of his will.” By these words he overturns all the grounds of election which men
imagine to exist in themselves. For he shows that whatever favours God bestows in reference to the
spiritual life, flow from this one fountain, because God chose whom He would and, before they were
born, had the grace which He designed to bestow upon them set apart for their use. (Institutes 3.22.2)
In Calvin’s mind, God’s decision to elect individuals to salvation is therefore is based on nothing in
the individuals themselves. No condition or feature they possess moves God to elect them instead of
his refraining from doing so. In that sense, election is unconditional.
One should bear in mind the distinction between election and salvation, however. Salvation is
that  conversion  from  death  to  life—from  alienation  from  God  to  union  with  him—of  which
Scripture speaks.  God’s  electing someone is  his  decision to  bring it  about  that  they are saved.
Salvation  can  therefore  be  conditional  even  though  election  is  unconditional:  God  simply
unconditionally decides that an individual will meet the conditions for salvation. And, indeed, in
Protestant theology, salvation is typically held to be conditional: faith in Christ being that condition.
Not merely is election unconditional in Calvin’s thought, however, so is reprobation.
At last, [Paul] concludes that God hath “mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he
hardeneth” (Rom 9:18). You see how he refers both to the mere pleasure of God. Therefore, if we
cannot assign any reason for His bestowing mercy on His people but just that it so pleases Him,
neither can we have any reason for His reprobating others but His will. When God is said to visit in
mercy or harden whom He will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any cause beyond His
will. (Institutes 3.22.11)
Another quote to the same effect:
Those, therefore, whom God passes by, He reprobates, and that for no other cause but because He is
pleased  to  exclude  them from the  inheritance  which  He  predestines  to  His  children.  (Institutes
3.23.1)
Therefore, for Calvin, God’s decision to bring it about that an individual is damned is likewise not
grounded in anything in the reprobated individual. It is God’s free pleasure.
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Now, unconditional election and reprobation are what we would expect if Calvin’s perspective
was fundamentally a theologically determinist one. ‘If God determines everything,’ one might say,
‘why would election be based on anything in man or that man does? The only things that are in man
or that he does are the things that God has determined him to be or to do.’ And it is surely right that
conditional election blends far more naturally with a libertarian perspective. God cannot determine
free actions on that theory, and so if salvation involves a free decision, God can only save those who
would satisfy that condition. It would therefore makes perfect sense, on the libertarian view, for
God to elect on the basis of foreknown free decisions to accept the offer of salvation. Calvin, in
roundly  eschewing  that  perspective,  therefore  finds  himself  in  natural  alignment  with  the
theological determinists.
But it isn’t as strong a proof as one would wish of Calvin’s determinism. After all, returning to
Daniel  Johnson’s  distinction  above between Calvinist  soteriology and Calvinist  determinism,  it
might  be  argued that  Calvin’s  belief  in  unconditional  election  and reprobation doesn’t  bespeak
determinist convictions, but merely a concern to remove entirely human merit from the equation—
arguably one of the distinctive claims of ‘Calvinist soteriology’ (if man is so bound up in moral
darkness that he cannot lift even a mental finger to will the good, then it plausibly follow that he
incapable of doing anything whereby he might merit salvation). Man might therefore have free will
as the libertarian understands it (in non-spiritual matters), but such free will would play no part in
election or reprobation.
It is certainly true that Calvin wished to rule out the idea that human beings could in any way
merit their salvation or election. One of the reasons he gave for insisting that foreknowledge could
not ground election was to block of the ‘common imagining’ that God predestined according to
foreseen merits. Calvin writes,
For they commonly imagine that God distinguishes between men according to the merits which He
foresees that each individual is to have—giving the adoption of sons to those whom He foreknows
will  not  be  unworthy  of  His  grace,  and  dooming  those  to  destruction  whose  dispositions  He
perceives will be prone to mischief and wickedness. Thus by interposing foreknowledge as a veil,
they not only obscure election, but pretend to give it a different origin. (Institutes 3.22.1)
3.6 Calvin's Deterministic Convictions
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We can, however, see clearer commitment to a determinist perspective from other things he wrote
beyond the Institutes. In his Concerning The Eternal Predestination of God, which arose out of his
dispute with Albertus Pighius (c.  1490–1542) and Georgius  of  Sicily  over  Calvin’s  doctrine of
predestination, it is clear he held to a very intimate view of God’s predestining activity and human
action. Here follow pertinent quotes with commentary. I deal first with quotes affirming a belief in
the all-determining nature of divine sovereignty. Here is one such broad affirmation:
But of all the things which happen, the first cause is to be understood to be His will, because He so
governs the natures created by Him, as to determine all the counsels and the actions of men to the
end decreed by Him. (1961 [1552]: 178)
The  claim  that  God  is  the  first  cause  of  all  is  common  in  Christendom,  and  so  isn’t  readily
interpreted as an affirmation of theological determinism. But Calvin’s understanding of what this
involves has God governing his creatures’ natures to determine all their ‘counsels and actions’ to the
end God has decided. That God can govern human nature to bring about whatever action he desires
is exactly the sort of claim a libertarian theist would deny, however. He would say that God cannot
generate whatever action God pleases from an individual, because free, morally responsible actions
must come from the person themself—they can’t be caused to perform them. That would make
them unfree. But it appears Calvin has no qualms about affirming that God can get whatever actions
he wishes  from his  creatures.  This  naturally  suggests Calvin is  a theological  determinist  and a
compatibilist.
Calvin provides a bit more detail when says he sides with Augustine:
Augustine’s opinion is to be accepted: When God wills to be done what cannot be done but by
willing men, their hearts being so inclined that they will, He Himself effects this, not only by helping
in their hearts but by determining them, so that, though they had no such intention, they fulfil what
His hand and His counsel decreed. (1961 [1552]: 176)
The point at issue here is how God, should God wish to bring about a free and willing action from a
human being, would bring about that free and willing action. Here Calvin agrees with Augustine
that God does not merely bring about desire-states that he believes are likely to tend towards that
free action, or that he foreknows will lead to that free action (moves that a libertarian theist would
be inclined to make); instead, Calvin affirms that God effects the free action himself, determining
men to fulfil what his hand and counsel decree. If Calvin is a libertarian (or proto-libertarian), this is
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language that is very unexpected and hard to square with incompatibilist commitments. How can
God effect the action without what the incompatibilist would take to be a compromising of human
freedom?
Moreover, Calvin is clear that these determinations from God can be determinations to either
good deeds or evil deeds:
Again it is quite clear from the evidence of Scripture that God works in the hearts of men to incline
their wills just as He will, whether to good for his mercy’s sake or to evil according their merits
(1961 [1552]: 177)
Evidently, Calvin does not think that when God does this determining of someone to perform an
evil action, that removes their responsibility—it is still  an action for which they are considered
guilty and blameworthy. This again indicates a compatibilist understanding.
3.7 Calvin’s Dual-Actor Principle
What I consider the most striking evidence of Calvin’s commitment to a deterministic perspective is
what I term his ‘Dual-Actor Principle’. I shall let him speak for himself:
For myself, I take another principle: Whatever things are done wrongly and unjustly by man, these
very things are the right and just works of God. (1961 [1552]: 169)
Therefore, every single action, or work, whether good or evil, has two authors: one is man, and the
other is God. He elucidates further with reference to the Scriptural example of Job:
Robbers steal the cattle of the saintly Job. The deed is cruel and shameful.  Satan by this means
tempts him to desperation—an even more detestable machination. But Job himself indicates another
author of the deed: The Lord gave, the Lord has taken away. He not unjustly transfers to God what
could not be attributed without the robbers. (1961 [1552]: 179–180)
This is very easy to understand on a theological determinist perspective. Suppose God causes a
human being to perform a sinful act. The human agent is therefore causally responsible for bringing
about the evil intention, but the agent’s bringing about that intention is also caused by God. Two
agents are therefore causally responsible for the evil intention: the human agent and God. It is true
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of both of those agents that they have caused the existence of the evil intention. Of course, the
human agent stands in closer causal proximity to the sinful intention—it is  his intention in a way
that it is not God’s—but that does not prevent both actors from being causally responsible for the
coming to be of that intention.
It is harder to square Calvin’s Dual-Actor Principle with a libertarian perspective. For on that
scheme God does not cause any human agent to act. Or, if he does, then such acts won’t be sinful:
because if God  causes the agent to act, the action cannot be a morally responsible one. In what
sense, then, can God be considered the author of human sinful deeds? How can sinful works be
justly considered God’s works also? One might say that the wicked acts of sinful men are God’s
acts also in the sense that God arranges their coming into being. If God foreknows that Peter will
sinfully deny Christ in a certain circumstance, and God brings about the circumstance in order that
Peter will sin, then the incompatibilist interpretation of Calvin might suggest that that is all Calvin
had in mind when he claims that God authors sinful acts.
But this is something of a stretch. It doesn’t appear to license Calvin’s remark that Job ‘not
unjustly  transfers to God’ what was perpetrated by the robbers.  What  is  true on the libertarian
scheme is that God set things up so the robbers could rob, but the robbing itself is the robbers’ own
work, and not God’s. Also, if Calvin’s understanding is implicitly libertarian, we would expect to
find more of the language of permission from him. We would expect him to say that God arranges
matters so that he permits a human agent to sin for God’s own purposes, but that no positive ‘shove’
comes from God’s end. The wicked deed is done only by the wicked human agent, and not by God.
God has his ‘hands off’, so to speak, when it comes to human sin, even though he may arrange and
orchestrate  it,  and  give  opportunity  for  it,  for  his  good  purposes.  But  instead  we  see  Calvin
explicitly disclaiming the language of permission:
From this it is easy to conclude how foolish and frail is the support of divine justice afforded by the
suggestion that evils come to be not by His will, but merely by his permission. Of course, so far as
they are evils, which men perpetrate with their evil mind, as I shall show in greater detail shortly, I
admit that they are not pleasing to God. But it is a quite frivolous refuge to say that God permits
them, when Scripture shows Him not only willing but the author of them. (1961 [1552]: 176)
Notice  that  not  only  does  Calvin  disclaim  the  language  of  permission,  he  also  disclaims  the
language of mere  willing,  and insists that we must go a step further.  In other words,  Calvin is
concerned to hold that God doesn’t merely plan that men should sin; he wants to say that God does
more than that. In fact, he wants to say that Scripture presents God is as author of the wicked man’s
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acts. This is the Dual-Actor principle in action. If a man brings something about, then it is also true
that God has brought that thing about. If a man forms a sinful intention in his heart, then it is also
true that God has formed that sinful intention in the man’s heart. There are always (at least) two
authors to any work.
But  what  could  this  extra  step  of  authorship  amount  to?  For  the  determinist  interpreter  of
Calvin, there is no mystery here. Calvin is saying, ‘God doesn’t merely permit man to sin, nor does
he merely will (or plan) that man should sin, he also determines man to sin’. That is what is meant
by ‘authorship’ here. But on a libertarian interpretation of Calvin, it is hard to know what the extra
thing is that Calvin is insisting on here. On the libertarian view,  all God can do is plan for sin to
occur and to arrange matters so that it does. He cannot cause, or otherwise determine, sin to occur.
What, then, could Calvin mean by his further insistence that God ‘authors’ the sin of the wicked, if
he is a libertarian? There doesn’t appear to be a satisfactory answer.
3.8 Calvin on God as Author of Sin
Now, to claim that God is the author of the wicked man’s acts carries with it an evident problem.
How does one block off the natural suspicion that God is therefore guilty of the wicked acts he
brings about, and is as wicked as the wicked are? We should hear Calvin’s remarks in response to
this:
How then is God to be exempted from the blame to which Satan with his instruments is liable? Of
course a distinction is made between the deeds of men and their purpose and end; for the cruelty of
the man who puts out the eyes of crows or kills a stork is condemned, while the virtue of the judge is
praised who puts his hand to the killing of a criminal. (1961 [1552]: 180)
Calvin’s response is the natural one to reach for: God’s intentions are good; the intentions of the
wicked are not. God intends evil for a good end, while the wicked’s aim is on his own evil pleasure.
This isn’t a comprehensive response, but it is a start. Some mention of rights should also be made, I
think. God, as sustainer and creator, has the right to bring about evil deeds in his creatures if that
suits his purposes, whilst his creatures do not have the right, or not as broadly as God does, to bring
about evil intentions (never, I take it, in oneself, and at best rarely in others). But I shall address
matters of theodicy in more depth later. I merely intend to place them in one’s consciousness here,
and to draw attention to Calvin’s take.
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3.9 Calvin on the Ability Requirement for Moral Responsibility
Like Luther, Calvin had remarks (though less bombastic) to make on the ability requirement on
moral responsibility so often brought up in objection to the Reformed position. In another dispute
Calvin had, this time with Sebastian Castellio (1515–1563), he was pressed on the matter in the
following manner by Castellio. Castellio claimed (not unfairly, to my mind) to extract from the
writings of Calvin these two claims:
Article 13: From the perspective of God we sin necessarily, whether we sin on account of our own
purpose or by accident.
Article 14: Whatever perversions men perpetrate by their own will, those also proceed from the will
of God. (from Calvin, 2010 [1558]: 51)
And Castellio objects,
If we sin necessarily, all admonitions are in vain […] [They are] in vain if it is as impossible for
[people] to change as it is for them to swallow a mountain. What if Calvin says that the commands
are displayed for the reason that men might be inexcusable? We reply that this is futile. For if you
command your son to eat a rock, and he does not do it, he is no more inexcusable after the command
than he was before. It is just as if God commands me, “Do not steal,” and then I steal necessarily. I
am not more able to abstain from stealing than I am able to eat a rock. I am not more inexcusable
after the command than I was before, and I am not more excusable before the command than after it.
(from Calvin, 2010 [1558]: 51–52)
He goes on to take a swipe at Calvin’s view of reprobation:
If  an impious person is  reprobated before  he commits  impiety,  that  is,  before  he is  born,  from
eternity he therefore sins necessarily. He is already inexcusable and condemned before receiving the
command from God. This is contrary to all things concerning the law, God, and man. (from Calvin,
2010 [1558]: 52)
We can see what Costellio’s concern is. It’s the Argument from Ability again. His concern in the
initial section of the quoted material is with the legitimacy of God’s blaming human beings for
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failing to keep his commandments when those human beings’ sins are necessitated by the divine
will. Why would we not blame a man for failure to swallow a mountain were he under a duty to do
so? Because a man is not able to swallow a mountain. His inability excuses him from blame. But
surely someone who is predestined to sin on some occasion is likewise not able to refrain from
sinning on that occasion. Shouldn’t his inability excuse him also?
An  objection  against  God’s  rationality  is  also  present  in  the  quoted  material.  If  man  is
predestined to sin and unable to refrain from sin, why would God give commands in the first place?
To command people to do something they are unable to do is not the mark of a rational agent, or so
the thought goes. The response to that, originating in Luther, is that God gives the commands not
because he expects their  fulfilment,  but  because he wishes to communicate a sense of guilt  or
inexcusability in the receivers of the command. But Castellio correctly sees that this is not the nub
of the issue. The point is that if one cannot be blamed for doing something that is impossible for one
to  do,  then  being  commanded  to  do  that  impossible  thing,  even  commanded  by  God,  cannot
increase one’s guilt or bring awareness of one’s own moral failure, because there was no such moral
failure in the first place.
Calvin gets somewhat personal in his response:
I ask you, when last year the hook was in your hand for the purpose of stealing firewood so that you
might warm your home, was it not your own will that drove you to steal? If this alone does not
suffice for your just condemnation, that knowingly and willingly you disgracefully and wickedly
gained at the expense of another, whatever you roar against necessity, this does not in the least secure
your acquittal. (2010 [1558]: 112)
Calvin refers to an incident where Castellio was accused of stealing other people’s firewood. For his
part, Castellio claimed that he was only taking the poorer pieces of driftwood that other people had
no claim on.13
Putting the firewood to the side, we should note that (i) Calvin does not challenge the idea that
people are under a necessity, stemming from God’s will, to sin. This is further evidence of Calvin’s
determinist  outlook.  We should also note  that  (ii)  Calvin  doesn't  really  engage with the issues
Castellio raises about impossibility and inability,  and the intuitive pull  that some sort of ability
condition must be satisfied in order for moral responsibility to obtain. He is content to assert that
conscious, informed, voluntary action is sufficient for moral responsibility,  ability or no ability.
Although  this  looks  like  a  compatibilist  conception  of  the  conditions  necessary  for  moral
13 See Helm (2010: 20, n. 13) for discussion of the affair.
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responsibility, and interesting on that account, it is not a comprehensive nor satisfactory response to
the intuitions Castellio musters, and in the next chapter I present a more thoroughgoing answer to
this class of worry.
3.10 Arminius and the Belgic Confession
But it is now time to introduce Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609). Arminius’s deviation from Calvinist
thought  was  occasioned  by  problems  he  had  with  the  Belgic  Confession,  a  confession  first
introduced in 1561 and that was popular in the Netherlands and Belgium amongst the Reformed
churches  of  that  time.14 Arminius  was  a  Professor  at  the  University  of  Leiden,  but  when  his
disagreements with the standard understanding of Reformed belief became clear, he fell under the
attack  of  one  of  his  colleagues  at  the  university,  Franciscus  Gomarus  (1563—1641).  Gomarus
eventually forced Arminius into public disputation on the matter. And in Arminius’s Declaration of
Sentiments, addressed to the States of Holland and West Friesland in 1608, he summarises the view
of predestination he is opposing as follows:
God by an eternal and immutable decree has predestinated, from among men [...] certain individuals
to everlasting life, and others to eternal destruction, without any regard whatever to righteousness or
sin, to obedience or disobedience, but purely of his own good pleasure, to demonstrate the glory of
his  justice  and mercy;  or,  (as  others  assert,)  to  demonstrate  his  saving  grace,  wisdom and free
uncontrollable power. (1853: 211–212)
The idea that God elects and reprobates in order to display mercy on the one hand and justice on the
other is an idea we will return to. One should also note that Arminius’s expression ‘without any
regard whatever to righteousness or sin’ is liable to misinterpretation. The defender of Calvin’s
theory of election and reprobation would of course be committed to the idea that God did not elect
or reprobate on the basis of sin or righteousness, but it is of course true that God cannot satisfy the
aim of reprobation unless there is sin. Reprobation is God’s decision to arrange the damnation of an
individual, and it remains true that someone cannot be damned unless they sin. Sin is therefore
involved as the means by which God implements reprobation. Apart from that, however, Arminius
can be said to offer a fair summary.
14 Schaff tells us that ‘The Confession was publicly adopted by a Synod at Antwerp (1566), then at Wesel (1568),
more formally by a Synod at Emden (1571) by a national Synod at Dort (1574), another at Middelburg (1581), and
again by the great Synod of Dort, April 29, 1619.’ (1931: 505).
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He goes on to note an inference from this doctrine:
From this decree of Divine election and reprobation,  and from this administration of the means
which pertain to the execution of both of them, it follows, that the elect are necessarily saved, it
being  impossible  for  them  to  perish—and  that  the  reprobate  are  necessarily  damned,  it  being
impossible for them to be saved; and all this from the absolute purpose of God, which is altogether
antecedent to all things, and to all those causes which are either in things themselves or can possibly
result from them. (1853: 215)
Arminius  avers  that  God’s  decree,  on  the  predestinarian  scheme  he  is  opposing,  must  be  the
‘antecedent cause’ of all things that come to pass, and that God’s purpose thereby governs what all
entities with causal powers are, both in themselves, and also what they bring about. This is about as
close a formulation of theological determinism as one might find in the scholastic period.
But he considers this scheme to be inconsistent with the Belgic Confession, and his appeals to
the Belgic Confession are of direct relevance to understanding Arminius’s beliefs on free will and
predestination. He makes two arguments, and here is his first:
Without the least contention or caviling, it may very properly be made a question of doubt, whether
this doctrine agrees with the Belgic Confession [...]; as I shall briefly demonstrate.
1.  In  the  14th  Article  of  the  Dutch  Confession,  these  expressions  occur:  “Man  knowingly  and
willingly subjected himself to sin, and, consequently, to death and cursing, while he lent an ear to the
deceiving words and impostures of the devil,” &c. From this sentence I conclude, that man did not
sin on account of any necessity through a preceding decree of Predestination: which inference is
diametrically opposed to that doctrine of Predestination against which I now contend. (1853: 220)
We can see at once what Arminius’s issue was: he was an incompatibilist. If man knowingly and
willingly fell when he listened to the overtures of the devil, then it follows that he couldn’t have
been caused or determined or necessitated to do so. Because then it wouldn’t have been free! And
man couldn’t be blamed for it. Arminius reads the Belgic Confession in the light of his intuitive
incompatibilism, and thereby perceives a tension with the predestinarian doctrine in circulation.
He is explicit further on in the Sentiments about his incompatibilism:
This [predestinarian] doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will, in which and with which
man was created by God. For it prevents the exercise of this liberty, by binding or determining the
will absolutely to one object, that is, to do this thing precisely, or to do that. (1853: 224)
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And also:
This Predestination is inconsistent with the Nature and Properties of Sin [...] [b]ecause sin is called
“disobedience” and “rebellion,” neither of which terms can possibly apply to any person who by a
preceding divine decree is placed under an unavoidable necessity of sinning. (1853: 227)
That is Arminius’s first objection on the basis of the Belgic Confession. He has a second:
Then, in the 16th Article, which treats of the eternal election of God, these words are contained:
“God shewed himself Merciful, by delivering from damnation, and by saving, those persons whom,
in his eternal and immutable counsel and cording to his gratuitous goodness, he chose in Christ Jesus
our Lord, without any regard to their works. And he shewed himself just, in leaving others in that
their fall and perdition into which they had precipitated themselves.” It is not obvious to me, how
these words are consistent with this doctrine of Predestination. (1853: 220–221)
It isn’t entirely plain what Arminius’s problem is here. I think he must be taking issue with either (i)
the thought that reprobates have ‘precipitated themselves’, or that (ii) that God ‘shewed himself
just’ in the act of reprobation. If the first,  then his point amounts to nothing more than another
expression of his incompatibilism: how could they be justly said to precipitate themselves when
they fall because God has predestined them to fall? If the second, however, then a different point is
being  made.  If  Arminius  is  complaining  about  the  idea  that  God  could  show himself  just by
reprobating, then he must think that it would be in tension, somehow, with God’s justice for him to
reprobate. But what is the argument there? Later on in his Sentiments, we find a candidate for his
argument:
[S]in is the meritorious cause of damnation. But the meritorious cause which moves the Divine will
to  reprobate,  is  according  to  justice;  and  it  induces  God,  who  holds  sin  in  abhorrence,  to  will
reprobation. Sin, therefore, which is a cause, cannot be placed among the means, by which God
executes the decree or will of reprobation. (1853: 227)
So,  a  plausible  reconstruction  of  the  argument  is  this:  A just  God  abhors  sin;  but  the  end  of
reprobation  is  damnation,  and  damnation  requires  the  existence  of  sin;  therefore,  reprobation
requires God to will sin, and that is contrary to the just nature of God. He makes similar remarks
when he says that reprobation is opposed to the goodness of God:
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[Reprobation] is also repugnant to the Goodness of God. Goodness is an affection [or disposition] in
God to communicate his own good so far as his justice considers and admits to be fitting and proper.
But in this doctrine the following act is attributed to God, that,  of himself, and induced to it by
nothing external, he wills the greatest evil to his creatures; and that from all eternity he has pre-
ordained that evil for them, or pre-determined to impart it to them, even before he resolved to bestow
upon them any portion of good. For this doctrine states, that God willed to damn; and, that he might
be able to do this, be willed to create; although creation is the first egress [...] of God’s goodness
towards his creatures. (1853: 223)
The objection here is slightly different, however. In this latter case the objection appears to centre
on God’s goodness as a disposition to do good. If God is disposed to do good to his creatures, then
why is he so disposed to as to will and arrange such a terrible end for so many of his creatures?
Reprobation is therefore in tension with God’s goodness.
Lastly, Arminius also complains that
Reprobation is an act of hatred, and from hatred derives its origin. But creation does not proceed
from hatred; it is not therefore a way or means, which belongs to the execution of the decree of
reprobation. (1853: 225)
Whether or not Arminius is right that creation does not proceed from hatred, there is a problem over
the  bare  fact  that  reprobation involves,  or  appears  to  involve,  hatred.  How could God hate  an
individual before they are even created? Before they have offended him? And isn’t God a God of
love? How, then, is any expression of hatred consistent with God’s loving nature? These questions
are also pressed by contemporary critics of Calvinism, and we shall come to them in due course.
3.11 The Remonstrants and the Synod of Dort (1618–1619)
With Arminius’s argumentation, the great split in early Protestant thought was effected and it has
persisted to this day. At the present time, evangelical Christianity is divided between the Arminians
and the Calvinists. Now, Arminius died in 1609, and was therefore unable to further publicly defend
his  creed.  But  his  followers  took  up  the  slack,  and  in  1610  published  the  Five  Articles  of
Remonstrance. (Their party then became known as the ‘Remonstrants’.) The Five Articles do not
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explicitly repudiate the strong predestinarian doctrine of Calvin, however, save, perhaps, in the first
and fourth article. The first article contains this:
That God, by an eternal, unchangeable purpose in Jesus Christ his Son, before the foundation of the
world,  hath determined,  out  of  the fallen,  sinful  race of men,  to save in Christ,  [...]  those who,
through the grace of the Holy Ghost, shall believe on this his Son Jesus (Schaff, 1977: 545)
The  force  of  this  phrasing  is  that  it  avoids  commitment  to  the  idea  that  God has  predestined
individuals to either salvation or damnation. The article is readily interpreted as meaning that the
object of God’s election was a certain  description, namely, ‘those who shall believe on his Son
Jesus’. Thus, God elects a certain description as being one that saves if one satisfies it, and leaves it
to man’s own free will to meet that description. In this way, the article can be seen as dodging
Calvin’s commitment to the unconditional election and reprobation of individuals.
The fourth article contains this:
But  as  respects  the  mode  of  the  operation  of  this  grace  [the  grace  whereby man accomplishes
something good], it  is not irresistible, inasmuch as it is written concerning many, that they have
resisted the Holy Ghost. (Schaff, 1977: 547)
An  anti-determinist  concern  might  be  perceived  here,  insofar  as  ‘irresistible  grace’  can  be
understood as ‘determining grace’. If so, then the concern of this article is to affirm that God’s grace
doesn’t cause, or otherwise determine, one to a good action (such as placing one’s faith in Christ);
instead, whether the action is performed or not is presumably left to one’s own (libertarian) free
will. Thus, it is easy to see incompatibilist convictions at play in these early Arminian declarations.
The Synod of Dort (or Dordrecht) was held from November 1618 to May 1619 in order to
address the Remonstrant doctrine and the civil conflict it was causing. However, the  Canons of
Dort, which were the final and considered declarations of the synod on the issue, refused to affirm
the  stronger  view  of  predestination—that  all  things  are  necessitated,  or  determined,  by  God’s
decree. They did say, in Rejection VII of the ‘Third and Fourth Main Points of Doctrine’, that they
condemned those
Who teach: That God in the regeneration of man does not use such powers of His omnipotence as
potently and infallibly bend mans will to faith and conversion (Anon., 2010: 24)
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This  ruled  out  Arminius’s  view  that  man’s  coming  freely  to  Christ  was  to  be  understood  in
libertarian terms. But the  Canons also contained material that was not altogether friendly to the
deterministic perspective, even though it didn’t explicitly rule it out. For instance, in Article VII of
under the ‘First Head of Doctrine’, the Canons declare:
Election is the unchangeable purpose of God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, He hath
out of mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of His own will, chosen, from the whole
human race, which had fallen through their own fault from their primitive state of rectitude into sin
and destruction, a certain number of persons to redemption in Christ (Anon., 2010: 9)
The Canons’s affirming that divine election takes place after, in the order of God’s decisions, man
has ‘fallen through his own fault’,15 carries the natural implication that humanity’s fall  was not
something  that  was  necessitated,  or  predestined,  or  ordained  by  God.  Indeed,  there  is  no
pronouncement that everything that comes to pass is determined by God’s decree—the  Canons
restricts  its  discussion  to  matters  of  salvation  only.  The  Canons are  therefore  best  read  as  an
affirmation of soteriological Calvinism rather than determinist Calvinism.
Even worse from the deterministic perspective, the Canons also declare, in Article 5 under the
‘First Head of Doctrine’, that
The cause or guilt of this unbelief [in Christ], as well as of all other sins, is no wise in God, but in
man himself (Anon., 2010: 9)
This doesn’t constitute a denial that God is the ultimate cause of man’s sin (and therefore a denial of
theological determinism), because ‘cause’ appears to be used there as synonym (or close to that) of
‘guilt’. With regard to guilt, the statement is to be understood as declaring that the guilt-worthiness
of the act is grounded in features of man, not features of God. And that is surely correct: what
makes an act a wicked act—the evil intentions—these are present only in man, and never in God.
‘Cause’ should therefore be understood in a similar way, to mean something like ‘active principle’,
or ‘reason’, or ‘ground’. And indeed the wicked principles of man’s nature that lead to unbelief and
the sinful features of his psychology in which unbelief is grounded, are again to be found only in
man, and not in God.
15 The Canons’ claim here is only properly understood within the context of the debate between infralapsarians and
supralapsarians. The former are seen as offering a softer view of predestination than the latter. Infralapsarians claim
that God only decided to elect and reprobate after he had decided (for some other reason) to bring about the fall.
God thus worked with human ‘already fallen’. The supralapsarians claimed that God’s decrees of election and
reprobation preceded the fall. Thus, God was electing and reprobating ‘before’ humanity was fallen.
52
But even if there is nothing to strictly rule out theological determinism in the Canons of Dort,
there is little encouragement to be found for theological determinists in those Canons. We will have
to wait until we reach the celebrated  1646 Westminster Confession before we see the contours of
Reformed thought return to reasonably clear affirmations of theological determinism. 
3.12 Molinism
But before we discuss the Westminster Confession, another signal development in philosophical
theology must be mentioned, that of Molinism. ‘Molinism’ is the term used to refer to the theory of
Luis de Molina (1535–1600), a Roman Catholic theologian. For the debate in Reformed thought
between the Calvinists and the Arminians was paralleled in the Catholic tradition by the debate
between  the  Dominican  Thomists  and  the  Jesuit  Molinists.  In  the  De  Auxiliis  Controversy
(controversy on help), the two parties debated the nature of the help that God gave to man when
God bestows saving grace upon him.16 Both parties shared the Catholic commitment that the grace
by which God brings about  an individual’s  salvation is  of infallible  efficaciousness in bringing
about the consent of the saved party. But the two parties disagreed on the mechanism by which this
was accomplished. The Thomists thought that God secured consent through ‘a physical impulsion
by means of which God determines and applies our faculties to the action’ (Astrain 1908). The
Molinists  thought  that  the  efficacy  of  the  grace  followed  from  God’s  middle  knowledge,  a
knowledge of what any individual would freely choose to do in any possible circumstance. By only
giving saving grace to those who God foreknows will freely choose him, God can thereby guarantee
that the individual offered grace will always accept it. Thus, infallible grace. 
Molina laid out his theory in his  Concordia (1988 [1588]), wherein he distinguished between
three types of knowledge in God. The first was God’s natural knowledge. This is God’s knowledge
of all necessary truth (such as mathematical truths). This knowledge is had by God prior to God’s
decision to create. Indeed, this is part of the knowledge that God relied on when deciding to create
and deciding what to create, because this knowledge contains all the necessarily true subjunctive
conditionals, truths like ‘were I to decide the laws of nature are going to be this way, then events of
such-and-such a sort would be nomologically impossible’. God surely decides what to create in the
light of such truths. Also note that this natural knowledge is  essential to God. God can’t be God
without it. There can’t be a possible world where God doesn’t have natural knowledge because
16 See Matava 2016 for an outline of the controversy.
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there is no possible world where the propositions which are naturally known are false, and God
knows everything true in every possible world in which he exists (which is all possible worlds).
The next sort of knowledge is free knowledge. This is God’s knowledge of contingent matters of
fact that obtain as the result of God’s creative decree. Suppose God decides to create Adam. With
Adam in existence, God would know the proposition <Adam exists> to be true. But this knowledge
is not essential to God. God, on the standard understanding, could have refrained from creating
Adam. God did not create Adam necessarily. Therefore, there is a possible world in which Adam
does not exist. In that world, God does not know the proposition <Adam exists> to be true; he
knows it to be false. Free knowledge is inessential to God and it is God’s knowledge of things that
God brings about by his free choice.
Summing up, God’s natural knowledge is (i) prior to his decision to create and (ii) essential to
God (because knowledge of things necessary). God’s free knowledge is (iii) posterior to creation
and (iv) not essential to God (because knowledge of things contingent). Molina’s suggestion is that
there is a third category of knowledge between these two:  middle knowledge. Middle knowledge
holds (v) prior to God’s decision to create, but it is (vi) inessential to God (because it is knowledge
of contingent matters). 
What  sort  of  things  are  the  objects  of  God’s  middle  knowledge?  Molinists  believe  that  all
propositions about what human beings would freely choose to do in any possible circumstance are
included as part of the objects of middle knowledge. ‘Subjunctive conditionals of freedom’, as they
are known. These are propositions of the following form:
Were an agent, S, to be placed in circumstances, C, S would freely X,
where X ranges over possible decisions. Thus, Molinism posits that, before God can form any
intention to create anything, God is aware of an infinity of truths about what any possible person
would freely choose to do in any possible circumstance. And no particular truth of that kind will be
essential to God. Suppose, as a matter of fact, that it is true that
(1) Were Curley to be offered $100, he would freely accept the bribe.
For the Molinist, that truth cannot be necessarily true. Molinists are libertarians. If it is necessarily
true that Curley would accept  the bride,  then it  can’t  be a  free accepting of the bribe.  It  must
therefore be a contingent truth, and if it is contingent, then it can’t be essential to God’s nature to
know it. These are all therefore contingent truths about what any possible person would freely do in
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any possible circumstance, and they are all thrust into God’s mind, alongside his natural knowledge,
before God can decide to create.
That is how Molinists understand God’s working providentially: God foreknows what each of
his creatures would freely do in any situation, and God therefore brings about the situations that
God foreknows will lead to the free decisions God wants to bring about. And that is how Molinists
solve the de auxiliis problem of how it is that grace could infallibly bring about the free consent of a
human person: God uses middle knowledge to bring about those circumstances he foreknows would
lead to the free compliance of the agent.
Why introduce  Molinism to  the  discussion?  Several  reasons.  For  one  thing,  Arminius  read
Molina.  He  had  a  copy  of  the  Concordia, and  Arminius’s  language  is  considered  to  reflect
Molina’s.17 More generally, it is being increasingly realised that this early debate between Calvinists
and Arminians at the 1618–19 synod of Dort owed a great deal to the Roman Catholic discussions
of grace and free will that took place during the de auxiliis controversy that ran just a few decades
before, from 1581 to 1607.18 And, as we shall see, it will go on to affect the statement of divine
sovereignty we find in the 1646 Westminster Confession. For another thing, it is the most popular
formulation of Arminianism current today. William Lane Craig, a popular contemporary defender of
Molinism, writes that it is ‘one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived. For it would
serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future, but divine providence and predestination
as  well’ (2000:  127).  The  Molinist  theory  of  divine  providence  remains  the  chief  rival  to  the
theological determinist one. On that score alone, it is good to bear it in mind. Lastly, the theory will
have an effect on certain other discussions in this thesis.
3.13 The 1646 Westminster Confession
Finally,  we  come  to  the  Westminster  Confession  of  Faith of  1646.  This  confession,  with  the
associated  Shorter and  Larger  Catechisms,  produced by the  Westminster  Assembly  of  Divines
(which met 1643–53) are widely regarded as the greatest expression of the Calvinistic, Reformed
faith. Fesko writes that ‘The Confession and catechisms of the Westminster Assembly have been
praised by theologians, both in the seventeenth century and in our own day, as being the high-water
mark  of  Reformed  theology  in  the  early  modern  period’  (2014:  23).  Schaff  writes  of  the
Westminster Assembly, 
17 Dekker (1996) ‘was Arminius a Molinist?’
18 See the soon-to-be-released volume edited by Ballor, Gaetano, and Sytsma (forthcoming).
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Whether we look at the extent or ability of the labors, or its influence upon future generations, it
stands first among Protestant Councils. The Synod of Dort was indeed fully equal to it in learning
and moral weight, [… b]ut the doctrinal legislation of the Synod of Dort was confined to the five
points at issue between Calvinism and Arminianism; the Assembly of Westminster embraced the
whole field of theology, from the eternal decrees of God to the final judgement. The Canons of Dort
have lost their hold upon the mother country; the Confessions and Shorter Catechism of Westminster
are as much used now in Anglo-Presbyterian Churches as ever, and have more vitality and influence
than any other Calvinistic Confession. (1931: 728)
If  this  great  expression  of  Reformed convictions  reproduces  the  deterministic  strain  present  in
Calvinist thought, then that is a great feather in the cap of the theological determinist who seeks to
ground his beliefs, to a substantial extent, in the Reformed tradition.
I shall note three ways in which the Westminster Confession moves beyond mere soteriological
Calvinism—in  his  fallen  state,  man  is  bound,  by  necessity  to  sin—into  the  commitments  of
deterministic  or  philosophical  Calvinism—the  idea  that  God’s  decree  determines  (or,  in  their
language, necessitates, all that comes to pass).
3.14 The Determinism of the Westminster Confession: (i) God’s Decree
Here is the Westminster Confession ch. III, on God’s Eternal Decree, 1–2:
God  from  all  eternity  did  by  the  most  wise  and  holy  counsel  of  his  own  will,  freely  and
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; […] Although God knows whatsoever may or can
come to pass, upon all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it
as future, or as that which would come to pass, upon such conditions. (1977: 608)
First note that the Confession insists that God ordains all that comes to pass. That includes the free
actions of men. Of course, ‘ordain’ may be given an incompatibilist interpretation. But what follows
tells against that idea. An incompatibilist understanding of what it is to ordain a free action of the
creature would have it as the Molinist has it: God decrees based on foreknown free action. But that
is precisely what the Westminster Assembly is concerned to rule out. For here we can see how the
Westminster divines responded to Molinist ideas. They categorically deny that God used middle
knowledge—knowledge of what agents would freely do under certain conditions—when deciding
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what to create. God decrees nothing, in their eyes, on the basis of events either foreknown simply,
or  foreknown  to  come  to  pass  under  certain  conditions.  The  Arminian,  incompatibilist
understanding is therefore ruled out.
Here is an extract from ch. V of the Confession, ‘Of Providence’, section 1:
God, the great Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions,
and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to
his infallible foreknowledge (1977: 612)
It is to be noted that God’s directing and disposing of all things explicitly includes human actions. It
is not impossible, perhaps, to reconcile a statement like that with a libertarian understanding, but an
insistence that God directs and disposes every human action offers the libertarian little comfort.
This portion from section 4 of the same chapter tells more strongly against both libertarianism
and mere soteriological Calvinism:
The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves
in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first Fall, and all other sins of angels and men,
and  that  not  by  a  bare  permission,  but  such  as  hath  joined  with  it  a  most  wise  and powerful
bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own
holy ends; yet so, as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God;
who being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin. (1977: 613)
Of chief interest is the expression ‘and that not by a bare permission’. The Confession insists that
God doesn’t take his hands off with human action, even sinful human action, but joins ‘with it a
most wise and powerful bounding’, a bounding which guarantees that the action takes place. For my
part, I cannot see what this bounding could be save for a determining relation. I therefore cannot see
how  the  libertarian,  because  of  his  insistence  that  morally  responsible  action  requires
indeterminism,  can  agree  with  this  paragraph  from  the  Confession.  The  libertarian  picture  is
precisely the picture of bare permission—God actualises the relevant circumstance, a la Molinism,
and then watches man’s actions unfold as he foreknows they will. But God cannot determine the
action itself, if libertarianism is true. He must merely permit it. But the Westminster divines insist
there is more going on than mere permission. Insofar as the Westminster Assembly speaks for the
Reformed tradition, this constitutes a very strong piece of evidence that the Reformed tradition is
deterministic.
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Not only that, this section also tells against mere soteriological Calvinism. That, if you recall, is
the  sort  of  Calvinism that  insists  that  postlapsarian  humanity  (man  after  the  fall)  is  bound by
necessity to sin, but man before the fall, and man after regenerating grace, may well be able to
perform acts that are free in the incompatibilist sense. This section tells against that view because it
includes in its remit Adam’s sin. It says that divine providence, this ‘bounding’, ‘extendeth itself
even to the first Fall, and all other sins of angels and men’. Thus, Adam’s eating of the fruit, an
action performed before the canker of sin got a hold of man’s nature, was also infallibly bounded to
its occurrence by the power of God. In this way, the Westminster Confession corrects and enlarges
the weaker and more restricted posture displayed in the Canons of Dort.
3.15 The Determinism of the Westminster Confession: (ii) ‘Coming Most Freely’
The second way the  Westminster Confession gives  support  to a  deterministic  perspective is
through the expression ‘come most freely’ in Chapter X, ‘Of Effectual Calling’. Speaking of how it
is that God calls a soul—that is to say, regenerating it from its native darkness and drawing it to
Christ—, the Confession says that God:
enlighten[s] their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God, taking away their
heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty
power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so
as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace. (1977: 624)
The Confession claims both that such drawing is ‘effectual’ and that that effectuality is owed to the
exercising of God’s ‘almighty power’, an exercising that ‘determines them to what is good’. If God
is effectually exercising his power and thereby determining his elect to the good, that looks like a
clear case of determining of the stricter, philosophical sort that this thesis is concerned with. That by
itself might is not of great significance, perhaps, but the fact that the Assembly then go on to aver
that,  nevertheless,  the effectually  called individual  ‘comes  most freely’ cannot  escape notice.  It
appears that,  even though they wouldn’t,  and couldn’t,  have said so explicitly,  the Westminster
divines are compatibilists. They think that it is possible for God to determine an agent to come to
Christ, yet for it still to be true that that agent comes freely.19 But if the  Westminster Confession
entails compatibilism, then  it undermines pressure to deny theological determinism, because the
19 The same point is made by Anderson and Manata (2017: 294–295).
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denial  of  theological  determinism  is  nearly  always  motivated  by  the  desire  to  accommodate
incompatibilistic convictions.
3.16 The Determinism of the Westminster Confession: (iii) Divine Aseity
The third way in which the Westminster Confession implies theological determinism is through its
doctrine of aseity. In Chapter II, ‘Of God, and of the Holy Trinity’, section 2, we read this:
God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself; and is alone in and unto himself
all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creatures which he hath made […] In his sight all things
are open and manifest; his knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature; so as
nothing is to him contingent or uncertain. (1977: 607)
Here we are informed that God is ‘all-sufficient’ and that his knowledge is ‘independent upon the
creature’,  that  is  to  say,  for  anything  God  knows  about  his  creatures,  that  knowledge  is  not
dependent upon the creature. If God’s being omniscient (his knowing everything) depended upon
the creature, then God would would not be a se, all-sufficient, in the sense the Westminster divines
believe he is. How, then,  does God know anything about the creature? If God’s knowledge is not
based on the reality of the creature, what is it based on? The answer is that God’s knowledge of
creation is based on his decree. God knows that Albert is six-feet tall because God has decreed that
Albert should be 6-feet tall, not because of Albert’s being six-feet tall. One corollary of this model
is that everything external to God must be decreed by God, else God could not know of it. But the
Arminian will claim that either the free actions of human beings are independent of God, or,  a la
Molinism, facts about what agents would freely do are independent of God. Either way, there will
be something that God’s decree does not determine, and therefore something that God cannot know,
given the Westminster Assembly’s understanding of aseity. The Westminster Confession is therefore
committed to the impossibility of divine middle knowledge. Anderson and Manata summarise the
argument:
God  alone is the source of his eternal decree. God doesn’t “consult” anything  extra se when he
formulates his decree. To put the point in a quasi-syllogistic form: every event takes place according
to God’s eternal decree; God’s eternal decree is not determined in any respect by anything external to
or independent of God; therefore, every event is ultimately determined by God alone. (2017: 286)
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3.17 The Westminster Confession Opposed to Determinism?
I think all these three preceding considerations lend solid weight to the claim that the Reformed
tradition,  as  encapsulated by the  Westminster  Assembly,  is  deterministic.  This  goes  against  the
views of some commentators. Cunningham, for instance, states that
there  is  nothing  in  the  Calvinistic  system of  theology or  in  the  Westminster  Confession  which
requires men to hold the doctrine of philosophical necessity; or in other words, that a man may
conscientiously assent to the Westminster Confession although he should reject that doctrine. (1862:
508)
But, as we have seen, that does not agree with a close reading of the Confession.
Now, there are some portions of the Confession which appear to give support to a libertarian
perspective,  and these  have  been  capitalised  on  by  opponents  of  theological  determinism who
identify  as  Reformed.  J.  V.  Fesko,  for  example,  believes  that  in  ch.  III,  paragraph  1  of  the
Confession the Westminster  divines  explicitly  ruled out  a deterministic  understanding of  divine
providence. The relevant passage runs as follows:
God  from  all  eternity  did  by  the  most  wise  and  holy  counsel  of  his  own  will,  freely  and
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin;
nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes
taken away, but rather established. (1977: 608)
(I quoted this section earlier, but took out certain portions. Here it is quoted fully.) Matters therefore
seem plain to Fesko, who remarks:
the Confession does not teach philosophical determinism (or necessity) and does affirm contingency
(2014: 99)
He elaborates,
Contingency  does  not  mean  that  something  does  not  have  a  cause  […]  Rather,  it  means  that
something could be otherwise. […] But once God decrees it, there is no longer contingency from the
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divine perspective […] As it pertains to creatures, however, the divines state that the decree, far from
taking away freedom and contingency, establishes it. (2014: 103)
But it is confused to think that these remarks in the Confession on contingency express an aversion
to philosophical determinism. Then what did the Confession mean by its insistence on contingency?
To answer that we will need to understand with the way that mediaevals approached this issue—and
it is somewhat strange to the modern mind. If you suggested to a Reformed scholastic that God’s
decree necessitates its objects, and therefore that if God decrees that S will choose to A, then S’s
choosing  to  A is  necessary,  and  on  that  account  not  free  (because  freedom and  necessity  are
incompatible),  he  would  respond  by  saying  that  you  commit  a  modal  fallacy.  Let  ‘N’ be  the
necessity operator. The scholastic would say it does not follow from
(2) N(p → q)
that
(3) N(q)
It can therefore be true both that 
(4) N(God decrees that S chooses to φ → S chooses to φ)
and that
(5) ~N(S chooses to φ).
In short,  one  is  not  entitled  to  infer  the necessity  of  the  consequent  from the necessity  of  the
consequence. One can therefore cheerfully maintain the contingency of free decisions even in the
light of God’s necessarily successful decree.20
But the problem is  that the majority of modern-day advocates  of soft  compatibilism would
happily grant that free decisions are contingent and not necessary in the way (5) expresses. Because
determinism doesn’t entail anything like that. Determinism is in the business of the necessity of the
consequence, not the consequent. It says that some set of facts determines another set of facts; it
20 See van Asselt, Bac & te Velde (2010: 35–38) for a good summary of the scholastic understanding of the issue.
61
doesn't say that that latter determined set of facts is necessarily determined—in modern parlance,
determined in every possible world. Perhaps the determined set of facts is sometimes (across the
space of possibilities) determined, and sometimes not. Perhaps the nature of the determined facts is
equally capable of being both determined and undetermined, even though they are, in the actual
case, determined.
So,  given that  the determinist  can grant  what  the  Confession says  at  this  point,  it  can’t  be
insisted that the Confession rules out theological determinism. There is therefore no real pushback
against the earlier three arguments that the theology of the Westminster Assembly favoured what is
fundamentally a determinist outlook.
3.18 Wesley, Channing, and Westminster
There are two remaining characters I wish to introduce: John Wesley and William Channing. They
are both known for their strident moral objections to Calvinism. In particular, they see the Calvinist
doctrines of election and reprobation as casting grave doubt on the goodness of God. I want to
present their key arguments in this section.
The  Westminster  Confession reaffirmed  Calvin’s  account  of  election  and  reprobation  as
unconditional. On election the Confession (III: 5) says:
Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid,
according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath
chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his free grace and love alone, without any foresight of faith or
good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes
moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace. (1977: 609)
And on reprobation the Confession (III: 7) likewise says:
The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby
he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to
pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice. (1977:
610)
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It is this decision of God to ‘pass by’ the non-elect, and thereby guarantee their damnation,
when it appears he could have easily made every human being one of his elect, that particularly
raises the ire of Wesley and Channing.
3.19 John Wesley
John Wesley (1703–91) was one of the founders of the Methodist movement, and a very influential
figure in the history of 18th century England. The Methodist movement was a breakaway from the
established  Anglican  church  and  its  attendant  strictures,  and  the  movement  was  composed  of
Calvinist and Arminian factions. George Whitefield (1714–1770) is fairly considered the leader of
the  Calvinist  contingent,  though  Wesley’s  relationship  with  Whitefield  was  friendly.  He  did,
however, have a fierce exchange over predestination and the like with Augustus Toplady (1740–
1778), and Wesley’s attacks on Calvinism are perhaps best represented in his work Predestination
Calmly Considered, and his (not so calm) sermon of 1740 entitled ‘Free Grace’.
In  the  former  work  he  states  his  convictions  on  the  matter  of  an  unconditional  decree  of
reprobation:
[U]nconditional election I cannot believe; not only because I cannot find it in Scripture, but also (to
wave all other considerations) because it necessarily implies unconditional reprobation. Find out any
election which does not imply reprobation, and I will gladly agree to it. But reprobation I can never
agree to while I believe the Scripture to be of God; as being utterly irreconcilable to the whole scope
and tenor both of the Old and New Testament. (1997: 250)
But what, exactly, is the nature of his complaint? One issue is one that, as we have seen, is raised so
often in critiques of Calvinism: the issue of ability and human responsibility. Wesley thought that
unconditional reprobation (and predestination more generally) is incompatible with God’s holding
man responsible:
The sovereignty of God is then never to be brought to supersede his justice. And this is the present
objection against unconditional  reprobation; (the plain consequence of unconditional election;) it
flatly contradicts, indeed utterly overthrows, the Scripture account of the justice of God. [...] The
Scripture describes God as the Judge of the earth. But how shall God in justice judge the world? (O
consider this, as in the presence of God, with reverence and godly fear!) How shall God in justice
judge the world, if there be any decree of reprobation? On this supposition, what should those on the
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left hand be condemned for? For their having done evil? They could not help it. There never was a
time when they could have helped it. God, you say, “of old ordained them to this condemnation.”
And “who hath resisted his will?” He “sold” them, you say, “to work wickedness,” even from their
mother’s womb. He “gave them up to a reprobate mind,” or ever they hung upon their mother’s
breast. Shall he then condemn them for what they could not help? (1997: 261–262)
By now a familiar argument. If God has predestined, and let us also say, determined, an individual
to perform some wicked act, such as rejecting Christ, then how can God blame them for thus acting
wickedly? After all, a determining decree from God appears to give them the perfect excuse: they
couldn’t help it! If God has decreed it, then it must come to pass. No one can change that. How,
therefore, can it be that one is blamed for what one cannot change? The reprobate lacks ability;
therefore, he lacks moral responsibility. So goes the argument.
Wesley then proceeds to make a different claim. He claims that reprobation is inconsistent with
the love of God:
So ill do election and reprobation agree with the truth and sincerity of God! But do they not agree
least of all with the scriptural account of his love and goodness? that attribute which God peculiarly
claims, wherein he glories above all the rest. It is not written, “God is justice,” or “God is truth:”
(Although he is just and true in all his ways:) But it is written, “God is love,” love in the abstract,
without bounds; and “there is no end of his goodness.” His love extends even to those who neither
love nor fear him. He is good, even to the evil and the unthankful; yea, without any exposition or
limitation, to all the children of men. For “the Lord is loving” (or good) “to every man, and his
mercy is over all his works.”
But how is God good or loving to a reprobate, or one that is not elected? (1997: 268)
This is a different complaint, but again a fairly natural one. If God is love, and God is loving to all,
then isn’t that inconsistent, or at least in tension, with an unconditional decree of reprobation? If
God is loving to all wouldn't that lead him to electing all? Moreover, if God loves all, then he must
love the reprobate. But how can it in good conscience be said that God loves one he has predestined
to eternal damnation?
In his sermon, ‘Free Grace’, Wesley’s rhetoric is much more strident. He says that Calvinism
destroys  all  [God’s]  Attributes  at  once.  It  overturns  both  his  Justice,  Mercy  and Truth.  Yea,  it
represents the most holy GOD as worse than the Devil; as both more false, more cruel and more
unjust. More False; because the Devil, Liar as he is, hath never said, He willeth all Men to be saved.
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More Unjust, because the Devil cannot, if he would, be guilty of such Injustice as you ascribe to
GOD, when you say, That GOD condemned Millions of Souls to everlasting Fire prepared for the
Devil and his Angels for continuing in Sin, which for want of that Grace he will not give them, they
cannot avoid; And more Cruel, because that unhappy Spirit seeketh Rest and findeth none; so that his
own restless Misery is a kind of Temptation to him to tempt others. But GOD resteth in his high and
Holy Place: So that to suppose him of his own mere Motion, of his pure Will and Pleasure, happy as
he is, to doom his Creatures, whether they will or no, to endless Misery; is to impute such Cruelty to
him, as we cannot impute even to the great Enemy of GOD and Man. It is to represent the most High
GOD (He that hath Ears to hear, let him hear!) as more Cruel, False, and Unjust than the Devil.
(1741: 24–25)
Three claims are made here: that Calvinism makes God (i) false, (ii) unjust, and (iii) cruel. The
claim that Calvinism makes God false appears to come from verses like 1 Timothy 2:3–4, which
read, ‘God our Saviour, who desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the
truth.’ The objection must be that, if God has reprobated certain people, then it can’t be said that he
desires their salvation. Otherwise, wouldn’t he have elected them? God is thought to be more unjust
because of the ability-based reasons given previously: if they can’t avoid God’s decree for them,
how can they be blamed? God is held to be cruel because there appears to be no need for God to
reprobate. What could motivate God to do such a thing?
And yet more objections remain. William Channing is an able mouthpiece for them.
3.20 William Channing
William  Channing  (1780–1842)  was  an  influential  Unitarian  theologian  and  preacher  of  New
England. But early on in his intellectual development he came to oppose the Calvinist doctrine he
encountered. In 1820 he published a tract entitled ‘The Moral Argument Against Calvinism’. The
arguments found there are cut from the same cloth as Wesley’s, and complement them well. Like
Wesley, Channing is naturally repelled by the position of the Westminster Assembly:
Whoever will consult the famous Assembly’s Catechisms and Confession, will see the peculiarities
of the system in all their length and breadth of deformity. A man of plain sense, whose spirit has not
been broken to this creed by education or terror, will think that it is not necessary for us to travel to
heathen countries, to learn how mournfully the human mind may misrepresent the Deity. (1841: 223)
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But what, exactly, is the difficulty with the Confession and the catechisms? Channing says:
[T]he principal argument against Calvinism, in the General View of Christian Doctrines, is the moral
argument, or that which is drawn from the inconsistency of the system with the divine perfections. It
is plain, that a doctrine, which contradicts our best ideas of goodness and justice, cannot come from
the just and good God, or be a true representation of his character. (1841: 221–222)
He goes on:
Christianity, we all agree, is designed to manifest God as perfect benevolence, and to bring men to
love and imitate him. Now is it  probable,  that a religion,  having this object,  gives views of the
Supreme Being, from which our moral convictions and benevolent sentiments shrink with horror,
and which, if made our pattern, would convert us into monsters! It is plain, that,  were a human
parent to form himself on the universal Father, as described by Calvinism, that is, were he to bring
his children into life totally depraved, and then to pursue them with endless punishment, we should
charge him with a cruelty not surpassed in the annals of the world (1841: 238)
The complaint that Calvinism calls into question God’s benevolence can be fairly said to be covered
under the already mentioned argument the Calvinism undermines the love of God, but this section is
to be remarked on because it raises the issue of reprobation in the light of the fatherhood of God. A
complaint like that goes beyond concerns about mere divine benevolence. If it could be shown that
reprobation  is  compatible  with  divine  benevolence,  the  question  would  remain  whether  it  is
compatible with God as  father of humanity. As Channing points out, if an earthly father were to
reprobate his  offspring,  then he would be guilty,  intuitively,  of a great  failure in paternal  duty.
Doesn’t Calvinism imply that God is likewise guilty?
We also appear to see in Channing here a dislike of Hell, endless punishment, itself. He appears
to think that that doctrine too, which is very much a part of the Reformed confessions, also impugns
the goodness of God by attributing to him a cruelty that no earthly ruler could equal. Compared to
the endless suffering of the damned, any torment occurring on this side of the grave will inevitably
come up short. There is a real worry here about the justice of Hell: how can it be just for God to
punish man with an infinite, or endless, punishment for his sins, which appear only finite?
It is the task of this thesis to respond to all these objections, and the thesis is structured around
successive responses to these objections against Calvinism collated in this chapter.
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3:21 Summing Up
This chapter has been somewhat convoluted, so it is worth summarising the main points. We began
by examining Luther’s position on free will, and, despite tensions in his thought, we saw material
there that suggested Luther’s perspective was at least sympathetic to theological determinism. When
we looked at Calvin’s writings, we encountered a far plainer commitment to deterministic thinking.
The Synod of Dort, which convened in response to Arminian theology, was disappointing in its
refusal to endorse the stronger, deterministic strain in Calvinist thought, but that was rectified by the
great Westminster Confession of 1646, which did exemplify those convictions in a number of ways.
All  these  things  demonstrated  that  theological  determinism  is  well-grounded  in  the  Reformed
tradition.
Then we moved to criticisms of Calvinist position. Between them, Wesley and Channing made
the following arguments. (i) That Calvinism removes moral responsibility, because it implies that
man  cannot  do  otherwise  than  God  has  decreed.  This  is  the  argument  from  ability.  (ii)  That
Calvinism, with its doctrine of unconditional reprobation, is incompatible with God’s loving nature.
This is the argument from the love of God. (iii) That Calvinism, again on account of unconditional
reprobation, is inconsistent with the fatherhood of God. This is the argument from divine paternity.
(iv) Lastly, we also saw concerns about the justice of Hell. The chapters that follow are devoted to
responding to these objections. Chapter 4 will deal with the ability argument. Chapter 5 will deal
with an argument  called the manipulation argument,  not mentioned here because it  is  a  recent
invention, and a problem for all compatibilists. Chapter 6 addresses the question of the justice of
Hell. Chapter 7 provides a theodicy of reprobation—explaining what it is that motivates God to
reprobate, thereby vindicating his goodness—and Chapter 8 discusses the love and fatherhood of
God.
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PART 2—THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND FREE
WILL
Chapter 4—The Ability Argument
We saw that many of Calvinism’s critics focused their attention on ability claims, and argued that
deterministic  decrees  cancel  out  moral  responsibility  because  they  cancel  out  the  ability  to  do
otherwise. The idea that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility is a popular
one—it  is  called  the  ‘Principle  of  Alternate  Possibilities’,  and  is  much-discussed  in  the
philosophical literature of the past 50 years. I scrutinise the principle in this chapter. I shall argue
that the truth of this principle can be accommodated by theological determinists—I propose that we
can use a Kratzer-style semantics of ‘can’ to model ‘could have done otherwise’ statements in such
a way that the truth of such expressions is evidently consistent with determinism, and in that way
show that Calvinism’s critics were too hasty in assuming that Calvinism ruled moral responsibility
by ruling out the truth of such expressions.
4.1 Introduction
As I say, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) has been an important principle in the debate
concerning free will and determinism. Here is a statement of it drawn from Widerker and McKenna
(2006: 2).
PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.
The  principle  states  a  necessary  condition  for  acting  in  a  morally  responsible  fashion—no
alternative possibility, no moral responsibility. But why believe PAP? I see it as a presupposition of
a certain conversational practice of ours. Often,  when an individual is accused of some sort of
misdemeanor and he desires to be exonerated from the accusation, he will protest using language of
the following sort: ‘I couldn’t help it!’ or ‘But there was nothing I could have done!’ or ‘I wasn’t
able to do anything about it!’. Moreover, it isn’t common to hear a retort of the sort, ‘It doesn’t
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matter that you couldn’t help it—you are still guilty’. A response like that merely baffles. The far
more common way to convince the man of his guilt is to say, ‘No, you could have helped it. You
could have done such-and-such.’ We can see PAP, therefore, as a codification of the principle that
governs this practice. We therefore appear to accept that disclamations of the ability to do otherwise
(if true) are sufficient for exculpation. But if the absence of this ability is sufficient for the absence
of moral responsibility, then the presence of the ability must be necessary for moral responsibility.
Hence, PAP.
PAP is an important premise in what I call the Naive Ability Argument for Incompatibilism.
This, I take it, is the argument that Wesley et al. have in mind. The argument is as follows:
(1) If someone is morally responsible for performing an action at t, then they could have done
otherwise at t.21
(2) If determinism is true, then, for any time t, no-one could have done otherwise than they did
at t.22
Ergo,
(3) If determinism is true, then no-one is morally responsible for performing any action.
(1) is an expression of PAP, and (2) is the intuitive suggestion that if a description of the past up till
t in conjunction with the laws of nature entails that you perform some action A at t, then you could
not, at t, have done otherwise than A.
Compatibilists are split over how to respond to this argument. Historically, compatibilists denied
premise (2); until the 1970s compatibilists were keen to construe abilities in such a way that it was
clear that, if their account were correct, then determinism didn’t remove the ability to do otherwise.
Such compatibilists are now called ‘classical compatibilists’ (see Berofsky 2006). They typically
defended conditional analyses of ability, saying something like the following:
(CAB) An agent S has the ability to do otherwise at t iff were S to try/sufficiently desire/intend
to do otherwise at t, they would do otherwise.
21 Advocates of PAP admit that you may be morally responsible in cases of derivative responsibility for an action you
performed at t even though you couldn’t have done otherwise at t. Recall that you are usually still responsible for
the things you can’t help doing when drunk because you usually could have refrained from getting drunk in the first
place. It is non-derivative moral responsibility is the object of concern here.
22 The first instant of time, if there is such, may be considered an exception to this. But since human beings and their
acts came to be after the first instant had been and gone, this point is immaterial. Make t a variable ranging over all
instants later than the first instant, if you wish. See Bailey 2012 for discussion.
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How they construed the content of the antecedent varied from one such compatibilist to another, but
it  is  clear  that  the  truth  of  determinism  is  not  itself  any  obstacle  to  our  possessing  abilities
understood  in  this  fashion.  The  truth  of  determinism  entails  that  they  won’t try/sufficiently
desire/intend to do otherwise; nevertheless, were this to happen, they would do otherwise.
But  compatibilists  fell  away  from  this  view.  Beginning  in  the  1970s,  a  new  breed  of
compatibilist appeared: the semi-compatibilist. With John Martin Fischer as their leader, they grew
in numbers and influence until they became the dominant strain in compatibilist thought. The semi-
compatibilist responds to the argument by denying (1)—he judges it a mistake to suppose that the
ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility.
What accounts for this changing of the guard? What gave the semi-compatibilist the chutzpah
necessary to deny such an intuitive principle? Several things. On the one hand, there were Austin
(1961) and Lehrer’s (1968) attacks on CAB. But the chief catalyst of change came in 1969 with
Frankfurt’s  influential  paper  ‘Alternate  Possibilities  and  Moral  Responsibility’.  In  that  paper
Frankfurt offered several counterexamples to PAP; a developed version of the most celebrated of
them is as follows.
Black is a neuroscientist of considerable expertise who hates Smith. Indeed, Black hates Smith so
much that he desires Smith dead. Now Black also knows that Jones hates Smith. One day Black
finds out, to his delight, that Jones has formed a plan to murder Smith. But Jones is a temperamental
fellow, and Black is worried that Jones might change his mind or that his nerve might fail him. So
Black implants a device in Jones’s brain without Jones’s knowledge. This device monitors Jones’s
brain activity, and as soon as there is any indication that Jones is not going to follow through on his
plan, then Black will use the device to cause Jones to kill Smith. As it happens, Jones shows no sign
of reneging on his plan, and he murders Smith.
Surely it is true, says Frankfurt, that (i) Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith and that (ii)
Jones was not, thanks to Black’s device, able to do otherwise. So, PAP, says Frankfurt, is false.
Semi-compatibilists agree.
After word of these things spread, classical compatibilism fell  out of fashion and the semi-
compatibilist approach became more popular. Frankfurt changed everything, or at least the face of
compatibilism. But I think that was a mistake.  I shall defend in this chapter a modest classical
compatibilism that assumes that it is not, strictly speaking, abilities that PAP is concerned with, but
a certain species of possibility. My account builds on the Lewis-Kratzer understanding of ‘can’, and
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it permits us another way of seeing that the truth of determinism is compatible with the possibility
of doing otherwise.
4.2 Analysis of modals
David Lewis, in a famous 1976 paper on the paradoxes of time travel, considers whether we ought
to  say,  of  a  man who has  travelled  back in  time and who is  appropriately  situated  to  kill  his
grandfather, that he can kill his grandfather. On the one hand, we can suppose he satisfies all the
ordinary criteria for being able to do it (well-armed, fit, has an excellent opportunity), and therefore
that he can; but on the other hand, it appears sound reasoning that he can’t, for we can infer from
the man’s very existence that his grandfather survives and reproduces. Lewis proposes the following
resolution: ‘To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain
facts. Which facts? That is determined [...] by context. [...] What I can do, relative to one set of
facts, I cannot do, relative to another, more inclusive, set.’ (1976: 150). So, relative to the fellow’s
intrinsic properties and opportunity, he can kill his grandfather, but relative to a broader set of facts
that includes his grandfather’s future existence, he cannot. Disappointingly, beyond the resolution of
this paradox, Lewis doesn’t go on to deploy this framework as part of a general theory of ability
ascriptions.
But Kratzer does. Her approach, like Lewis’s, sees context as supplying a set of facts relative to
which the ‘can’ claim is assessed. In her influential 1977 and 1981 papers (reprinted and revised in
her 2012a collection), she offers a premise semantics for the modals ‘must’ and ‘can’, according to
which ‘must’ functions to express the logical consequence of a proposition from a set of premises
and ‘can’ functions to express the compatibility of a proposition with a set of premises.
By way of illustration, she asks us to consider the following expressions:
(A) All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors.
(B) The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
(C) When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungunu said: Rakaipaka must be our chief.
The three expressions all contain a ‘must’ but the ‘musts’ appear to belong to different modalities.
The ‘must’ of (A) appears deontic and so concerns something like duty; the ‘must’ of (B) looks like
it is epistemic; and the ‘must’ of (C) looks like it concerns something like prudence: what would be
best for the people of Kahungunu.
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So, given the apparently different foci of these ‘musts’, what is their common element? Kratzer
thinks that sentences (A)–(C) are incomplete. To make them complete we add something like the
following:
(A') Given the duties incumbent on Maori children, they must learn the names of their ancestors.
(B') Given what we know, the ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
(C') When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungunu said:  In view of what is best for the
tribe, Rakaipaka must be our chief.
The italicised portions indicate the clauses that were suppressed in the original expressions, what
Kratzer calls the conversational background. It is these hidden portions that function to pick out the
set of premises that the central  proposition asserted is  assessed relative to.  Following Kratzer’s
(2012b) terminology, let’s call this picked out set of premises the ‘modal restriction’. So we can
distinguish three elements in the resulting picture: the modal force—a ‘must’ or a ‘can’; the modal
scope—the  central  proposition  explicitly  asserted;  and  the  modal  restriction—a  contextually
supplied set of premises relative to which the modal scope is assessed.
If we say all that, then we can give an account of the meaning of ‘must’ and ‘can’ that isn’t a
long and tiresome disjunctive one that makes reference to every different sort of modality. Instead
we can just say this:
‘Must’ expresses that the
<modal restriction> logically implies the <modal scope>
and ‘can’, being the dual of ‘must’, expresses that the
<modal restriction> is logically compatible with the <modal scope>
It isn’t hard to see how we get the modal scope—it is the central proposition asserted—but what of
the modal restriction? How do we arrive at that? The answer lies in the conversational backgrounds.
In Kratzer’s view these are contextually provided functions that assign to every possible world a set
of propositions (the premises). By way of example, consider (B') above. The function that context
pro- vides is an epistemic one, concerned with what a certain group of people know. So for each
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possible world the function assigns a set of propositions (or premises) that include all and only that
which is common knowledge at that time for that community in that world.
So with f as the contextually supplied function from the set of all possible worlds, and w and p
being variables ranging over worlds and propositions respectively, we can put Kratzer’s central idea
in symbols (where the ‘ ’ denotes strict implication).⇒
‘Must’ expresses that
f(w)  ⇒ p
and ‘can’ expresses that
~(f(w)  ~⇒ p).
This much more or less captures Kratzer’s early 1977 work on the topic.23 But her later 1981 work
gave a more complicated picture. She later suggested that the conversational background is really
com- posed of  two functions  from worlds  to  sets  of  premises,  namely  a  modal  base f and an
ordering source g. The modal base functions, as above, to get us a set of premises, and the ordering
source does the same. But the set of propositions derived by the ordering source is used to induce an
order on the worlds that the modal base is true at. Then ‘must  p’ holds iff  p is true in all worlds
closest to the ideal specified by the ordering source, and ‘can p’ holds iff p is true in at least one of
the worlds closest to the ordering source.
I do not wish to go into detail about this later account and the reasons for introducing this more
complicated apparatus. I will, for ease of understanding and accessibility, work with the framework
given by Kratzer’s earlier account. However, for those familiar with Kratzer’s later work, I will
make it plain in a later footnote how my theory should be stated relative to her more developed
account.
4.3 Analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’
We now need to apply all this to PAP. PAP is the claim that the truth of the expression ‘S could have
done otherwise’ is necessary for S to be morally responsible for whatever act S performed. But
23 I have left out how she handles inconsistent modal restrictions, but that is immaterial for my purposes because, on
the account I will give, it will not be possible for the modal restriction to be inconsistent.
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‘could have done otherwise’ is an ambiguous expression in at least two ways. Firstly, ‘could have’ is
ambiguous between a subjunctive and an indicative reading.24 On the indicative reading it occurs as
the past form of ‘can’, where ‘can’ is understood to mean ‘be able to’, such that ‘S could have done
otherwise’ means ‘S was able to do otherwise’.25 On the subjunctive reading, ‘could have’ is the past
form of the present tense subjunctive ‘could’. This subjunctive interpretation doesn’t have abilities
in view, and instead holds that it is various circumstances that might have obtained that are in view,
various possibilities that could have come to pass.  On such a reading, the ‘could have’ can be
viewed as equivalent to the non-epistemic ‘might have’, such that ‘S could have ϕ-ed’ means ‘S
might have ϕ-ed’, rather than ‘S was able to ϕ’.
So, the indicative ‘could have’ deals with ability, and the subjunctive ‘could have’ talks about
possibility.  But  once we are  aware  of  this,  the following idea  might  occur  to  one:  rather  than
assuming that PAP is concerned with the ability to do otherwise, we might instead suppose that it is
concerned with the possibility of doing otherwise. We could assume that it is only the truth of the
subjunctive ‘could have’ that is necessary for moral responsibility, while supposing that the truth of
the indicative ‘could have’ is not, strictly speaking, necessary. In this chapter, I shall make this
assumption. I say: grant me this modest assumption, and I can give you a classical compatibilism
that evades the standard objections.
A great advantage of making this move is that one avoids entirely the debate about satisfactory
analyses of ability ascriptions. Abilities aren’t in view at all, only a certain sort of possibility.
But is it a plausible move to make? Someone might make the following objection: ‘But we
don’t talk only about whether or not someone could have done otherwise, we also talk about, in
present cases, whether some individual can do otherwise, and ‘can’ is in the indicative.’ It is true
that ‘can’ takes the indicative, but it would be a mistake to think that, because of this, it must always
be abilities rather than possibilities in view. A distinction is often drawn between the ‘“can” of
ability’ and the ‘“can” of possibility’ (see Vetter 2015: 76). That there is a clear possibilist use of
‘can’ can be seen from the following examples: ‘You got burgled? Well, these things can happen.’
‘Learning a language can be a difficult affair.’ ‘Propositions can be true; contradictions cannot be
true.’ They all resist a parsing into ability language. ‘Burglaries are able to happen.’ ‘Learning a
language is able to be a difficult affair.’ ‘Propositions are able to be true, but contradictions aren’t
able.’ All such expressions, even if one might not be prepared to say that they are strictly incorrect,
are nevertheless decidedly awkward and unnatural. This is because we are trying to get ability-talk
24 A distinction van Inwagen ably deploys in his 1984 response to Dennett 1984.
25 Or perhaps, more carefully, ‘S was both able and had an opportunity to do otherwise’, if we think that the ‘have’
modifier forces our attention to a particular occasion. ‘I could run a marathon’, where ‘could’ is the past form of the
abilitative ‘can’, talks about a general ability possessed in the past; ‘I could have run a marathon’ suggests that one
was able and also in a good position to run a marathon on a particular occasion. I thank Simon Kittle for this point.
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to do a job better done by possibility-talk. One way of detecting the ‘can’ of possibility is to see
whether the sentence carries an identical meaning if you replace the ‘can’ with ‘may’ (just so long
as it is clear that the ‘may’ is not expressive of permission or the deontic modality). This works for
the  above examples.  ‘Burglaries  may happen.’ ‘Learning a  language may be  a  difficult  affair.’
‘Propositions may be true, but contradictions may not.’ This is because ‘may’ can also be used to
express possibility.
So, I can accommodate currently occurring moral-responsibility contexts by supposing that the
‘can’ in the ‘can do otherwise’ that occurs on such occasions is the ‘can’ of possibility. It might be
suspected that I press for possibility rather than ability because I think that Kratzer’s apparatus, for
all its success, cannot satisfactorily handle abilities.26 I agree that Kratzer’s account appears in its
best light when it is seen as giving a model of the ‘can’ of possibility, rather than the ‘can’ of ability.
Nevertheless,  whether  or  not  the  Kratzer  semantics  can  give  an  adequate  analysis  of  ability
ascriptions,  discussion  of  that  remains  for  another  occasion.  Defending  that  supposition  would
involve, among other things, responding at length to the formal objections made against the idea by
Anthony Kenny (1975: 136–7).
It might also be objected, however, that we also use ‘able’-talk when we talk about whether or
not someone ‘can do’ or ‘could have done’ otherwise. We also ask ‘are they able to do otherwise?’
and ‘were they able to do otherwise?’. We do indeed use such expressions, but, on the view I am
proposing  here,  this  is  a  mistake,  though  a  very  understandable  one.  Given  the  very  close
connection between the ‘can’ of ability and the ‘can’ of possibility, and the subjunctive ‘could have’
and the indicative ‘could have’, we can’t expect the ordinary-language user to pay careful attention
to such subtleties, especially in a context that concerns agents. Indeed, we would positively expect
him to slide, in his benighted ignorance, from possibility-talk to ability-talk and back again, thus
confounding what should be kept separate.
One last objection that might be made at this juncture is this: if I am eschewing abilities as,
strictly speaking, unnecessary for moral responsibility, then it might be wondered if the account I
am giving is really classically compatibilist at all. Weren’t the classical compatibilists of old all
concerned to defend the relevance of ability ascriptions to moral responsibility? Well, I agree that
they were, but it is also nevertheless clear that I am a classical compatibilist of some sort. I accept
PAP, and therefore accept that the truth of a ‘could have done otherwise’ expression is necessary for
moral responsibility. Moreover, I don’t say anything like, ‘People naively supposed that alternative
possibilities were necessary for moral responsibility. But that was a mistake. What we are  really
26 Maier’s pessimistic  judgement  that  ‘the Kratzer  semantics  alone does not suffice to settle  questions about the
agentive modalities.’ (2013: 115) appears to be a popular one.
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interested in when we ask whether or not someone could have done otherwise is the following
feature ...’. That is the sort of thing semi-compatibilists say. I am not to be counted amongst their
number. I accept the requirement for alternative possibilities. That said, I recognise that the account
I am giving is not as fully fledged or as substantial as other classical compatibilisms—but that is
why I call it ‘modest’.
Finally, let’s return to the second way in which ‘could have done otherwise’ is ambiguous: we
don’t know what doing otherwise involves. I shall  take it  to mean intending otherwise.  I think
examples like Fischer and Ravizza’s ‘Sharks’ case show this (1998: 125). John is walking by a pool.
He sees a child drowning. He is not inclined to get himself wet, so he continues walking. We think
John is  a  wicked  man,  and  we  are  inclined  to  blame him for  not  saving  the  child.  However,
unbeknownst to John, there were sharks in the water, and, were John to have attempted to rescue the
child, he would have been set upon and eaten. So, he couldn’t have saved the child in any case.
Does this mean we cannot blame him? After all, he couldn’t have done otherwise than fail to save
the child. But I think that only shows that he must be guilty on account of the presence of a different
alternative possibility, namely, that he could have decided to try and save the child yet did not. But
such decidings and choosings are, as I supposed at the start of this thesis, simply the forming of
intentions. So, we can hold John guilty for not intending otherwise than he did.
4.4 Applying the Kratzer semantics to ‘could have done otherwise’
So, if we are understanding ‘could’ in the way proposed by Kratzer’s early model, then we need to
ask ourselves: what is the modal restriction? It is clear what the modal scope is: it is ‘S intends
otherwise at  t’. But if ‘could’ expresses the compossibility of a set of premises with the modal
scope, then we need to know what these premises are. What sort of conversational background does
our ‘could have done otherwise’-talk presuppose? If we use ‘f’ as a variable ranging over functions
that perform the role of the modal restriction, then we can use ‘fm’ as a variable ranging over a
certain subset of those functions, which subset handles the sort of moral-responsibility contexts we
are concerned with.  fm,  I  shall  suppose,  will  vary according to which particular  occasion of an
agent’s acting is being considered. For every possible world in which the agent in question acts on
that one particular occasion in question, fm will assign to that world a non-empty set of propositions.
fm is therefore a function from worlds to sets of premises; but what are these premises to which it
takes us?
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If we are to cast the incompatibilist in a Kratzerian mould, then he might say this: fm takes from
every possible world two things in forming the premise set; it takes (i) the laws of nature that hold at
that  world (N) and (ii) a complete description of the history of the universe of that world that
includes all and only such moments that are prior  to the agent performing his act at t (D).27 And,
indeed, if it is true that
(4) {N, D}  ~(S intends otherwise at ⇒ t),
it therefore follows, if the incompatibilist is right, that S could not have intended otherwise relative
to this set of premises.
But we don’t need to take the incompatibilist’s word for it that this is how to characterise the
function in question. It is my contention that we should take  fm to be a function from worlds to
propositions describing psychological setups such that the relevant possibility of doing otherwise
consists in something like psychological compossibility—the idea that S’s intending otherwise at t
must  be  compossible  with  S’s  psychological  setup  prior  to  t in  order  for  the  morally  relevant
alternative possibility to obtain. What do I mean to include in these psychological setups? Let me
explain.
I introduce my account by way of the following distinctions made by Robert Kane concerning
the ambiguity of the term ‘will’. Kane says we ought to distinguish the following three senses of the
word ‘will’:
(i) what I want, desire, or prefer to do
(ii) what I choose, decide, or intend to do
(iii) what I try, endeavor or make an effort to do (Kane 1998: 26)28
He calls (i) the desiderative or appetitive will, (ii) the rational will, and (iii) the striving will (1998:
27). The desiderative will is easy to understand: it is your desires, your wants. The rational will
concerns the decisions you make, typically (at least in part) on the basis of your desires; if you like
to drink coffee, you may decide to purchase some. The distinction between the rational and the
striving will is more subtle, but it is recognised once we realise that deciding to buy some coffee
isn’t sufficient for striving for some coffee. I may decide to buy some coffee while I am at work, but
27 Though an incompatibilist such as van Inwagen (1984) would, if I read him correctly, take the question of the
compossibility of N and D with doing otherwise as a  consequence of his account of ability,  rather than as an
analysis of it.
28 To Kane’s list we might also add commands as a type of will. To flout the commands of a monarch is to flout his
will, even though the monarch might not desire or intend, for some reason(s), that his commands be fulfilled.
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because I know that I won’t have the opportunity to buy some coffee until I leave work, I only try or
endeavour to buy some coffee after I leave the office.29
Kane also says, ‘If there is indeterminacy in free will, on my view, it must come somewhere
between the input and the output—between desiderative and rational will.’ (1998: 27). And this, I
think, is right. I think all parties to the debate, whether compatibilist, libertarian or whatever, must
acknowledge this threefold distinction of will. Moreover, we all also realise that the locus of the
free-will debate is found here between the desiderative will on the one hand, and the rational and
striving  will  on  the  other.  As  Kane  points  out,  I  think  we  would  all  be  happy  with  a  purely
deterministic  relation  from  the  rational  to  the  striving  will,  but  we  are  not  all  happy  with  a
deterministic  relation from the desiderative will  to  the rational  will,  for libertarians would take
strong exception.
But  note that our judgements of praise and approbation are sensitive too to this  distinction
between the desiderative will  and the rational  will.  If  a  man is  genetically  disposed to  a  short
temper, then we don’t blame him for that. We say something like, ‘He can’t help the desires he was
born with [the desiderative will], but we can hold him accountable for what he does with those
desires [the rational will] (so long as they don’t compel him)’. The distinction here concerns what
an agent is given, what he finds himself with, and what he does with what he has been given. The
desiderative will concerns the former, and the rational will the latter. This distinction is one we all
intuitively acknowledge in our assessments of moral responsibility.
But once armed with this distinction I think we have all we need to state a plausible classical
compatibilism. We say that fm—the modal restriction found in PAP—is a function that moves from a
world to a set of premises that offers a complete description of the relevant agent’s desiderative will
prior to their choosing. The central suggestion of this chapter can therefore be put like this: to claim
that ‘S could have done otherwise’ in the sense required for moral responsibility is just to claim that
S’s intending otherwise was compatible with their desiderative will. More formally, that
(5) ~(S’s desiderative will  ~(S intends otherwise)).⇒
And to say that ‘S couldn’t have done otherwise’ means
(6) S’s desiderative will  ~(S intends otherwise).⇒
29 It may be that the distinction between the rational and the striving will doesn’t amount to much. It may be only the
distinction between deciding now to do something now and deciding now to do something later.
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I think we can see the force of this idea when we consider scenarios where we would be inclined to
describe the desiderative will as en- tailing the rational. Consider a case of a man with a strong
addiction to heroin; in fact, his addiction is so strong that it is literally irresistible. We don’t wish to
hold a man responsible for what he does under irresistible compulsion, and my account explains
why: in such a case it looks as if what the agent chooses follows inevitably from his desiderative
will, his addictive desires. Intuitively speaking, these make choosing otherwise impossible relative
to the desiderative will and so remove his moral responsibility.
So far so good, but in fact (5) and (6) are too weak. A description of the desiderative will by
itself doesn’t really entail very much. We want it to be the case that the addict’s decision is entailed
by his desiderative will. But it won’t be, for without any beliefs about how to fulfil one’s desires,
even an overwhelming desire can find no outlet in action. So we should include a description of the
agent’s  doxastic  states  alongside  the  description  of  their  desiderative  will.  For  the  sake  of
completeness, we might also want to include the agent’s experiential states as well, in case we think
they might have some bearing. I will suppose that the doxastic, desiderative and experiential states
of the agent constitute the agent’s psychological setup. I intend the psychological setup to include
all those aspects of the agent’s makeup that are commonly supposed to be the ‘springs of action’—
beliefs and desires, even if they are not enough to provide an  analysis of decision, are often
considered adequate to account for all those features explanatorily relevant to the agent’s decision-
making in ordinary cases.30 So,  we should therefore replace  ‘S’s  desiderative  will’ in (5) and (6)
with ‘S’s psychological setup’.
Is the psychological setup enough to get us the required entailment from addictive desires to
acting upon such desires? It is not, because it may be that the addict ceases to exist before any
choice  issues  from  his  mental  faculties.  So,  we  need  to  include  S’s  continued  existence  (E)
alongside a description of S’s psychological setup. But including S’s continued existence in (5) and
(6) isn’t enough either. For suppose that an addict is going to act on an irresistible desire. We want it
to be impossible for him to do otherwise. However, again, it won’t be, because it may be that an
external force (an angel swooping down from heaven, say) interferes and causes the addict to intend
otherwise than that which the desiderative will would have determined. So, we must also include
the claim that the agent is not interfered with in such a way. All I intend to include in this non-
interference claim (NI) is the idea that no force external to the agent and the agent’s psychological
setup is directly causally responsible for the agent’s producing his decision. The only admissible
30 I am not particularly concerned to limit the psychological setup of the agent to beliefs, desires and experiences. If it
should emerge that  it  would be better for  my account to include yet  more aspects of the mind as  part  of  the
psychological setup, then I am happy for the psychological setup to be expanded as required—with one proviso:
that it does not include what I introduce below as the ‘individual nature of the agent’.
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candidates are features intrinsic to the agent or his psychological setup. But continued existence (E)
and non-interference (NI) aren’t enough either; we must also include the laws of psychology (P), for
without these there is nothing to rule out the possibility of an overwhelming desire to φ’s giving rise
to ψ-ing rather than φ-ing.
The resulting analysis is therefore  more complicated. Suppose S made a decision at t. Strictly
speaking, fm must generate all the above premises such that a  more complete understanding of ‘S
could have done otherwise at t’ in the sense required for moral responsibility is this:
(7) ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P}  ~(S intends otherwise at ⇒ t)).
Spelled out:
An agent S could have done otherwise at t (in the sense required for moral responsibility) iff a
description  of  S’s  desiderative  will,  and S’s  doxastic  and experiential  states,  over  an interval31
immediately prior to t in conjunction with the claims that (i) S continues to exist until t and (ii) S’s
decision-making at t was not directly caused by any force external to the agent or his psychological
setup, and with (iii) the actual laws of psychology, do not entail that S choose as he did at t.32
Is this the final analysis? I think we must make one more adjustment. (7) would give, I think,
the wrong result in cases where the decision of the agent is the result of direct causal interference by
an external force. If an angel swoops down from heaven and causes me to decide, in a manner that
bypasses  the  psychological  setup,  to  sing  ‘God  Save  the  Queen’,  then  wouldn’t  I,  if  people
complained about the noise and I were aware of what the angel had done, complain that I could not
help it? But (7) would get the result that I could have helped it, because my not choosing to sing
would be entirely consistent with my psychological setup, etc. just prior to the angel swooping
down and causing me to decide to sing.
As a result, I think we must also suppose NI to be actually true, and the decision brought about
in the proper manner for the ‘could have done otherwise’ claim to be true. So, in addition to the con-
tent generated by fm, we will have to add the non-interference claim alongside it. The final analysis
of ‘S could have done otherwise at t’ is therefore:
31 It does not matter which interval, for, even if the interval is very long, what S’s psychological setup was like in the
distant past won’t be relevant to what it is possible for S to intend at t—what will be relevant is S’s psychological
setup as t approaches.
32 For those desirous to know how my account would be incorporated into Kratzer’s later framework, it is achieved as
follows: let the propositions detailing S’s instantiation of his psychological setup be the modal base. E, NI and P are
to be considered as the ordering source.
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(8) NI & ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P}  ~(S intends otherwise at ⇒ t)).
‘S couldn’t have done otherwise at t’ is just the negation of (9):
(9) ~(NI & ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P}  ~(S intends otherwise at ⇒ t))).
It might be thought that narrowing things down to whether or not an agent can intend otherwise
given  his  psychological  setup  is  too  restrictive  a  model  to  handle  the  great  variety  of  moral-
responsibility  contexts.33 Suppose a  mugger  holds  a  gun to my head and suggests  it  would be
prudent for me to relinquish possession of my immediate finances. I agree and hand my wallet over.
If, after the fact, someone were to challenge the propriety of my doing so, I might well respond that
‘I couldn’t have done otherwise’. Such an expression would be strictly false on my account: after
all, I could have formed the intention to fight the mugger. Or suppose I am tied up and a child
drowns in front of me as I watch helplessly. I would again complain that I couldn’t have done
otherwise. But this will likewise be false on my account: I could have intended differently.
One might think, therefore, that an account of the modal restriction that varies more widely in
generated content given context would be desirable. In the mugging case, one might say, the modal
restriction wouldn’t generate a description of my desires, but instead a set of rules about what are
reasonable courses of action given the value of one’s life. In that case, what I mean when I say ‘I
couldn’t have done otherwise’ is that my resisting the mugger was not possible relative to those
rules. In the case of the drowning child, it  might be suggested that the modal restriction would
generate a list of all possible bodily exertions in that situation, such that the ‘I couldn’t help it’ claim
expresses the conviction that relative to my position and the laws of nature, there was no possible
bodily exertion that would have resulting in the breaking of my bonds.
Such an account might, at the end of the day, be a better way to go. There would be no type of
modal restriction distinctive to moral-responsibility contexts in that  case. Nevertheless,  my  more
uniform account can still handle these sorts of examples. In the mugging case, what I really mean
when I say that ‘I couldn’t have done otherwise’ is that I couldn’t have reasonably done otherwise.
In other words, yes, I could have done otherwise, but it wouldn’t have been reasonable to do so
(because I would have been shot). In the drowning child case, when I say that ‘I couldn’t have done
otherwise’ I am again speaking loosely. Indeed, strictly speaking, I could have done otherwise, but
33 I thank Pablo Rychter for this suggestion.
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what I mean is that, of all the things I could have intended, none of them would have had the
desired result (the rescuing of the child).
Whatever the advantages of variant accounts, it is the analysis given in (8) and (9) that I am
defending on this particular occasion. It seems to get us what the compatibilist wants. It appears
sufficient to ensure that the addict cannot do otherwise, yet doesn’t require anything like the falsity
of determinism. Furthermore, it avoids all the old objections to CAB. I have not analysed the ‘could
have done otherwise’ claim as a subjunctive conditional,  and therefore the objections to the  old
classical compatibilism aimed to exploit this feature cannot be deployed against my proposal. I have
made  the  suggestion  that the alternative possibilities requirement on moral responsibility  is
concerned with compatibility or compossibility, rather than the truth  of  various  ‘would’
conditionals:  broadly speaking,  just  so long as one’s desiderative will is compatible with one’s
deciding to do otherwise, then one ‘could have done otherwise’ in the sense required for  moral
responsibility. Such, I suggest, is the compossibility that PAP is fundamentally concerned with.
4.5 Frankfurt and other considerations
Why might compatibilists have overlooked this suggestion? I think there are two reasons. Firstly,
compatibilism has often been understood, both by its proponents and its opponents, as precisely the
claim that the rational will is fixed by the desiderative will! The traditional ‘strongest desire wins’
compatibilism of Hobbes (1651) and Edwards (1977 [1754]), for instance, is a compatibilism that
insists  that  our decisions  are determined by what the understanding recognises as the strongest
desire.  I don’t think that such compatibilisms have an adequate way of handling overwhelming
desires—the addict, if literally overwhelmed by his desire for a drug, surely has his responsibility
diminished,  if not removed—so I don’t  consider it  a problem that  my way of securing PAP is
inconsistent with their proposals.
Secondly, it might be thought that the phrasing I reach for is too close to libertarian phraseology
for comfort. Locating the freedom of the agent in what the agent does with his desires and so forth
looks like exactly the sort of thing libertarians have demanded throughout the years. Well, I would
concede that the theory I give here is a concession of sorts to the libertarian: he was quite right to
insist on a measure of independence for the rational will from the desiderative. It might then be
wondered how I can concede this consistently with the truth of determinism. For if the desiderative
will, or the psychological setup more broadly, doesn’t determine the rational will, then what does?
But what lies between the psychological setup and the rational will? It is the agent. It is he who
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decides what is going to happen given the content of the desiderative will. Accordingly, I move that
it is the individual nature of the agent that determines the rational will. I don’t mean by ‘nature’ the
essential properties of the agent—they might not be essential to either being an agent or being that
particular agent—I merely intend to describe categorical properties of the agent distinct from the
psychological setup that I think explain why one decision rather than another is issued in typical
cases of decision-making.
This helps make it clear how my theory differs from the libertarian’s (or Arminian’s); for let ‘A’
denote S’s individual agential nature; then I am happy to agree that 
(10) {S’s psychological setup, E, I, P, A}  ~(S intends otherwise at ⇒ t)
can be true consistently with the truth of ‘S could have done otherwise’ (in the moral-responsibility
sense). But the libertarian denies this. For the libertarian insists that, broadly speaking, there must
be no entailment from the psychological setup plus  anything (or at least  any hard fact34) to the
rational  will  for the relevant  possibility  of doing otherwise to obtain.  I  contend for the weaker
position that, speaking loosely, there must merely be no entailment from the psychological setup to
the rational will. Nevertheless, still speaking loosely, I do believe that there is an entailment from
the psychological setup plus the nature of the agent to the rational will.
Finally,  let’s  deal with Frankfurt’s celebrated counterexample to  PAP. Frankfurt was trying to
give us an example where an agent was morally responsible for what he did, but couldn’t have done
otherwise. I think it should be clear, relative to my account of ‘could have  done otherwise’, that
Frankfurt’s scenario is one where Jones could have done otherwise. (8) is a conjunction, and so if
Frankfurt’s counterexample is to succeed, then at least one of these conjuncts will have to be false
of Jones. Is the non-interference (NI) claim false? It is not. It is an important part of Frankfurt-style
counterexamples that there is no actual interference by Black or his device at all. Such things turn
out to be entirely unnecessary in securing Jones’s decision. Is it the second conjunct that is false? Is
there any entailment from Jones’s psychological setup, in conjunction with his continued existence,
his not being interfered with, and the laws of psychology to his not doing otherwise than deciding to
go ahead and kill Smith? We have no reason to think so. We would have, if Jones acted from an
addiction  or  compulsion.  But  again,  Jones’s  decision  is  supposed  to  be  (aside  from  its  grim
objective) a regular and ordinary piece of decision-making. Jones is not supposed to be driven along
by an overwhelming inferno of desire.  We do not,  therefore,  have any reason to think that  his
decision to go ahead and kill Smith is entailed in the relevant way, quite the contrary.
34 See Plantinga 1986 for an explanation of the distinction between hard and soft facts.
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Nor does Black’s brooding presence  over  Jones’s  activity  do anything  to affect  this  lack of
entailment. The only way in which we could get the conclusion that Jones couldn’t do otherwise (in
the relevant sense) on account of Black is if the set of premises fm points us to includes a description
of Black, his behaviour, his device, and his  motives. But my account is of a fundamentally
abstractive character: I am interested in whether or not the agent’s psychological setup, considered
in the abstract, is consistent with a different intention being formed. So, fm will never stray so far
outside the agent as to include someone else and their schemes in the set of premises it points us to,
and for this reason Black will always be irrelevant, and all such Frankfurt-style counterexamples
will fail to counter.
4.6 Conclusion
Thus, we see that there is no need for the Calvinist to insist, as Luther appeared to do, that because it is
impossible for the reprobate to turn to Christ, and because the reprobate is nevertheless blamed for his
refusal to turn, our moral-responsibility discourse is radically mistaken. It is indeed impossible relative to
God’s  determining  decree  that  the  reprobate  should  turn,  but  it  is  not impossible  relative  to  the
reprobate’s psychological setup, and it is this fact that permits the Calvinist to retain, without substantive
alteration, the natural assumption that blameworthiness requires that one ‘could have done otherwise’.
So much for the argument from ability. I turn in the next chapter to what is called the ‘manipulation
argument’. This argument is a recent development, and therefore not to be found on the lips of the
historical opponents of Calvinism. But the argument’s great place in recent discussions of compatibilism
and incompatibilism make it prudent for it to be addressed.
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Chapter 5—The Manipulation Argument
5.1 Introducing the Argument
For the reasons given in the past chapter, I am largely unmoved by the ability-based arguments for
incompatibilism.  I  am  more  impressed  by  manipulation  arguments.  There  is,  I  feel,  a  bite  to
manipulation arguments that is absent from arguments from ability. Moreover, as we shall see, the
manipulation argument threatens to have extra bite when directed at the theological determinist.
There  are  objections  to  the  argument  that  the  secular  determinist  can  make  that  his  theistic
counterpart cannot. But we shall also see that there are unexpected advantages that the theological
determinist will have when crafting a response that his secular peer does not have access to.
What is the argument, then? Consider the following scenario. You work a dreary old job in a
dreary old office. But one day at your place of work something interesting happens. Your colleague,
Ivan, is peculiarly animated this morning. He gestures you over to his desk. You comply.  Here
shows you a very intricate piece of technology that he is hiding beneath his desk. ‘With this device,’
he whispers, ‘I can tap into people’s brain waves. More than that, I can send signals to people’s
brains, causing them to do whatever I program into this device!’ You are incredulous. ‘Don’t believe
me, eh?’ He replies. ‘Well, you just watch this.’ He fiddles with the device. ‘I’ve just tapped into the
boss’s brain waves. You remember those briefs we handed in late last week? I’ve send instructions
to his brain that will cause him to storm out of his room in a few seconds, and rant at us for handing
them in late.’ Sure enough, a few seconds later, the boss emerges from his office, red-faced and
furious,  and proceeds to  harangue you and your  colleague at  length  for  your  tardiness,  before
returning to  the privacy of  his  studio.  You are amazed.  ‘Perhaps it  is  just  a  coincidence’,  you
suggest falteringly. ‘Still unpersuaded?’ says Ivan, fiddling once more with the device. ‘Fine. I’ve
just send another signal to the boss’s brain. This time I’ve told him to come out and sing us some
opera.’ Once again, the incredible happens. Your boss emerges from his enclosure, and the whole
office  floor  is  treated  to  a  (surprisingly  pleasant)  rendition  of  the  anvil  chorus  from Verdi’s  Il
Trovatore.
Were  such a  scenario  to  come to pass,  you would  no  doubt  be  greatly  astonished that  the
decisions of another human being could be so precisely manipulated. But that is not the reaction we
are interested in. We are interested in how your assessment of the boss’s culpability for his actions
is  affected by the knowledge that  Ivan  caused the  boss  to  act  in  that  way through his  device.
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Suppose another member of the office overheard the boss’s rant and complains to the boss’s boss,
and the boss is summoned to respond to accusations that his behaviour crossed professional lines.
Our intuitive reaction is that the boss is unfairly accused. ‘After all,’ we want to say, ‘it wasn’t his
fault. It was Ivan’s fault. Ivan  made the boss do it. It wasn’t the boss; it was Ivan. The boss was
merely  Ivan’s  programmed tool.  You can’t  be  responsible  if  you are  a  mere  tool,  made to  do
something by someone else, can you?’35
In short, we intuitively feel that the boss is not responsible for actions performed as the result of
manipulation  of  the  sort  Ivan  employed.  What  does  this  have  to  do  with  compatibilism  and
incompatibilism? It is an argument for incompatibilism in the following way. Why is it that the boss
is not responsible for his manipulated actions? The incompatibilist has a straightforward answer: it
is because he was caused to do them. He was caused by Ivan’s device. An if an agent is caused to
perform an action, then that action is neither free nor morally responsible. But the compatibilist can
reach for no such explanation—for he thinks that moral responsibility is compatible with an agent’s
act  being determined.  It  looks like the compatibilist  is  committed to  thinking that  manipulated
agents  are  responsible.  But  that  is  very counterintuitive,  and therefore  a  good reason to  be an
incompatibilist over a compatibilist.
The compatibilist will not, of course, think that just any old determining is compatible with
moral responsibility. No modern-day compatibilist thinks that actions caused by compelling desires
are fit  to  blame agents on account  of.  Fischer  and Ravizza (1998),  for instance,  insist  that the
decision must arise from an appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism. And so on and so forth.
But it is the great advantage of the manipulation argument that its advocates can, it appears, simply
suppose  that  all  the  compatibilist  conditions  on  moral  responsibility  are  met.  Because  the
compatibilist is committed to thinking there is no problem, in principle, with an agent’s free action
being the inevitable  result  of a certain chains of causation (chains of causation that satisfy the
compatibilist requirements on moral responsibility), there doesn’t seem to be any way of blocking
off the possibility that the manipulation might come through those same chains of causation. The
advocate of the manipulation argument can simply suppose that the manipulating device or person
causes the subject’s action in the same way, and not through irresistible desire, or through bypassing
the agent’s deliberative faculties, or what have you.
35 In this way, we can see that both of the central arguments for incompatibilism are based on two distinct types of
language we employ to perform an exculpatory function. We employ ability- or possibility-based language like ‘But
I couldn’t help it!’ to justify the ability to do otherwise as necessary for moral responsibility; and we use force- or
cause-based  language like ‘But  he  made me do it!’ to  justify  the  incompatibility  of  manipulation with moral
responsibility.
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5.2 Mele’s Zygote Argument
Having thus summarised the manipulation argument, I want to lay out the versions of the argument
that are discussed in the current literature. Most of the discussion takes place around the two most
prominent versions of the argument: Mele’s Zygote argument and Pereboom’s Four-Case argument.
Here is Mele on the former. Diana is a ‘supremely intelligent being’ (2006: 184), a goddess.
Diana creates a zygote Z in Mary. She combines Z’s atoms as she does because she wants a certain
event E to occur thirty years later. From her knowledge of the state of the universe just prior to her
creating  Z and the laws of nature of her deterministic universe,  she deduces that  a zygote with
precisely Z’s constitution located in Mary will develop into an ideally self-controlled agent who, in
thirty years, will judge, on the basis of rational deliberation, that it is best to A and will A on the basis
of that judgment, thereby bringing about  E. If this agent, Ernie, has any unsheddable values at the
time, they play no role in motivating his A-ing. Thirty years later, Ernie is a mentally healthy, ideally
self-controlled  person  who  regularly  exercises  his  powers  of  self-control  and  has  no  relevant
compelled  or  coercively  produced attitudes.  Furthermore,  his  beliefs  are  conducive  to  informed
deliberation about all matters that concern him, and he is a reliable deliberator. So he satisfies a
version of my proposed compatibilist sufficient conditions for having freely A-ed. (2006: 188)
Mele goes on to offer a ‘skeleton form’ (2006: 189) of the manipulation argument that would be
deployed on the basis of such a case:
1. Because of the way his zygote was produced in his deterministic universe, Ernie is not a free agent
and is not morally responsible for anything.
2. Concerning free action and moral responsibility of the beings into whom the zygotes develop,
there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes to exist and the way any
normal human zygote comes to exist in a deterministic universe.
3. So determinism precludes free action and moral responsibility (2006: 189)
One should note that the focus has shifted when we come to the numbered argument. It has moved
from Diana’s intent to bring about  E via Ernie’s  A-ing (and, therefore,  presumably,  calling into
question  Ernie’s  responsibility  for  A-ing)  to  questioning  Ernie’s  responsibility  for  anything
(presumably because we are to understand that, in fact, all of Ernie’s actions throughout his life
have been planned out by Diana). But either the original scenario or the numbered argument can be
adjusted to bring the two into uniformity.
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There is some unfortunate phraseology in the first premise of the argument. The preliminary
clause ‘Because of the way his zygote was produced in his deterministic universe’ has led to some
confusions over how to interpret the argument. Kearns (2012), for instance, has wondered what ‘the
way’ refers to. He objects that if ‘the way’ refers to deterministic causation, then the first premise
will  simply  beg  the  question  against  the  compatibilist.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  refers  to  the
manipulative causation of Diana, then the worry emerges that the generalisation from manipulative
causation as responsibility-undermining to determinism  simpliciter as responsibility-undermining
will fail. If it is by virtue of manipulative causation that Ernie is not responsible, then the problem is
to do with manipulation, the compatibilist might aver, not determinism.
But we can largely sidestep such issues. As Patrick Todd suggests, we can do away with the
‘because’ clause. It isn’t necessary. As he proposes, we can replace the first premise with merely
(1*) Ernie is not free or morally responsible with respect to performing A or bringing about E. (2013:
193)
Support for premise (1*) might come from some detailed sub-argument but in typical presentations
of the manipulation argument, that isn’t supposed to be how it goes. One’s natural, intuitive reaction
to the Zygote case is that Ernie is not free in his  A-ing. The support for (1*) can therefore come
straightforwardly from bare intuition. This isn’t quite sufficient to remove the worry that something
is question-begging. Only those who do not affirm a certain sort of compatibilism can consistently
accept (1*). But we can remove that worry by altering the premise again:
(1**)  Intuitively,  Ernie  is  not  free  or  morally  responsible  with  respect  to  performing  A or
bringing about E.
There is no problem with all parties granting that claim. After all, one can consistently grant that
one has an intuition that p while denying that p. The rest of the argument can then proceed as one
would expect:
(2*)  There  is  no  responsibility-relevant  difference  between  Ernie’s  case  and  the  case  of
determined agents acting in a way that satisfies compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility.
(3*)  Therefore,  intuitively,  determined  agents  acting  in  a  way  that  satisfies  compatibilist
conditions for moral responsibility are not morally responsible.
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That is the form of the argument that I shall work with. 
5.3 Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument
Pereboom’s argument is more complicated. His strategy is this: to present you with a case where it
is hopefully obvious that the individual is not morally responsible, and then to proceed, step by step,
to  cases  which  come closer  and closer  to  resembling  our  own case  (assuming our  universe  is
deterministic), in the hope of showing that our case is really no different from the first, and we are
not  morally  responsible  agents  either.  He moves  across  four  cases,  and the thought  is  that  the
difference between the cases is too slender for one to plausibly say that responsibility fails in some
case x (ranging over 1–3), but obtains in case x + 1.
Pereboom describes the first case as follows:
Case 1. Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists, who can manipulate him directly through the
use of radio-like technology, but he is as much like an ordinary human being as possible, given his
history. Suppose these neuroscientists ‘locally’ manipulate him to undertake the process of reasoning
by  which  his  desires  are  brought  about  and  modified—directly  producing  his  every  state  from
moment to moment. The neuroscientists manipulate him by, among other things, pushing a series of
buttons just before he begins to reason about his situation, thereby causing his reasoning process to
be rationally egoistic. Plum is not constrained to act in the sense that he does not act because of an
irresistible desire—the neuroscientists do not provide him with an irresistible desire—and he does
not think and act contrary to character since he is often manipulated to be rationally egoistic. His
effective first-order desire to kill Ms. White conforms to his second-order desires. Plum’s reasoning
processes exemplifies the various components of moderate reasons-responsiveness. He is receptive
to the relevant  pattern of  reasons,  and his  reasoning processes  would have resulted in  different
choices in some situations in which the egoistic reasons were otherwise. At the same time, he is not
exclusively rationally egoistic since he will typically regulate his behaviour by moral reasons when
the egoistic reasons are relatively weak—weaker than they are in the current situation. (2001: 112–
113)
The Plum of case x will be referred to as ‘Plumx’. Case 1 therefore informs us about Plum1. Plum1 is
subject to ongoing manipulation. He is constantly monitored and when it looks a decision is going
to occur that the neuroscientists do not want to occur, his psychology is interfered with so that the
decision the neuroscientists prefer is caused. But compatibilist conditions on morally responsible
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decision-making are of course satisfied.  Plum1 ends up murdering Ms. White,  all  thanks to the
careful manipulation of these scientists. Pereboom thinks it is obvious that we should not blame
Plum1 for that. He then presents his next case.
Case 2. Plum is like an ordinary human being, except that he was created by neuroscientists, who,
although they cannot control him directly, have programmed him to weigh reasons for action so that
he is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic, with the result that in the circumstances in which
he now finds himself,  he is  causally determined to undertake the moderately reasons-responsive
process and to possess the set of first- and second-order desires that results in his killing Ms. White.
He has the general ability to regulate his behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances, the
egoistic  reasons  are  very  powerful,  and  accordingly  he  is  causally  determined to  kill  for  these
reasons. Nevertheless, he does not act because of an irresistible desire. (2001: 113–114)
Plum2 is different because, although, like Plum1, he was created by neuroscientists, Plum2 is not
subject to any ongoing manipulation. Plum2 is programmed to from the start to develop into an
individual who will kill poor Ms. White. He is subject to initial manipulation. Again, it is stipulated
that all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility are satisfied, and there seems to be nothing
to rule out that stipulation. Again, Pereboom thinks it is fairly plain that Plum2 is not responsible.
Matters are less clear in the next case.
Case 3. Plum is an ordinary human being, except that he was determined by the rigorous training
practices  of  his  home and community so that  he  is  often but  not  exclusively rationally egoistic
(exactly as egoistic as in Cases 1 and 2). His training took place at too early an age for him to have
had  the  ability  to  prevent  or  alter  the  practices  that  determined  his  character.  In  his  current
circumstances, Plum is thereby caused to undertake the moderately reasons-responsive process and
to possess the first- and second-order desires that result in his killing White. He has the general
ability to grasp, apply, and regulate his behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances, the
egoistic  reasons  are  very  powerful,  and  hence  the  rigorous  training  practices  of  his  upbringing
deterministically result in his act of murder. Nevertheless, he does not act because of an irresistible
desire. (2001: 114)
At this point Pereboom begins to argue on the basis of ‘no sufficient difference’ reasoning. He asks
what the difference could be between Plum3 and Plum2 that could get Plum3 off the hook for  killing
Ms. White. There doesn’t seem to be, he says, anything that can do this work. Plum2 was a case of
neuroscientific preprogramming, and Plum3 is a case of social preprogramming. Why should that
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difference in causal means make a difference to the subject’s moral accountability? Plum3 is a case
of social indoctrination.
Case 4. Physicalist determinism is true, and Plum is an ordinary human being, generated and raised
under normal circumstances, who is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic (exactly as egoistic
as in Cases 1–3). Plum’s killing of White comes about as a result of his undertaking the moderately
reasons-responsive  process  of  deliberation,  he  exhibits  the  specified  organization  of  first-  and
second-order desires, and he does not act because of an irresistible desire. He has the general ability
to grasp, apply, and regulate his behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances the egoistic
reasons are very powerful, and together with background circumstances they deterministically result
in his act of murder. (2001: 115)
With Plum4 we reach a scenario very close to our own case (assuming determinism is true). It is a
case of regular determined decision-making. But Pereboom presses that point that the compatibilist
cannot claim that Plum4 is not responsible. Where, then, does he jump off in the sequence? There is
no point at which a relevant difference obtains; ‘between each successive pair of cases there is no
divergence at all in factors that could plausibly make a difference for moral responsibility’ (2001:
116) says Pereboom. He summarises:
The best explanation for the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible in the first three cases is
that  his action results  from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond his
control. Because Plum is also causally determined in this way in Case 4, we should conclude that
here too Plum is not morally responsible for the same reason. More generally, if an action results
from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond the agent’s control, then he is
not morally responsible for it. (2001: 116)
Pereboom is certainly right that a deterministic causal chain tracing back to factors beyond the
agent’s control is  an explanation for why it is that the early Plums are not responsible. It is an
explanation  that  the  compatibilist  cannot  use.  But  the  consequence-argument-style  piece  of
reasoning Pereboom gives is not necessary, I think. It is enough for Pereboom to say that there is
something that makes the early Plums not responsible, and the incompatibilist can provide a ready
explanation of that fact: it is because determinism precludes moral responsibility. It might not be
obvious in ordinary cases, but manipulation cases help bring it to light what a problem determinism
really is.
We can summarise Pereboom’s four cases as follows:
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Case 1: Ongoing Invasive Manipulation
Case 2 (Zygote case): Initial Invasive Manipulation
Case 3: Initial Social Manipulation
Case 4: Regular Determined Action
As one can see from the parenthetical insertion, I take Pereboom’s second case to be identical in the
essentials  to  Mele’s  zygote  case.  In  both  cases  it  is  the  creation  of  one  individual  by  another
individual or body of individuals with the express purpose of exploiting deterministic knowledge to
produce  certain  actions  from the  created  subject  at  a  future  date.  Mele’s  zygote  argument  is
therefore basically an argument from the obvious failure of responsibility in Case 2 to the failure of
moral  responsibility  in  a  deterministic  universe  more  generally.  But  Pereboom’s  four-case
presentation is, I’d say, credibly considered to add up to a slightly punchier manipulation argument
than Mele’s. The step-by-step presentation of small adjustments Pereboom gives makes the positing
of  an  abrupt  change  from  non-responsibility  to  responsibility  look  a  more  tendentious  and
implausible affair.
I describe the first two cases as ‘invasive’. There seems a clear sense in which this is so. The
neuroscientists in the first two cases are directly fiddling with Plum’s brain. They have bypassed the
usual  methods  we  employ  to  change  someone’s  mind  or  attitude  about  something  (argument,
persuasion, encouragement, pleasing presentations, and so on), and have brought about these states
directly. It is in that sense that I consider the first two cases invasive. The third case is not invasive
in  that  way.  There,  the  manipulation  occurs  through  channels  we  are  more  familiar  with:  the
indoctrination of a youth through strict training and instruction, a social matter.
Lastly, some confusion has arisen because of  the way that Pereboom described Case 1. The
expression  ‘directly  producing  his  [Plum1’s]  every  state  from  moment  to  moment’  has  led
Demetriou (2010) to claim Plum1 is indeed not responsible, but not because of anything to do with
manipulation. He is not responsible because he doesn’t satisfy basic conditions of agency: his later
psychological states aren’t caused by his earlier ones, they are caused by the neuroscientists at every
instant. If each one of my mental states is caused by something external to me at every moment, and
not by my prior states, in what sense, suggests Demetriou, can I be a functioning agent? Don’t
intentions have to be caused by earlier psychological states (or some other states concerned with the
agent) to be considered the genuine acts of the subject? Pereboom adjusted recent presentations of
his argument (2014) in response to her criticism. But I believe Matheson is correct in dismissing
these worries and sticking to the original form of the argument. He points out that ‘It is not as if
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normally brain/mental states alone are sufficient to produce subsequent brain/mental states; there
are always background conditions which are jointly sufficient with the prior brain/mental state.’
(2016:  1976).  Thus,  it  isn’t  true  that  the  neuroscientists’  influence  must  suppress  the  prior
brain/mental states of Plum1, because they, like the external world, for instance, can be part of the
total setup that causally influences any one of Plum1’s later states. Matheson also makes the point
that even if a somewhat invasive ‘first intervention’ is necessary to alter Plum1 psychologically so
that he comes to decide to kill Ms. White, after that the neuroscientists role can be reduced to that of
mere  ‘causal  enforcer’:  ‘The  neuroscientists  would  still  be  manipulating  Plum1 “moment  to
moment” because they are still controlling exactly what his states are like from moment to moment;
it’s just that they have less work to do after the first intervention, which does much of the heavy
lifting.’ (2016: 1975). Thus, even if some suppression of Plum1’s prior mental states is necessary
originally,  after  that  only  minor  adjustments  might  be  needed  to  keep  him  on  track—minor
adjustments which don’t suppress prior psychological states. So, as long as we understand Case 1’s
‘directly producing his every state from moment to moment’ in the manner Matheson proposes, I
see no reason to think that Plum1 fails basic conditions of agency.
5.4 The Hard-Line Soft-Line Distinction
I  now  turn  to  more  general  criticisms  and  objections  to  the  Manipulation  argument.  But  one
important distinction lies in the type of reply that one should give to the manipulation argument.
McKenna (2008) distinguishes  between hard-line  and soft-line replies.  Suppose  we present  the
manipulation argument as follows:
(a) If an agent  S is manipulated to  A in the manner of the Zygote case, then  S is not morally
responsible for his A-ing.
(b) An agent  S’s being manipulated to  A in the manner of the Zygote case is not relevantly
different from the actions of regular determined agents satisfying compatibilist conditions for moral
responsibility.
(c) Ergo, regular determined agents satisfying compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility
are not morally responsible for their actions.
A hard-liner will deny (a). A soft-liner will deny (b). Soft-line replies have been proposed by e.g.
Fischer (2004) and Demetriou (2010). Such replies try to locate some relevant difference between
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the manipulated agent and the agent acting in regular determined conditions. For my part I think
that objecting to details of the manipulated case (in the manner that Demetriou did with Plum1, say)
and insisting that that detail is relevant and doesn't carry over to regular determined cases is an
ultimately futile endeavour. As McKenna puts it:
[A]s I see it, for any world at which determinism is true, it is at least in principle a metaphysical
possibility that, whatever the causal springs of an agent’s actions happen to be, there is a way to
replicate them by artificial means. So, eventually, incompatibilists will be able to come up with some
manipulation story that gets the causal details ‘‘just right’’ as would be required by whatever credible
formulation of CAS (Compatibilist-friendly Agential Structure) anyone could cook up. (2012: 171)
I think he is exactly right. The reply compatibilists make to the manipulation argument therefore has
to be a hard-line reply.
McKenna (2008) defends such a hard-line reply himself. He defends what he calls the ‘reverse
generalisation’ strategy. To see how that reply works, consider Pereboom’s four-case presentation.
The thought behind Pereboom’s presentation is that you judge Plum1 to be non-responsible,  and
because Plum2 doesn't appear relevantly different, you carry that judgement over to Plum2.  And
likewise you carry that judgement from Plum2’s case over to Plum3, and then to Plum4. But then you
have reached an incompatibilist conclusion. McKenna proposes that the compatibilist is within his
rights to simply run the argument the other way. The compatibilist should start with Plum4, where
he has no qualms about stating that Plum4 is perfectly morally responsible, and then, perceiving that
there is no responsibility-relevant difference between that case and Plum3, he likewise claims that
there is no issue with saying that Plum3 is morally responsible, and thereby justifies moving all the
way to affirming that he has no reason to think Plum1 isn’t morally responsible. The force of the
argument all seems to depend where you start from. If you start with Plum1 and move up, then you
end up an incompatibilist; if you start with Plum4 and move back, then you end up a compatibilist.
But if an argument can be employed equally well by either side, then the argument supports neither
side, and thus cannot be used as evidence for incompatibilism.
Fischer has also, in effect, argued in the same way. He writes,
[I]f they show anything, [manipulation arguments show that] there is no difference between certain
‘‘initial  design’’ scenarios  and  ordinary  scenarios  in  which  there  is  no  special  reason  to  doubt
compatibilism. If this is correct, then I do not see how the Zygote Argument and its siblings show
that the price of compatibilism is exorbitant – or even marginally higher than it has always been.
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How could it increase the cost of compatibilism to show that a compatibilist must accept that an
agent is morally responsible in a scenario that is no different than an ordinary situation in which
there is no special reason to call into question the agent’s moral responsibility? (2011: 5)
The same strategy is present here. Start with the ordinary case of determination. There is no evident
problem with compatibilism there. Fine; so, since the manipulated case is not relevantly different,
there is no problem there either.
But I think that such a bare ‘reverse generalisation’ strategy is an inadequate response to the
manipulation argument, and does nothing (or next to nothing) to blunt the intuitive force of the
manipulation argument. I think there are two points that can help us see this. First, Fischer accepts
that in the case of regular determination, we are to characterise the situation as one in which ‘there
is  no special  reason to call  into question the agent’s  moral  responsibility’.  In effect,  a  case of
agnosticism in the regular case. The attitude is, ‘Well, I don’t see any reason to doubt that they are
responsible. I don’t see directly see that they are responsible either, but I don’t have any reason to
doubt it.’ Determinism isn’t obviously relevant to moral responsibility, nor is it obviously irrelevant.
Arguments must be given to motivate the idea that determination threatens moral responsibility.
Mere intuitive reflection on an instance of determined decision-making won’t tell us anything either
way. But then if we are, in the first instance, and relative to the initial data of intuition, agnostic
about whether being determined is compatible with moral responsibility, it isn’t legitimate to carry
over that agnosticism when we encounter a case that would move us away from our indifference.
This is because our agnosticism obtains precisely because we can see no reason to prefer one view
over the other. But when such a reason is encountered,  our views should shift accordingly.  We
began by thinking we had no reason,  on the  basis  of  the ordinary,  regular  case of  determined
decision-making, to doubt that the compatibilist conditions were sufficient for moral responsibility.
When we think about the manipulation case, however, we feel it is wrong to blame the victim of
manipulation for wrong acts they were manipulated into. And we thereby acquire a reason to doubt
that the proposed compatibilist conditions are sufficient.
This is surely a regular occurrence in philosophy. A young student is so impressed with the
horror of execution that he instinctively believes that the death penalty is impermissible. But then
someone asks him to consider the case of a brutal mass-murderer, and all of a sudden the death
penalty seems permissible now in certain cases. Perhaps the example is ultimately unpersuasive, but
that’s not the point. Having a plausible general claim overturned on the basis of a hard-to-initially-
think-of  but  intuitive  counterexample  is  a  staple  of  philosophical  debate  and progress.  Indeed,
Fischer himself finds the Frankfurt counterexamples persuasive. Suppose someone responds to the
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Frankfurt  counterexample  by  saying  that  Smith  can’t  be  responsible  for  killing  Jones  because
‘Smith couldn’t do otherwise thanks to Black’s device, and you can’t be responsible when you can’t
do otherwise!’. Logic doesn’t prevent such a move, but most people would take the intuitive cost of
denying that Smith is responsible to be too great for that move to be feasible. Likewise, the cost of
taking manipulated agents to be morally responsible will be held by many to be too great.
Secondly, we can see more clearly what is wrong with the ‘reverse generalisation’ response by
considering  matters  in  terms  of  sets  of  beliefs.  McKenna’s  response  to  Pereboom’s  four-case
argument was to suggest that one can just as easily reverse the argument, and that it really all hinges
on where you start from, for it is your starting position that determines your entailments. But that
isn’t really true. Rather, it all hinges on the comparative collective plausibility of your position and
its entailments. Suppose we do, as McKenna suggests, start with Plum4 and work our way back. If
we do that, then we infer that Plum3 is responsible, Plum2 is responsible, and also Plum1. So our set
of beliefs looks like this:
B1:{Plum4 is responsible, Plum3 is responsible, Plum2 is responsible, Plum1 is responsible}
And if we work our way forwards from Plum1, then our set of beliefs looks like this:
B2: {Plum1 is not responsible, Plum2 is not responsible, Plum3 is not responsible, Plum4 is not
responsible}
If we start with the belief that Plum4 is responsible, then we end up with B1. If we start with the
belief that Plum1 is not responsible, then we end up with B2. The two sets of beliefs collect the
relevant entailments. But that is not where matters rest. We must ask, which set of beliefs is the
most plausible? Which set is more difficult, intuitively, to believe? But when we ask that question, it
becomes obvious that B1 is more implausible, all elements considered, than B2. B1 commits one to
thinking that  Plum1 and  Plum2 are  morally  responsible.  That  is  very  counterintuitive.  Does  B2
contain anything comparably counterintuitive? It does not. One might try to push the thought that
<Plum4 is  not  responsible>  is  counterintuitive.  But  this  seems a  stretch.  People  are  intuitively
unsure about whether regular cases of determined decision-making are responsibility-cancelling.
The  average  Joe  will  be  unsure.  If  anything,  the  intuitive  worries  the  layperson  has  about
determinism will incline him more to the view that Plum4 is indeed not responsible. B1 is therefore
evidently the more implausible set of beliefs. But B1 is the compatibilist’s set of beliefs; B2 is the
incompatibilist’s  set.  An  agnostic  undecided  on  the  two  views  is  therefore  put  under  rational
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pressure to prefer incompatibilism. But then the manipulation argument succeeds: contemplation of
these manipulated cases puts pressure on one to prefer incompatibilism. More clout must therefore
be given to hard-line replies than merely the suggestion that one might reverse the generalisation. (I
will offer such clout later in this chapter.)
5.5 Is Manipulation is the Problem?
One important category of soft-line reply is to suggest that manipulation itself is the problem. So, if
we recall the structure of the manipulation argument,
(a) If an agent  S is manipulated to  A in the manner of the Zygote case, then  S is not morally
responsible for his A-ing.
(b) An agent  S’s being manipulated to  A in the manner of the Zygote case is not relevantly
different from the actions of regular determined agents satisfying compatibilist conditions for moral
responsibility.
(c) Ergo, regular determined agents satisfying compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility
are not morally responsible for their actions,
one response is to deny (b), and locate the relevant difference in precisely the fact that in the zygote
case the agent is manipulated and in regular cases the determined agent is not. King (2013) has
complained that there is no feature of manipulated cases that can be plausibly held to generalise
across  from manipulated  cases  to  determined but  non-manipulated  ones.  The  intuition  of  non-
responsibility is bound-up with manipulation and doesn’t survive in cases where the manipulator is
taken  away  and  determinism  preserved.  A  compatibilist  might  therefore  suggest  that  being
determined  via  manipulation  removes  moral  responsibility  but  being  determined  by  nature  (or
however determinism would go if it were true in the actual world) does not. All we have to do is
add  a  ‘no  manipulation  by  other  agents’ clause  to  our  moral  responsibility  conditions.  Lycan
appears to suggests this (1987).
In response, three points can be made. First, such a response is of no use to the (compatibilist)
theological determinist. This is because all determination is by God is determination by an agent—
God,  and therefore  manipulation.  Theological  determination  implies  a  global,  all-encompassing
manipulation.  All  our  regular  decision-making  is  therefore  relevantly  like  the  zygote  case,  if
theological determinism is true.
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Secondly, it isn’t a plausible addition to make. It is ad hoc and implausible. It is ad hoc because
there is no independent motivation for the extra condition—it sticks out like a sore thumb. That it is
implausible can be seen from thought experiments like the following. Consider your life on the
assumption that determinism is true. If you are a compatibilist,  you will have no problem with
holding yourself responsible for it. Now consider a world in which, again, determinism is true, and
your life is fixed in every detail, but this time there is a manipulator at the beginning of your life
who has programmed you to perform, eventually, every action they wanted. If the intrinsic features
of  your  life  are  kept  identical,  along  with  every  experience,  it  is  odd  to  suppose  that  moral
responsibility obtains straightforwardly in one case and not in the other. It is also implausible to
take a ‘no manipulation by other agents’ condition as a basic condition. Surely manipulation is bad
because it violates a more fundamental condition. But if that is so, then that condition should be
spelled out.
Thirdly, Pereboom provides a good counter to this suggestion himself: 
One distinguishing feature of Case 4 is that the causal determination of Plum’s crime is not, in the
last analysis, brought about by other agents. However, the claim that this is a relevant difference is
implausible. Imagine a further case that is exactly the same as, say, Case 1 or Case 2, except that
Plum’s states are induced by a machine that is generated spontaneously, without intelligent design.
Would he then be morally responsible? (2001: 115)
Pereboom appears right in saying that if, in every manipulation case, we replace the neuroscientist
or other agents with mere machines instead, that the intuition of non-responsibility yet remains.
5.6 Bignon’s Response
Bignon  is  a  theological  determinist,  and  in  his  recent  monograph  he  offers  a  response  to  the
manipulation argument from a theological perspective. Here is the solution he proposes that the
theological determinist should employ to counter the manipulation argument:
Let me then suggest  that  the relevant  difference we are looking for  is  predicated upon a moral
principle much like the following: “in order for a human choice to be morally responsible, it is
necessary that the choice be made on the basis of that person’s God-given character and desires.” In
other  words,  for  a  choice  to  be  free  such  that  its  maker  is  morally  responsible,  it  need  not  be
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undetermined, but it does need to be determined (assuming determinism is true) by the agent’s own
desires, which flow from the agent’s God-given character and inclinations. (2018: 36–37, italics his)
This  distinctively  theological  suggestion  allows  Bignon to  explain  why it  is  that  people  in
manipulated  cases  are  not  responsible,  while  those  in  the  regular  determined  cases  are:  when
neuroscientists or demi-gods are interfering with people’s psychology to bring about the decisions
the neuroscientists or demi-gods want,  then it becomes false that the agent thus manipulated is
acting on their God-given character and desires. The character and desires have now been given (at
least in part) by the manipulating party.
Despite our shared commitment to theological determinism, I do not find Bignon’s solution
satisfactory. For one thing, it appears to be solution by fiat where divine manipulation is concerned.
Theological  determinism  faces  a  harder  problem  of  manipulation  than  regular  deterministic
compatibilists  because  manipulation  is  everywhere  for  the  theological  determinist:  God  is
manipulating everything any human being does. That seems like a problem, but Bignon asserts that
the problem is the solution! If God is giving you your character and desires, then that is alright;
that’s when you are morally responsible. But that is surely too quick. Those who find manipulation
cases  intuitively  problematic  will  likewise  find  Bignon’s  suggestion  intuitively  problematic,
because  Bignon’s  suggestion  amounts  to  the  claim  that  when  God  does  the  manipulation
responsibility obtains (or at least there is no issue on that score with responsibility obtaining).
For  another  thing,  it  seems  ad  hoc in  the  same  way  that  the  suggestion  that  it  is  bare
manipulation that is the problem was ad hoc. Indeed, it is really only a refined version of it. The
suggestion that ‘manipulation is the problem’ has become ‘non-divine manipulation is the problem’.
And to the extent that it is more refined, it is even more  ad hoc.  Why should somebody’s being
given their character and desires by God be consistent with responsibility while those desires and
character being given in the same way, but by a different agent, a human agent, suddenly become
inconsistent with it? And even if God as manipulator makes a difference, shouldn’t this difference
be explicable in more fundamental terms? Then what are those more fundamental notions? And,
again, it is implausible to imagine that your life if caused by God would raise no worries for moral
responsibility,  but  an  intrinsic  duplicate  of  your  life  but  caused  by  a  human  or  demi-god
manipulator  would  be  inconsistent  with  it.  And  isn’t  everything  given  by  God  on  theological
determinism? Why don’t  human  manipulators  count  as  God’s  means  of  giving  characters  and
desires  to  the  manipulated  subjects?  For  all  these  reasons,  I  think  we need more  than  Bignon
provides.
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5.7 The Uncertainty Response
I have thus far pooh-poohed the existing responses to the manipulation argument, both secular and
theological. But I do think that a satisfactory response to it can be given, and I shall do that here in
the two closing sections. In this section I shall give a relatively weak response, granting much of the
force of the manipulation argument,  but putting a slightly different spin on matters.  In the last
section  I  give  a  more  forceful,  hard-line  reply  to  the  manipulation  argument,  arguing  that  the
intuitive  push  manipulation  cases  exert  against  compatibilism  can  be  matched  by  an  equally
intuitive push against incompatibilism.
I introduce the first of these two responses, the Uncertainty Response, by way of Patrick Todd’s
clever suggestion concerning manipulation arguments. Todd says this:
Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist
conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue,
however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that
the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on
whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of
manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. (2011: 128, italics his)
Recall the difference between Plum2 and Plum4. Todd says that the advocate of the manipulation
argument  doesn’t  need  to  push  for  the  admission,  from  the  compatibilist,  that  Plum2 is  not
responsible. He needs only to push for the gentler admission that Plum2 is  less blameworthy than
Plum4. Surely, argues Todd, it is intuitive that Plum2 is not as blameworthy as Plum4; after all, Plum2
was manipulated. On a blameworthiness scale of 1 to 10, would you, O compatibilist, even if you
think both are responsible, rank both Plum2 and Plum4 as equally responsible, both as a 10? Surely
not.
But  once  it  is  conceded  by the  compatibilist  that  Plum2 isn’t  as  blameworthy as  a  regular
determined agent, then it looks like the compatibilist is committed to thinking that determination is
relevant to moral responsibility: it mitigates it. Todd continues:
But if the compatibilist admits that determinism itself is mitigating, a fair question is, In virtue of
what? What is it about determinism’s obtaining that makes revised judgments of blameworthiness
appropriate? Here the compatibilist is on thin ice, for she must specify features of determinism that
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only mitigate responsibility rather than ruling it out. Now, what could such features be? I submit that
I cannot see what the compatibilist could offer here. (2011: 131, italics his)
Suppose that the compatibilist says that manipulating determining mitigates responsibility because
it  implies  our  characters  are  formed  ultimately  by  factors  beyond  our  control.  But  that  holds
universally on determinism. So that  wouldn’t  mitigate,  it  would rule  out responsibility entirely.
Suppose the compatibilist says that manipulating determining mitigates responsibility because it
undermines the ability to do otherwise. But if manipulating determining does that, so will regular
determining. In short, Todd argues, there is no plausible way of explaining why Plum2 is of reduced
blame  save  by  appeal  to  determinism  simpliciter.  But  if  determinism  diminishes  moral
responsibility, then it does so across the board. And that looks like a problem for compatibilism.
But  I  think  that  Todd  has  overlooked  an  important  distinction  between  the  two  following
propositions:
(I) I judge that Plum2 is less blameworthy
and
(II) I am less confident about my judgement that Plum2 is blameworthy.
To admit (I) does look like it raises thorny issues for the compatibilist—it commits one to a belief in
lesser responsibility in Plum2’s case. But (II) does not. It simply acknowledges that matters are more
complicated and less certain here, and even though Plum2 might be fully blameworthy, that is harder
to see than in the regular case. In other words, if (II) is true, then the degrees obtain this side of the
mind/world divide, as an epistemic feature, not a metaphysical feature.
Indeed,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  that  is  a  perfectly  viable  way  of  understanding  the
manipulation cases. Plum1, Plum2 and Ernie in the Zygote case are all cases where we are uncertain
whether or not they are responsible. This is what our reluctance to rank the blameworthiness of
Plum2 and high as Plum4 amounts to: an uncertainty about the moral responsibility of Plum2. It’s a
very unusual scenario, and the compatibilist just isn’t sure what to make of it. No admission of
lesser responsibility need follow.
Now, this isn’t sufficient as a compatibilist rebuttal of the manipulation argument, because if it
is conceded that uncertainty reigns as far as Plum2 is concerned, then the incompatibilist can push
the point and argue that, because Plum4 is principally no different from Plum2, then the uncertainty
must  carry over.  The compatibilist  taking this  line of response must be just  as uncertain about
Plum4’s responsibility as he is about Plum2’s.
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And I would concede this point. Or, rather, I would concede that other things being equal the
compatibilist  taking  the  uncertainty  response  should  indeed  be  uncertain  and  agnostic  about
responsibility  in  more  commonplace  non-manipulative  cases  of  determination.  But  here  the
theological determinist has an advantage his secular counterpart does not. Other things are not equal
for the theological determinist. The theological determinist does not think that the empirical and
intuitive  data  we have  about  our  own responsibility  in  cases  of  regular  determination  exhaust
everything  of  evidential  relevance.  The  theological  determinist  (when Calvinist)  will  also  take
himself to have good reason to believe that the Scriptures are divine revelation. But the Scriptures
assert, or rather presuppose, man’s responsibility in the ordinary cases of everyday life. Thus, if the
theological determinist takes himself to have good reason to believe from the Scriptures that (i) man
is  responsible  in  everyday  cases,  and  from  the  Scriptures  and  elsewhere  that  (ii)  theological
determinism is  true,  then he will  have access  to  reasons that  will  enable him to overcome the
uncertainty  judgement  about  moral  responsibility  in  ordinary  determined  cases.  That  is  the
uncertainty response to the manipulation argument.
5.8 A Manipulation Argument for Compatibilism
The uncertainty response is a broadly defensive one. But here is a more aggressive pushback against
the incompatibilist advocate of the manipulation argument. I will introduce the argument by telling
a story:
You are Jack. You have a good friend called ‘Algernon’. You and Algy went to the same school
together, and both entered the world of London business where you both find success and offer each
other  valuable  assistance  in  your  various  commercial  ventures.  And one  day scientists  make a
striking discovery. They discover that there existed, millennia ago, a certain god called ‘Diana’. Not
only have they discovered her existence,  they have also discovered that she has interfered in a
remarkable  way with  about  a  tenth  of  the  human population.  Through  interfering  with  human
zygotes  at  the  early  stages  in  human history,  she  inserted  DNA-based instructions  of  her  own
creation  into  the  human  genome.  The  presence  of  these  genetic  instructions  enables  her  to
effectively program every action that the grown-up human being so interfered with performs. And
she exploits  this  to,  indeed,  program every  action  of  every  human being’s  life  in  which  these
instructions are found. Not merely that, but she has inserted instructions for all the offspring that
those with the new genetic material have. Let a human being with this new genetic programming be
a D-human. Diana has set things up so that when a D-human mates with another D-human, the
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instructions are triggered in the child of that union, and the child also becomes a D-human, and
performs whatever actions in response to stimuli that the instructions bequeath to them. In this way,
D-humans remain  about  a  tenth of  the  total  human population.  These scientists  have therefore
discovered that about 1 in 10 people one knows are actually acting in response to a very clever
piece of genetic programming.
The scientists have also discovered that Diana has recently perished in a war of the gods. But
that is of little consolation, for her effects live on, and the genetic instructions appear here to stay.
But about those instructions: they do not  compel the D-human to act. They do not override his
desires and personality. Rather, they work via the D-human’s personality, character, and so on. The
instructions create the right character,  the right desires, and the D-human then voluntarily (in a
manner that satisfies compatibilist  conditions on freedom) acts on them. The instructions cause
action,  but  they  do not  compel  it.  A compatibilist  could  look at  how a  D-human acts  and be
perfectly content in ascribing moral responsibility to them.
These scientists do one last thing. They feel the public should know about these D-humans in
our  midst,  and the  scientists  know how to  detect  the  D-strain.  So  they  have  everyone’s  DNA
scanned. When they detect the D-strain, they note down the name of the afflicted subject, and they
go on to publish, in everyone’s local newspaper, the names and details of every D-human in that
neighbourhood.
Thus, one day, as you are enjoying your morning coffee, you open up the newspaper and are
confronted with the long list of names, names of all the D-humans local to you. You know you
aren’t  one—the scientists  told you that after  you got scanned—but you are worried about your
acquaintances.  Thankfully,  you  don’t  notice  the  name  of  anyone  you  know,  save  for  one  sad
exception: you notice, with dismay, Algy’s name is on the list. ‘Algernon D. Whittaker’ it reads, as
plain as day. There can be no mistake—it’s Algy alright. 
Stirred by the news, you make your way over to Algy’s manor, intending to offer him in person,
like any decent chap would, your commiserations. Algy greets you in his usual warm and friendly
manner, and you both take up seats in the drawing room.
‘Nasty business this,’ you say to to him. ‘Imagine finding out that, all this time, one has actually
been following instructions from a deceased deity! But, Algy, my dear fellow, I want to know how
you are taking the news. How do you feel about the whole thing?’
‘Well, Jack,’ he replies, ‘At first I was rather cut up about it. It felt like a sort of loss of control.
Was it really me acting all these years? Who am I, really, if in everything I’ve ever done I was only
following instructions programmed into me by another person? So, questions like that. But then I
played the argument out. And then, after prolonged reflection, my attitude shifted quite radically.’
103
He stands up, smiling.
‘What do you mean?’ you ask.
‘I mean  this!’ he cries, and, all of a sudden, deals you a cruel blow across the face. You are
utterly shocked and bewildered. But you soon recover.
‘What in blazes was that for?’ you roar.
‘Think about it, Jack!’ he responds. ‘Everything I’ve done and will do I do because I have been
a manipulated by that old bird of a deity. At first I wondered if there was some way I could defeat
her programming—outwit her somehow. But it’s not possible—her programming is comprehensive.
I realised that, even if I tried to double-guess myself, then I was only trying that because I had been
programmed to try that. There’s no escape from it.
‘But then it dawned on me what a liberating fact that is!’ Algy goes on. ‘If no matter what I do, I
am following manipulative programming, then I can not be responsible for anything I do! I, and all
the  other  D-humans,  must  now  be  considered  entirely  exempt  from  the  realm  of  moral
accountability. We can do anything we want now, without fear of being wrongdoers! The sky’s the
limit! Of course, my life is no different, from the inside, than yours. I am not subject to strange
compulsions (or no more than an ordinary human being is); I have to weigh and deliberate matters
just as you do, but with the great and profound difference that I can not be blamed for any of my
decisions! Fantastic!  They can all  be traced back to Diana’s manipulation (bless  her!),  thereby
entirely exonerating me.’
With that, he deals you another cruel blow across the face. It is not to be borne. You lunge at
him, tackling him to ground, and begin to pummel him with your fists. Algy is an able wrestler,
however, and through a combination of lithe movement and deft parrying, he manages to deflect the
force of your blows. And his mocking cry rises above the fray:
‘You still don’t get it, do you, Jack? You’re hitting an innocent man! Ha ha! Are you outraged at
me,  Jack?  Are  you indignant?  Entirely  inappropriate  responses!  I’m not  a  morally  responsible
agent! In fact, all you do by hitting me is add to your own guilt! Ha ha! I can no more be fairly
punished than a robot, or a painted vase!’
There is the story. I believe it points to an intuitive cost to the incompatibilist position. The
incompatibilist,  it  appears,  is  forced  to  think  that  Algernon  is  is  no  way  blameworthy  for  his
behaviour. But that seems like quite the cost. Most of us, I wager, would feel that Jack was quite
within his  rights to give Algy a good thrashing, Diana or no Diana.  After all,  from the inside,
Algernon’s  life  was in  no principal  way different  from yours or mine.  We might  also turn the
question on ourselves: suppose you or I discovered that we were a D-human. Should we cease to
view ourselves as responsible for anything we have done? Intuitively not, I think.
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But  then  the  compatibilist  has  his  own  intuition  to  appeal  to  to  match  the  intuition  the
incompatibilist appeals to in the case of Plum2 and Ernie. This vindicates a hard-line reply to the
manipulation argument. If we add the proposition <Algy is not responsible for his behaviour> to the
collection  of  propositions  that  the  incompatibilist  is  committed  to,  then  all  of  a  sudden  the
compatibilist  commitments  in  this  regard do not  appear  clearly  more counter-intuitive  than the
incompatibilist ones.
This latter response can be employed by the secular compatibilist too. But between them, both
the uncertainty response and this manipulation argument for compatibilism constitute a sufficient
rebuttal to the manipulation argument as directed at the theological determinist.
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PART 3—THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND GOD’S
GOODNESS
Chapter 6—The Justice of Hell
6.1 Introduction
We saw that in ch. 3 that Channing appeared concerned about the justice of Hell itself, and given
that so often the complaint against Calvinism concerns God’s predestining to damnation, I doubt
that a fully satisfactory response to the difficulty can be given unless, indeed, the question of the
justice of Hell is also addressed. Consider that there are a few arguments one could make against
both of the following claims being true: <God exists> and <Hell exists and will be occupied by a
substantial  number  of  human  beings>.  One  big  argument  is  that  God  would  surely  use  his
omnipotent power to prevent Hell from being occupied—there is no justifying good great enough
that would permit God to let people end up there. That argument is the subject of the next chapter.
Another popular objection relies on a perceived disparity between the gravity of human offences
and the severity of the divine punishment. Isn’t Hell too severe a punishment? It is that question that
is addressed in this chapter.
Here, for instance, are Isaac Asimov’s remarks on the matter:
I would [...] want a God who would not allow a Hell. Infinite torture can only be a punishment for
infinite evil, and I don’t believe that infinite evil can be said to exist even in the case of a Hitler.
(1995: 334)
It is a natural thought. Hell is supposed to perform a retributive function—it is supposed to be just.
But it is not just to punish someone in a manner clearly in excess of what they deserve. But isn’t
that what is going on with the case of Hell, as traditionally understood? Aren’t human sins, for all
their grievousness, of a finite quantity? Isn’t Hell,  as traditionally understood, punishment of an
infinite nature? How, then, can Hell be just? The punishment seems far in excess of the crime. This
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objection relies on a perceived disproportionality between the gravity of the human offence and the
seriousness of the punishment of Hell. Satisfying some such ‘proportionality principle’ is therefore
a requirement.
But, as we will find in the course of this chapter, this ‘proportionality principle’, strikingly, does
not have the consequence that finite sin cannot merit infinite punishment. Moreover, I will outline
several ways in which human sin, and human beings, can be correctly considered as being infinitely
heinous. In this way, it is will be shown that the charge that Hell is unjust cannot be made to stick.
We will also see that the Calvinist has certain advantages in this regard over the Arminian.
6.2 What is Hell?
But, first, we must define our terms. What, exactly, are we to understand Hell as? For the purposes
of this chapter, I shall,  building on the list of theses that Jonathan Kvanvig (1993: 25) takes to
characterise what he calls the ‘Strong View of Hell’,  take Hell to be correctly described by the
following theses:
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis. This is the claim that God will, on the Day of Judgment,
consign some people to Hell. Not everyone goes to Heaven.
(H2) The Existence Thesis. People consigned to Hell are not annihilated; they continue to exist.
This claim, in conjunction with (H1), means that the quip sometimes heard from universalists
—“I do believe in Hell; it’s just that no one will be there.”—is ruled out.
(H3) The No-Escape Thesis. Once consigned to Hell, there is no means of removing oneself
out of Hell, nor any possibility of this happening to one, nor of it being true at any later point
that one is not in Hell. This thesis therefore implies that Hell is of everlasting duration.
(H4)  The Retribution Thesis. Hell is there to satisfy the demands of justice. The nature of
one’s stay in Hell is so constituted that it metes out deserved punishment for one’s misdeeds.
While this is all good as far as it goes, (H1)–(H4) are not sufficient, I believe, to capture everything
pertinent to the traditional view of Hell. This is because (H1)–(H4) do not entail that there is any
significant degree of conscious suffering in Hell. It is consistent with the above theses that Hell
contains only mild discomfiture, or that it consists merely in the deprivation of certain goods or
pleasures,  while  many  other  goods  and pleasures  yet  remain  available.  Perhaps  that  is  all  the
punishment people deserve for their sins.
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Consider how Dante describes those who occupy the first circle of Hell,  Limbo. It contains
virtuous pagans, such as Virgil, who, lacking baptism, or having no exposure to true religion, were
unable to worship God aright. Dante says of the first circle that
There, as it seemed to me from listening,
Were lamentations none, but only sighs,
That tremble made the everlasting air.
And this arose from sorrow without torment (Inferno, Canto 4, 25–28)
Virgil explains to Dante exactly how he and the other noble pagans are punished:
Lost are we and are only so far punished,
That without hope we live on in desire. (Inferno, Canto 4, 41–42)
An account of Hell that contained only unhappiness of this sort—an endless sense of disquiet and
unfulfilled desire that prompts continual sighing—could satisfy (H1)–(H4), but it would be a picture
of Hell greatly at odds with the more accustomed imagery of fiery torment.
So, theories of Hell that satisfy (H1)–(H4) may be considered insufficiently severe. We should
keep to hand, therefore, the following thesis:
(H5) The  Torment  Thesis. The  punishment  that  is  meted  out  in  Hell  is  such  that  every
occupant of Hell is subject to frequent conscious suffering of a kind that is at least comparable to
the worst cases of earthly suffering.
Adding  (H5)  to  (H1)–(H4)  guarantees  an  account  of  Hell  that  is  closer  to  the  more  severe,
traditional understanding.
But it is helpful to consider (H1)–(H4) apart from (H1)–(H5). For the purposes of this chapter,
let ‘Hell’ refer to any model of Hell that satisfies (H1)–(H4), and let ‘Hell+’ refer to any model of
Hell that satisfies (H1–H5). As we shall see, it is easier to make a case against the existence of
Hell+ than it is against Hell, though ultimately I shall defend the plausibility of both varieties.
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6.3 Lewis Carroll
We began with a quote from one fiction writer, Isaac Asimov. But the argument was rather short
and undeveloped. However, another famous writer of fiction, Lewis Carroll, pushes the same line of
argument that Asimov did, and he fleshes out his thoughts at length.36
Carroll  begins his argument with an appeal to the proportionality principle we have already
noted. He states it as follows:
There is, however,  one principle which clearly applies equally to both [human and divine justice]:
we recognise that some proportion should be observed, between the amount of crime and the amount
of punishment inflicted: for instance, we should have no hesitation in condemning as unjust the
conduct of a judge who, in sentencing two criminals, had awarded the greater punishment to the one
whose crime was clearly the lesser of the two. (1899: 349)
Carroll  then draws out what he takes the implications of this  principle  to be for the traditional
doctrine of Hell. Consequently, he says,
We feel intuitively that sins committed by a human being during a finite period must necessarily be
finite in amount; while punishment continued during an infinite period must necessarily be infinite in
amount. And we feel that such a proportion is unjust. (1899: 350)
Not only that, but Carroll believed that the consequences of setting aside these feelings are dire
indeed:
To set aside this intuition, and to accept, as a just and righteous act, the infliction on human beings of
infinite punishment for finite sin, is virtually the abandonment of Conscience as a guide in questions
of  Right  and  Wrong,  and  the embarking,  without  compass  or  rudder,  on a  boundless  ocean  of
perplexity. (1899: 352)
It is the contention of this chapter that believing in eternal punishment for earthly sins occasions
nothing so drastic as a dethroning of the conscience, or anything comparable to that. Indeed, I will
36 Lewis Carroll, concerned that his literary reputation rested on such trifles of fancy as unpunctual white rabbits and
little girls that grew and shrank with surprising rapidity, was determined to compose a sober volume of essays on
theological topics, as would better befit a man of the cloth. Alas, he passed away before he could succeed in this
enterprise,  and  only  the  first  essay,  ‘Eternal  Punishment’,  which  is  discussed  here,  was  completed.  See
Collingwood’s remarks in Carroll (1899: 344).
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attempt the opposite. I will show that the justice of Hell’s infinite punishment follows plausibly
from our moral intuitions in conjunction with certain plausible suppositions about human beings.
In order to assess this argument, we need to have a clear statement of this crucial proportionality
principle before us. However, Carroll does not offer us the most perspicuous formulation of the
principle. On his phrasing, the principle holds between ‘amounts’: a proportion must be observed
between the ‘amount of crime and the amount of punishment inflicted’ (1899: 349). But ‘amount’ is
sufficiently unclear that it may lead to obviously false understandings of the principle. It must not
refer to simple quantity. Suppose I commit two minor sins, and my friend commits one extremely
grave sin that far outstrips my two sins in the greatness of its evil. To suggest that I should receive
twice as much punishment as my friend because I sinned twice and he sinned once is clearly unjust.
We must also dismiss the idea that the proportionality principle  is concerned with temporal
duration. There is a clear sense in which the punishment of Hell, because it is everlasting, would be
of  an  infinite  amount—it  would  be of  infinite  duration.  But  the concern  of  the  proportionality
principle isn’t to match up the duration of punishment with the duration of the offence. A minor sin
might be indulged in for a long while, and a great sin might be performed with astonishing alacrity,
but we don’t hold on that account that the longer sin must receive the longer punishment. But if the
proportionality  relation doesn’t relate  the number of sins to the number of punishments,  or the
duration of sins to the duration of punishments, then what is it relating to what?
6.4 The Proportionality Principle
Most contemporary  writers  who have remarked on the principle  have taken the proportionality
requirement to be a relation between the gravity or seriousness of the wrongdoing and the intensity
of the punishment. Kershnar, for instance, says this:
By proportionality in punishment, I mean that there is a systematic positive relation between the
seriousness of a person’s wrongdoing and the maximum severity of punishment she may be given.
(2018: 43, italics mine)
Charles Seymour puts it like this:
It is unjust to punish sins disproportionately to their seriousness. (1998: 69, italics mine)
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Kenneth Himma presents the following understanding:
[P]unishment is morally justifiable if and only if it  is not excessive, given the  magnitude of the
wrong. But infinite suffering, on this line of analysis, is out of proportion to any wrong that finite
human beings could commit. (2003: 61, italics mine)
I  think  that  all  these  thinkers  are  referring  to  the  same  type  of  property  with  the  italicised
expressions. I shall use ‘severity’ to refer to that type of property. We are surely all familiar with the
fact that different moral offences are different in severity. It is evident to the moral intuition. Killing
a dog without good cause is wrong; killing a stranger without just cause is much worse; and killing
a family member for no good reason worse still. The offences increase in severity. (Kershnar speaks
of a ‘severity of punishment’, and that is not an unnatural use, but I will not follow him in speaking
of severity of punishments. One must regiment the language.)
It is surely right that it is the severity of the wrongdoing that determines the sort of punishment
that is thereby deserved, rather than the mere numerical quantity of these sins or their temporal
duration. That is not to say that numerical quantity is irrelevant, however. The sort of punishment
one deserves for a lifetime’s sins will be a function of both the number and the severity of those
sins. But I don’t wish to complicate matters by bringing in quantity at this point. Let us stick with
individual  sins for the moment.  We therefore have one half  of the proportionality  principle,  as
follows:
(Proto-PP) For any culpable fault F exemplified by an agent A, there is a punishment P that A
deserves, and P is proportional to the severity of F.
But the reference to punishment is uninformative. In what sense can a punishment be proportionate?
But again, it is evident that, just as there are various degrees of severity, so there are various degrees
of  punishment.  Receiving  ‘six  of  the best’  to  one’s  posterior  is  a  lot  worse than a  rap on the
knuckles from a ruler, yet a caning pales in comparison with a serious whipping from a cat-o’-nine-
tails. I shall use ‘degrees’ to speak of these different levels of punishment. And the concern of the
proportionality  principle  is  to  have  the  severity  of  the  offence  proportional  to  the  degree  of
punishment. We can therefore state the proportionality principle as follows:
(PP) For any culpable fault F exemplified by an agent A, there is a degree of punishment D that
A deserves, and D is proportional to the severity of F.
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But more needs to be said about degrees of punishment. I shall take degrees of punishment to be
sets of possible punishments. There are many possible ways to be punished for a crime. One might
be beaten, starved, subjected to extreme heat, to extreme cold, to psychological torment, to public
humiliation, and so on. Punishments might be comparatively mild too: one might be restricted, in
certain ways, in one’s freedom, or one might lose certain rights, or sources of pleasure or happiness,
without  there  being  any  positive  infliction  of  pain  or  suffering.  But  some  of  these  means  of
punishment will be just as bad as each other. Perhaps being eaten alive by dogs is just as bad a
punishment as being burnt at the stake. In that case, a moral offence that would have one as a
proportionate  punishment  would  also  have  the  other.  In  this  way,  a  moral  offence  will  have,
proportionate to its severity, a set of possible punishments. This set of possible punishments is the
degree of punishment. 
We can say more about these degrees of punishment.  They are surely sets of  pairs. This is
because we don’t just talk about the type of punishment that is to be meted out, but also about how
long the punishment should last.  As Himma notes, “any given punishment has two dimensions,
duration  and  intensity,  and  both  dimensions  necessarily  play  a  role  in  determining  whether  a
punishment  is  proportional  to  the  crime.”  (2003:  64).  A very  painful  punishment  with  a  short
duration might be equivalent to a less painful punishment with a longer duration. Perhaps eight
minutes with one’s hand in the fire is just as bad as five minutes with one’s arm in the fire. A degree
of punishment, then, as a set of pairs of intensity and duration, might end up looking something like
this:
{<hand in the fire, 8 minutes>, <arm in the fire, 5 minutes>, <serious itch, 1 year> … }
Each member of the set  would be a suitable  punishment for a moral offence severe enough to
warrant that degree. We might also, if we wished, try to bring the punishments under a common
metric. To borrow Jeremy Bentham’s terminology, we might coin the ‘dolor’ as a unit of pain or
suffering. This may permit us to collapse, say, <arm being sawed off, 1 minute> and <leg being
sawed off, 1 minute> to <100 dolors (per second), (for) 1 minute>, for example.
But, as noted above and as will be seen below, we can’t always think of punishment in terms of
the infliction of suffering. So, although some punishment-pairs may be collapsed in this way, it
can’t be comprehensively done.
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6.4 Can finite sins merit only finite punishment?
We can now begin to analyse the claims of Asimov and Carroll.  Asimov claimed that ‘infinite
torture can only be a punishment for infinite evil’ (1995: 334). But if a just infinite punishment
implies  infinite  evil,  then,  by contraposition,  finite  evil  implies  the absence of any just  infinite
punishment.  But since our sins (assuming they are finite)  still  surely merit punishment (at least
sometimes), and the merited punishment cannot be infinite, it follows that the finite evil for which
we are responsible can only merit finite punishment. Call this claim (FF):
(FF) Finite sins can only merit finite punishment.
This claim is crucial to the popular case against the justice of Hell as given by Asimov and Carroll,
and I will argue that it is false, although I don’t think its falsity is as significant as might be thought.
But the components of the claim need to be analysed. What does it mean for sins to be finite? And
what does it mean for punishment to be infinite?
Let’s begin with sins. In what sense are our sins finite? I see two relevant ways in which our
sins are plausibly finite: they are finite in quantity and severity. As to quantity, if it were revealed to
us that we were beings who had lived for an eternity past before our present embodiment in these
human bodies, and that our previous existences which went back throughout all of the infinite past
were as consistently sinful as our present ones, then it would surely be conceded that we all have
racked up an infinite quantity of sins to our account. But no one thinks anything like that is true. We
have only lived a finite amount of time, and therefore only committed a finite amount of sins. One
might put the argument this way: a sin is a decision, and we have only ever made a finite number of
decisions; therefore, our sins are finite in number. Thus, it is likely that all would agree that our sins
are finite in quantity.
But what about severity? What does it mean for severity to be finite (or infinite)? Here, it is hard
to give an informative answer. It is tempting to reach for interpretations that render (FF) trivially
true. If we say that ‘finite sins’ are just those sins that merit finite punishment, then (FF) becomes
the not particularly enlightening proposition that <sins that merit only finite punishment can only
merit finite punishment>. Needless to say, that is nothing to write home about—it is a dialectically
useless claim—the believer in Hell will of course deny that our sins are finite in that sense—the
objector to the justice of Hell needs some account of ‘finite sin’ such that the believer in the justice
of Hell would at least be somewhat inclined to think that the sins we commit are finite in that sense.
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One way to argue, from premises all would accept, that all our sins are of finite severity would
be as follows: it is clear that we commit some sins of finite severity. To claim that all our offences
are of infinite severity is too much. So if indulging feelings of impatience while waiting in a queue
is a sin of finite severity, then we have a handle on what it would mean for a sin to be of infinite
severity: it would be a sin that immeasurably dwarfs sins like that. But it seems wrong to say, even
of the grosser sins that human beings commit, such as brutal murder, that they are infinitely greater
than indulging feelings of impatience, substantially greater, yes, but not infinitely greater.
However, defenders of the justice of Hell may deny that we commit any sins of finite severity.
All sins are sins against God, they may say, and for that reason are all of infinite severity. But will I
discuss that sort of reasoning below. Let us grant for the moment that the claim that all human sins
are of finite severity is well-motivated. 
But what sense are we to attach to the idea of punishment’s being finite or infinite? In our terms,
this must be an infinite degree of punishment. But degrees, as I defined them, are sets of pairs of
duration and intensity. There are therefore two ways in which a degree of punishment can be finite
or infinite: it can be infinite by virtue of having an infinite duration, or by having infinite intensity.
As for duration, there is a plain sense in which the punishment of Hell is infinite in that way: it
has an infinite temporal extension—it goes on forever. A punishment can therefore be finite by
lasting for a finite duration, and infinite by lasting for an infinite duration.
But there is the distinction, that must be kept in mind, between actual and potential infinity. A
potentially infinite collection of objects is a finite collection of objects that increases in number
indefinitely. Such a collection may start with a single object, or none, but more and more objects
will be added without the process ever stopping. Such a collection will at no point be infinite, for an
infinite sum cannot be reached by successive addition; it is instead a collection of an endlessly
increasing finite number of objects. An actual infinite collection, on the other hand, is a collection
that is infinite  as it stands—an actually infinite  library of books contains an infinite number of
books as it is; you don’t need to add more books to it in any way to make it infinite.
In the light of that distinction, it is clear that Hell must count as potentially infinite. The fact that
no one in Hell will ever be able to claim, at any point, that they have been there for an infinite
amount  of  time  shouldn’t  cause  us  to  cease  from  describing  Hell  as  an  infinite  punishment,
preferring instead to call it  endless, perhaps, for it is clearly worse to be sentenced to a certain
punishment of endless duration than it is to be sentenced to the same punishment for any finite
duration; thus endless duration possesses the property, noted above as characteristic of infinity, of
being greater than any finite duration. Thus, we can attach a clear sense to punishment’s being finite
or infinite by virtue of its having finite or potentially infinite duration.
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What about intensity? Might a punishment be infinite on account of being of infinite intensity? I
think there is cause for scepticism here. To begin with, although it may be possible for pains to
continue indefinitely in intensity, it is not so clear that it is possible for human beings, as they are
currently constituted to experience pains above a certain level degree of intensity. There is only so
much, it may be thought, that body or soul may possibly bear. However, it may be that the damned
in  Hell  are  physically  and/or  psychically  reconstituted  such  that  they  become  capable  of
experiencing pains beyond what it was possible for them to experience in this life. But, assuming
that the relevant changes in nature are made, would it be possible for a human being to experience
an infinite pain? I don’t mean a pain extended over an infinite amount of time, I mean an occurrence
of  a  pain  of  infinite  intensity.  Here  some question  marks  may  be  placed  over  the  conceptual
coherence of the idea. We readily understand that pains may increase indefinitely in intensity, but
that there should be such a thing as an infinite pain? This seems like mistake, a category error of
some sort. I shall follow the gut sense here, and assume pain of an infinite intensity is not possible. 37
Accordingly, if the suffering of Hell, or any punishment at all, is going to be considered an infinite
punishment, then it will have to be by virtue of its temporal extension, its duration, and not because
of the intensity of the suffering experienced therein.
6.5 The Central Argument
We are now in a position to state the central argument of this chapter against the justice of Hell:
(1) Hell is a perfect expression of justice: you suffer neither more nor less than you deserve in
Hell.
(2) You are punished only for the sins of your earthly lifetime in Hell.
(PP) For any culpable fault F exemplified by an agent A, there is a degree of punishment D that
A deserves, and D is proportional to the severity of F.
(3) The sins of our earthly lifetime are all finite in severity.
(4) The sins of our earthly lifetime are finite in quantity.
(FF') Sins that are of both finite severity and finite quantity cannot merit a degree of punishment
that is of infinite duration. (From PP)
37 Theologically conservative Christians have extra reason to be suspicious of the possibility of an infinite pain. If
there were such a thing, then it should be possible for human beings to experience it, given the right natures. But
then it would be possible for human beings to pay the penalty for their sin (infinite demerit) in a finite time, and
thus (i) Hell wouldn’t need to be eternal, and (ii) the need for atonement is Christ wouldn’t be absolute: by suffering
an infinite pain on their own behalf, people could pay a satisfactory penance for their sins—a salvation by works.
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(5) Hell is a punishment of infinite duration.
Therefore,
(6) Hell is not just, contra (1). (From 2, 3, 4, FF', 5)
(FF') is a reworking of (FF) in the light of the full statement of the Proportionality Principle (PP).
That, and the argument itself,  makes it clear that (FF) (or (FF')) is  not to be identified with the
proportionality principle—a mistake one might instinctively make; (FF) (or (FF')) is a consequence
of the proportionality principle, not an analysis of it.
In this chapter I shall argue that (2), (3), (4) and (FF') are all plausibly false.
6.6 The Continuing-Sin Hypothesis
The denial of (2) is a very quick way of dealing with this argument. It is called the continuing-sin
hypothesis, and is defended by Murray (1999). For our purposes, we can take the continuing-sin
hypothesis (CSH) to be the conjunction of the two claims that
(CSH1) Human beings in Hell continue to sin
and
(CSH2) It is the truth of (CSH1), and that alone, that justifies the degree of punishment present
in Hell (or Hell+).
One can see at once that this is a promising resolution of the difficulty. If human beings continue to
sin in Hell, then there is no need to deny (FF), or to insist that human beings are guilty of an infinite
number of sins or that sin is always of infinite severity (denials of (3) and (4)), or anything like that.
The proponent of CSH can happily grant that sins are of finite severity and of finite quantity and,
indeed, that human beings can only deserve punishment of a finite duration for such sins, for what
makes the eternal punishment of Hell permissible for God to dole out is, he will say, that the human
beings present in Hell never stop sinning. It would be quite possible for them to ‘do their time’ in
Hell, pay the price for their sinful lives, and then be out after a few years (or however long), if they
refrained from reoffending. But they never do. So, because there is never a period of time when
they refrain from sinning long enough for the demands of justice to be completely satisfied with
regard to them, they therefore indefinitely prolong their stay.
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I think CSH is workable, especially for the Calvinist. There are a few points of concern with it
that Christian philosophers might have, however.
(i) It plausibly requires a denial of incompatibilism. Arminians won’t like it. For how can it be a
guaranteed result that those in Hell will continue to sin? Surely sheer anguish over their torment
will eventually prompt the damned to decide to cease from sin just so that their suffering might be
over. Or, if we aren’t thinking in terms of Hell+, and there is no great pressure to leave Hell, the
simple odds of someone with libertarian free will endlessly freely choosing to reoffend is just too
unlikely.  But  compatibilists  have  no  problem  here—God  can  give  the  damned  characters  (or
agential natures) such that these characters always cause the damned to choose to sin rather than
refrain—but  such  characters  would  be  freedom-cancelling  on  incompatibilism.  Incompatibilists
insist  that  nothing  must  determine  an  agent’s  deciding,  if  those  decidings  are  to  be  morally
responsible decidings. But if there is nothing to determine that the damned will continue in sin, how
can it be a guaranteed fact that they will continue to sin forever?
(ii) A second worry is that it seems to undermine the significance of the Day of Judgment. All
the reprobate is really sentenced to on that great day is punishment of a finite duration, and his
continual reoffending either prolongs his original sentence or requires fresh sentencing from God.
But surely the sentence of the Day of Judgment is more momentous on its own account than this
picture suggests. (Note that if one says that being placed in a position whereby reoffending forever
is inevitable is part of what the damned are sentenced to, then that looks like an infinite punishment,
and that is what gave rise to the issue in the first place.)
(iii) There is also the worry that, even if being put in a position such that perpetual sin (and
therefore perpetual punishment) is inevitable is not part of the sentence de jure, that is nevertheless
what the sentence amounts to de facto, and it is hard to shake the suggestion that the de facto aspect
is morally  relevant to the sentencing. But if  it  is relevant,  then, again,  it  appears that perpetual
sinning is part of the punishment,  and that appears relevantly infinite,  and nothing is gained in
responding to the proportionality problem.
(iv) CSH also seems to undermine the ultimate triumph of God over sin. Justice is never finally
accomplished on CSH. Sin continues forever, and God is forever responding to it punitively. There
always remains fresh sin to punish, and the work of justice is never complete.
Now, it might be thought that the standard view of Hell faces the same problem. That goes on
for ever, and is therefore never completed. Isn’t justice likewise never accomplished on that view?
But a response can be made: CSH is committed to the continuous commission of sins in Hell.
He who denies CSH is not. That is a plain sense in which the advocate of CSH is committed to
limiting God’s victory over sin, independently of issues concerning the satisfaction of justice. There
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are two relevant ways in which God can be thought to be victorious over sin. The first is by causing
sin to cease; the second is by punishing sin. CSH rules out the former sort of triumph while other
views do not have that consequence.38
(v) The CSH rules out reconciliationism.39 That is the view that the sort of reconciliation spoken
of in Philippians 2:10–11, ‘so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on
earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of the
Father’, extends also to the damned.40 As Bawulski puts it, reconciliationism’s ‘biggest distinctive,
probably its sine qua non, is that in the eternal state all sinning ceases: God’s victory will be such so
that sin shall be no more.’ (2013: 133). This does not save the damned—they still suffer in torment
—but they come to recognise God’s lordship and goodness, and they honour him from Hell’s pits,
and cease from sin. Their continuing torment is thus justified only on the basis of their earthly
rejection of God and his Christ. It is a cost to CSH that it rules out this exegetically defended view.
Now, I don’t think these objections are decisive. Consider concern (iv), that God’s triumph over
sin is limited if sin continues for ever. It can plausibly be countered that continual sinning increases
God’s glory insofar as it permits God to continually display his ability to frustrate and ruin those
who oppose him (a theme of the next  chapter).  Consider  also concern (v),  that  CSH rules  out
reconciliationism. We should distinguish between hamartiological reconciliation and liturgiological
reconciliation. The first is a reconciliation that involves the reconciled party ceasing from sin. The
second is a form of reconciliation that only involves the reconciled party participating in worship,
but not necessarily refraining from sin in toto. It seems to me plausible to hold that this latter sort of
reconcilation is all that is required to do justice to the reconciliation proof-texts.
Henri Blocher, a proponent of reconciliationism, writes against this idea, ‘The theory of sin
forever flourishing ignores the message of Christ's perfect victory over sin and all evil. Every knee
shall bow and  every tongue confess [...] (Phil. 2:10f), those of the lost included. It cannot mean
mere outward, hypocritical and forced agreement’ (1992: 303). But one can grant that the bowing,
confessing, and worshipping that the damned perform from Hell’s dark chambers is sincere and
profound, whilst also holding that the damned continue to sin in other respects. After all, Christians
in this life offer Christ genuine worship whilst sadly sinning in other areas.
The denial of (2) is therefore a ready manoeuvre for the Calvinist.
38 Perhaps the best exegetical argument that CSH is true is from the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31).
Dives still considers himself to have the authority to order Lazarus about, despite the dire condition Dives finds
himself in. This suggests he is still eaten up with pride. However, one might say that matters change at the eschaton,
or issue a caution about taking parables too strictly.
39 For a defence of the view, see Saville 2005 and 2007, and Bawulski 2013.
40 See Col. 1:20 and 1 Cor. 15:28 for similar verses.
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6.7 Denying FF
But one might also consider the denial of (FF'). (FF') was the claim that sins that are both finite in
severity and in quantity are not able to merit an infinite degree of punishment. I think (FF') can be
shown to be false, but it will turn out that its falsity is of limited use. In particular, not much use in
showing that Hell+ is just.
6.7.1 More detail
But first I want to flesh out in more detail how to model claims like (FF'). We saw that (FF) turned
out to be a principle (FF') relating moral severity to degrees of punishment. Consider, therefore, the
set, S, of moral severities, containing every possible strength of severity that could, in principle, be
attributed  to  an  act,  going  from very  minor  severity,  such  as  we  would  assign  to  a  flash  of
unjustified indignation, all the way to the infinite severity that many claim attends cursing God.
Consider also the set, P, of all possible degrees of punishment, ranging from very mild discomfort
of short longevity to the everlasting torments involved in the traditional conception of Hell. We saw
that a degree of punishment could be modelled as a set of pairs of intensity (of discomfort,  or
whatever)  and duration.  And that a degree of punishment can count as infinite  in virtue of the
durations  it  contains.  Finally,  consider  the retributive  function,  fr,  that  matches  up strengths  of
severity to degrees of punishment. This is the function we all work with when we talk about what
punishments deserve. S will therefore be the domain of this function. We can now render (FF) yet
more perspicuously:
(FF'') For any collection of moral failings that is both (i) finite in quantity and (ii) finite in
severity,  fr will not assign to that collection an infinite degree of punishment.
6.7.2 Pan the Hedonistic Immortal
I will give the following argument via thought experiment to show that (FF'') is false. I will argue
that there are cases where an infinite punishment is clearly inadequate to handle an offence of finite
severity.  But  if  certain  infinite  punishments  are  clearly  not  strong  enough  to  be  adequate
punishments,  then  we  have  no  reason  to  think  that  no  infinite  punishment  can  be  adequate
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punishment.  The opposition to infinite punishments comes from the conviction that any infinite
punishment  would be overkill  for any offence of finite severity.  If that claim is  false,  then the
objection to infinite punishments has little to hold it up.
Consider, then, the following thought experiment. Pan is an immortal god who lives a life of
unremitting hedonism and pleasure-seeking amongst the stars. One day he encounters Planet Earth.
He is initially tickled by the antics of the planet’s inhabitants, but he quickly grows tired of them,
and  eventually  sets  the  whole  world  ablaze,  guaranteeing  a  painful,  fiery  demise  for  every
inhabitant. This is an act of great wickedness, but, for all its wickedness, it surely remains an act of
finite evil, because the inhabitants of the Earth are of a finite number.
One other fact about Pan should be noted. Because of his hedonistic nature, he possesses a
harem of one hundred naiads, and they accompany him wherever he goes. Furthermore, he has a
natural right to this harem, similar to the way that a father has a natural right to his son’s obedience.
Suppose Pan comes before God for judgment for his crime. But all God decrees by way of
punishment is to take away from Pan one of his naiads. Naiad no. 65 will be permanently, and thus
for ever, removed from Pan’s entourage. Pan therefore loses his natural right to this naiad, and that
ray  of  elfin  sweetness  she  shone  into  his  life  has  is  forever  gone.  This  is  clearly  an  infinite
punishment, for the duration in the punishment pair is infinite:
<loss of access, and right to, naiad no. 65; for ever>
For the rest of Pan’s immortal existence, he will be without that member of his harem.
But the problem is that this appears plainly inadequate as a punishment for Pan’s misdeed. It
just wouldn’t, we can imagine, affect him severely enough to be a sufficiently serious punishment.
Certainly, he has lost one member of his harem, but he has ninety-nine left to him, so it is no great
loss, and his indulgent misadventures in time and space can continue as before.
Not merely are some infinite  punishments inadequate,  but also some finite  punishments are
plausibly too strong. Suppose that God sentenced Pan to be tormented in fire for a trillion years
instead.  There are (rounding up) 8 billion people on Earth at  present.  Even if the painful  fiery
demise that Pan caused them to suffer took an hour to culminate in death, that would only amount
to 8 billion hours of suffering caused by Pan. To cause Pan to suffer for a trillion years, therefore, in
punishment, is plausibly an excessive punishment. Not by virtue of the intensity of the pain—we
can suppose Pan only suffers the qualitatively  same pain he caused the inhabitants  of Earth to
experience—but  by virtue  of  its  duration.  a fortiori,  an  infinite  punishment  of  that  sort  would
likewise be too much.
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But if is unjust for Pan to suffer for a trillion years in this way, then it is likewise unjust for him
to suffer in that way forever.  So, if  we know both that  (i)  certain infinite  punishments  are not
serious enough (because of weak intensity) and that (ii) certain infinite punishments are excessive
(because that intensity (given that duration) is too great), then surely it is simply a matter of finding
the sweet-spot between these two alternatives: of finding the level of intensity of punishment of
infinite duration that is neither too strong nor too weak. It would be strange indeed if there were an
abrupt jump from a punishment that were too weak to be adequate punishment, even though of
infinite  duration,  to  one  slightly  stronger  that  became  impermissible  to  be  dispensed  over  an
indefinite duration. Therefore, (FF'') is probably false: fr will assign to Pan’s offence a degree of
punishment that contains at least one pair that contains an infinite duration.
6.7.3 Partial and Fully Infinite Degrees of Punishment
One helpful distinction one should note at this juncture is the distinction between partially infinite
and  fully  infinite  degrees  of  punishment.  A  degree  of  punishment  is  fully  infinite  iff  all  the
punishment pairs it contains are of infinite duration. A degree of punishment is partially infinite iff
it contains at least one pair that contains an infinite duration. In Pan’s case, it appears that f r would
map the severity of Pan’s offence to a partially infinite degree of punishment. I argued that there
would be an acceptable infinite punishment pair, but it is also surely true that there would be an
adequate finite punishment pair, in which case the degree of punishment the offence merits will be
partially infinite.
A  lot  of  Christians  who  believe  in  Hell  (traditionally  understood)  would  claim  that  every
wrongdoing is  a  wrongdoing against  God, and would merit,  on that  account,  eternal  suffering.
Every wrongdoing would therefore, on their view, merit a fully infinite degree of punishment, no
finite punishment ever being sufficient.
6.7.4 Some Objections
One might object to the argument from the Pan case as follows: Pan isn’t really punished at all. For,
in order to be punished for something,  you must experience some discomfort.  But Pan doesn’t
experience any discomfort. He merely endures a slight reduction, a slender diminution, of his daily
delight. Bawulski contends for this line of thought. He appears to insist that retributive punishment
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requires unpleasant experience. He therefore says that ‘It is hard to see how we might punish an
offender who is in a coma, especially if that coma were irreversible. We might be able to extract
compensation from her estate, but we would normally consider this means of punishment to be a
contingency-plan  sentence  in  lieu  of  a  punishment  that  involved the  offender's  knowledge and
recognition of her wrong-doing.’ (2010: 66). And he consequently moves that annihilation, being
put  out  of  existence,  cannot  function  as  a  punishment:  ‘there  is  great  difficulty  in  seeing  how
annihilation per se is punishment at all.’ (2010: 66).
I disagree with Bawulski here. It seems to me quite plain that annihilation can function as a
punishment.  Suppose  an  angel  indulges  in  malicious  thoughts  against  another  angel.  Then  the
offending angel goes to sleep. God decides that he will punish the angel, and his punishment is that,
before the angel wakes up, he puts the angel out of existence—annihilation. The angel is therefore
at no point aware of God’s displeasure, nor at any point experiences anything unpleasant. It simply
never wakes up. It is forever gone. I find it evident that such an annihilation is more than adequate
to  function  as  a  possible  punishment.  Indeed,  some  might  say  that,  in  the  angelic  case  here
described, the punishment is too excessive, while Bawulski’s complaint appeared to be that non-
existence could never have enough clout to be a punishment.
So, what things can count as punishments, if an unpleasant sensation, or even awareness that
one is being punished, is not necessary? Here follows a list of possible ways to punish. 
(i) Reduction in happiness. Like the Pan case, this need not be attended with suffering; one may
not miss the pleasures one might have otherwise had, but even if there is suffering together with the
reduction, the reduction is still part of the punishment in its own right, not merely by virtue of the
unhappiness it may cause.
(ii) Loss of a right one formerly possessed. One might lose the right to free speech, say. No
suffering need be involved, yet the loss of a right remains a bad thing to happen to one.
(iii) Annihilation. Being pushed out of existence is a serious thing to happen to one, even if the
process is painless, and one isn’t feeling anything at all.
(iv) The loss of a good that one would otherwise have had. I don’t think one needs to have a
right to a good in order for one’s being deprived of it to function as a punishment. Again, I don’t
even think one needs to know that one has been deprived of it for it to be a punishment. Suppose
that, as things are proceeding, I am on course to receive a large inheritance some years down the
line, though at present I have no right to it. I know nothing of this, however. But, on account of
various sins, God deigns to providentially alter the course of history so that I will no longer inherit
this fortune. Again, I know nothing of this. But it still seems to me that were I deprived in such a
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manner of a fortune that were coming my way, then that would be a punishment. Not a punishment
of a very great sort, you say. Perhaps not, but a punishment nevertheless, I feel.
It is also worth noting that being punished can even increase your net happiness. One of the best
ways of seeing this is to consider the punishment of being reduced to a state of mental retardation.
To be made intellectually disabled is to lose a great many goods, but rather than making you sad, it
might  make you happier.  A chuckling simpleton may lead a much happier  life  than a tortured
genius; nevertheless, to reduce the latter to the former would be a sore punishment. The thought
here is that the good one is deprived of is so great that one still suffers a net loss in goods, even
though one’s happiness might increase. After all, happiness is only one sort of good.
(v) The introduction of an evil into one’s life. This is very general, and it includes pain, because
pain, I assume, is an evil.  Illness, death, destruction, sorrow, ugliness, etc. are all also included
under this category. In fact, I say, between (iv) and (v) we cover every possible punishment. I think
that  anything  that  functions  as  a  punishment  has  to  involve  either  the  loss  of  a  good  or  the
introduction of a bad into one’s life. Annihilation would be the loss of future goods, fiery torment
the introduction of a bad, and so on.
All  this  goes  to  show  two  things:  first,  that  Pan’s  punishment  is  a  genuine  instance  of
punishment  (even if  not adequate punishment);  and, second, that  punishment  can’t  simply be a
function  of  duration  and intensity  of  suffering—there  are  more  ways  to  be  punished  than  just
through suffering.
6.7.5 The Significance of the Falsity of FF
Here is a fresh, more perspicuous, statement of (FF):
(FF'') For any collection of moral failings that is both (i) finite in quantity and (ii) finite in
severity,  fr will not assign to that collection an infinite degree of punishment.
We argued for its falsity using the Pan case as follows: if a collection of moral failings satisfying (i)
and (ii) can never merit an infinite degree of punishment, then it will be because any infinite degree
of punishment would be excessive. But there are clearly infinite degrees of punishment that are non-
excessive, indeed, insufficient, to deal with the collection containing only Pan’s moral failure. But if
some infinite  degrees  are  not  excessive,  then  (a)  there  is  no  big  worry  that  pushes  us  toward
accepting (FF''), and (b) if there are non-excessive infinite degrees, then all one needs to do, one
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feels, is to increase the goods lost or evils introduced bit by bit until one reaches an infinite degree
that is neither insufficient nor excessive.
Indeed, on the strength of this reasoning, I am inclined to think, not merely that (FF'') is false,
but that (Anti-FF) is true:
(Anti-FF) For any collection of moral failings that is both (i) finite in quantity and (ii) finite in
severity,  fr will assign to that collection a partially infinite degree of punishment.
It seems to me that any offence, no matter how trivial, can be justly punished with an everlasting
punishment just so long as you make the loss of goods comprising that punishment smaller still, and
therefore there will be at least one punishment pair in the degree that has infinite duration.
With that, the arithmetical certainty with which this principle was tossed about—how could
finite sins merit infinite punishment?—is turned on its head. Every finite sin merits a (partially)
infinite degree of punishment!
Although  this  is  a  rhetorical  victory,  the  typical  defender  of  the  justice  of  Hell  has  work
remaining  to  him.  ‘Hell’  was  defined  using  (H1–H4),  and,  as  I  noted,  such  a  conception  is
compatible with Hell being not such a bad place, and indeed even a very pleasant place. In order to
get closer to the traditional conception, we needed (H5), the Torment Thesis—the contention that to
be in Hell is to suffer greatly. That gave us ‘Hell+’.
I think the Pan counterexample and what follows from it succeed in showing that there is no
obstacle to supposing Hell is just, but that is too much of a low bar. It is the justice of Hell+ that
people want to see exonerated. One opposed to the justice of Hell+ could modify the argument
given above against the justice of Hell. He could amend the argument given above, as follows:
(1+) Hell+ is a perfect expression of justice: you suffer neither more nor less than you deserve
in Hell.
(2+) You are punished only for the sins of your earthly lifetime in Hell+.
(PP) For any culpable fault F exemplified by an agent A, there is a degree of punishment D that
A deserves, and D is proportional to the severity of F.
(3) The sins of our earthly lifetime are all finite in severity.
(4) The sins of our earthly lifetime are finite in quantity.
(FF2)  Sins  that  are  of  both  finite  severity  and  finite  quantity  cannot  merit  a  degree  of
punishment that is of infinite duration and great intensity of suffering. (From PP)
(5+) Hell+ is a punishment of infinite duration and great intensity of suffering.
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Therefore,
(6+) Hell+ is not just, contra (1+). (From 2+, 3, 4, FF2, 5+) 
This argument is not as good as the last one insofar as it is now conceded that (FF) is false, for now
the move from (PP) to (FF2) lacks the appearance of arithmetical certainty that gave the move from
(PP) to (FF) its original force. It appeared a matter of simple mathematics that offences finite in
quantity  and severity  could not  be proportional  to an infinite  punishment.  With that  conviction
stripped away, we realise that the move from (PP) to (FF2) rests entirely on the inclusion of ‘great
intensity of suffering’.
How might the move now be justified? I think it must rest on bare moral intuition. I do not think
this is unreasonable. No matter how great and how numerous a man’s earthly crimes, if they remain
finite in number and severity, it would be unjust for him to be painfully tormented for them forever
—intensities  above  a  certain  line  justice  cannot  join  with  an  infinite  duration.  This  would  be
analogous,  perhaps,  to the way in which certain  horrors,  some might  say,  can’t  be permissibly
brought about even if outweighed by far greater goods. There is a cap on these matters, and we can
only go so far, permissibly.
One way of attacking (FF2) would be to consider cases where the finite offences were gradually
raised  in  quantity  and  severity  until  they  were  so  great  that  eternal  suffering  seemed  an  apt
punishment, but I won’t pursue such a line because it would probably lead to clashing intuitions,
and, more fundamentally, the focus of the objector to the justice of Hell+ isn’t on possible sins of
incredible, though finite, severity, it is on the sins of our earthly lives, which don’t strike him as of a
collected severity severe enough to warrant everlasting torment.
It is to the undermining of that impression that I now turn. I shall do it by motivating the denial
of (3), and then of (4).
6.8 Against Our Sins Being Finite in Severity
There  is  an  established  tradition  in  Christian  thought  that  denies  premise  (3)  from the  above
argument against the justice of Hell. The tradition says this: not all our sins are of finite severity,
because at least some of our sins are against God, and to offend against God is to commit an offence
of infinite severity, because he is a being of infinite greatness. In the literature, this idea is referred
to as the ‘Status Principle’—the idea that the severity of your wrongdoing is partly a function of the
status of the offended party.
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6.8.1 Anselm on the Status Principle
Here is what Anselm has to say about how serious a matter it is to offend God. In his  Cur Deus
Homo he asks how serious a matter it would be to turn one’s head to look in a particular direction
when God has forbidden one so to look. The respondent in Cur Deus Homo’s dialogue says this:
When I consider the action in itself, I see that it is a very slight one; but when I enter fully into what
it is when done against the will of God, I see that it is something very serious, and above comparison
with any loss whatsoever (1890: 50) 
This conclusion is affirmed in the protagonist’s voice. He agrees that 
Thus gravely do we sin every time we knowingly do anything, however small, against the will of
God (1890: 51)
And it follows from that that no action of ours
could suffice to make satisfaction for one sin, however small, when that one act is considered as
opposed to the will of God. (1890: 50)
The language of infinity is not used by Anselm, but introducing it would help join the dots. Why
can we make no satisfaction for one small sin? What prevents it? Because all sin is an offence
against an infinite being, it therefore requires an infinite restitution, something finite human beings
are unable to provide.
6.8.2 Jonathan Edwards on the Status Principle
Jonathan Edwards is more explicit  in introducing both infinity and Hell into the discussion. He
writes, in a discourse entitled ‘The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners’,
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God is a being infinitely lovely, because he hath infinite excellency and beauty. … He is a being of
infinite greatness, majesty, and glory; and therefore he is infinitely honourable. … His authority over
us is infinite; and the ground of his right to our obedience is infinitely strong … 
So that sin against God, being a violation of infinite obligations, must be a crime infinitely heinous,
and so deserving infinite punishment. (1974a [1834]: 669)
After all, Edwards continues,
Nothing is more agreeable to the common sense of mankind, than that sins committed against any
one, must be proportionably heinous to the dignity of the being offended and abused (1974a [1834]:
669)
It therefore follows that
If there be any evil of faultiness in sin against God, there is certainty infinite evil: for if it be any
fault at all, it has an infinite aggravation, viz. that it is against an infinite object. If it be ever so small
upon other accounts, yet if it be any thing, it has one infinite dimension; and so is an infinite evil.
(1974a [1834]: 669)
Hell therefore involves no violation of justice:
The  eternity of the punishment of ungodly men renders it infinite: and it renders it no more than
infinite; and therefore renders no more than proportionable to the heinousness of what they are guilty
of. (1974a [1834]: 669)
6.8.3 Analysing the Status Principle
So much for the sources. But what are to make of the principle? Suppose we state the principle as
follows:
(SP) The severity of one’s wrongdoing is partly determined by the status or importance of the
party offended or wronged by one’s wrongdoing (if there is such a party) such that the greater the
status of the offended party, the greater the severity of one’s wrongdoing, ceteris paribus.
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Some have objected to the principle on the ground that it relies on a feudal perspective of matters.41
For a serf to strike his lord was a far greater crime than for him to strike his fellow serf—his equal
rather  than  his  superior.  But,  it  may  be  urged,  we have  moved  on from such an  inegalitarian
understanding of social relations.
It might be responded that our moving on, for all its progressive, enlightened allure, was not a
movement in the right direction. But there is a more decisive response. We all seem to grant that, as
far as greatness of being goes, the status principle holds. Consider: to kill a fly because it irritates
you is permissible. To kill a dog because it is irritating you, however, looks reprehensible. Finally,
to kill another human being because he is irritating you is universally regarded as a terrible thing to
do. What explains these different reactions? Difference in greatness of being. A fly is not a being
possessed of any great magnitude of greatness or intrinsic value. And that is why to kill it is no
great evil. But a dog is a far greater being than a fly, and for that reason we realise that stronger
reasons for killing one are necessary than in the case of the fly. Human beings, of course, being
made in the image of God, possess a value, and a worth, and a greatness that far outstrips both dogs
and flies. Accordingly, reasons of a very great sort are required to be justified in killing another
human being.42
But if greatness of being is indeed morally relevant to the severity of wrong, then it looks as if
the defender of Hell+ has an important principle to appeal to in their defence of the justice of Hell+.
It is as Anselm and Edwards have it: God is a being infinitely great, and so our sins against him,
being proportional, in part, to the greatness of being we offend, are plausibly infinitely severe. And
if they are infinitely severe, there can surely be no obstacle to supposing them to require infinite
punishment of a severe sort, the sort that Hell+ requires.
I want to discuss some remarks that Kvanvig makes, because they will help clarify matters. He
writes,
41 Marilyn McCord Adams declares the status principle ‘highly implausible’, and suggests that Anselm’s contrary
opinion can be explained simply because he was a creature of his time: ‘it is understandable how Anselm could
have come to hold such a principle. Anselm was a member of feudal society in which the amount of honour due to
serfs as opposed to lesser nobles, and to lesser nobles as opposed to the king, was very important in dictating
behaviour.’ (1975: 442). But, of course, we are all creatures of our time. Kvanvig makes a similar remark to Adams:
‘Some easily  grant  [the status  principle]  because their  moral  experiences  involve  participation in  inegalitarian
societies. […] That these experiences are grounded in the moral dimension of life rather than in the unprincipled
and transient character of societal organization is far from obvious.’ (1993: 29). But suppose that is correct. By the
same token, it would appear far from obvious that these experiences are grounded in transient societal organisation
rather than moral reality.
42 Kvanvig concedes, along similar lines, that it is possible to motivate the principle this way, apart from appeal to
societies with structured classes: ‘One such example [showing this] is that the moral guilt, if any, incurred by killing
a plant is quite different from that incurred by killing a human being.’ (1993: 30).
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even  the  smallest  amount  of  harm  might  deserve  an  infinite  punishment.  How  could  this  be?
According to the status principle, the punishment deserved is determined by two factors; the status of
the being affected and the amount of actual or intended harm involved. (1993: 30)
He elaborates on this:
Which sin or how much sin must a person commit against God to justify infinite punishment? There
is a plausible argument that one sin alone done against God must be enough if the equal punishment
version of the strong view is to be defended. […] If one sin alone is not enough to warrant infinite
punishment, no function on number of sins will do either, for any such function would be completely
arbitrary in drawing the line where it did. For example, suppose the claim is that sixteen sins are not
enough to warrant an infinite punishment, but seventeen are. The natural response is to wonder why
that would be so. We would be at a loss to find any principled reason for drawing the line at a
particular number of sins. (1993: 31)43
Kvanvig in these passages considers whether the status principle commits one to the view that one
sin alone against God is enough to ‘deserve’ or ‘justify’ infinite punishment. If we take ‘deserve’ to
mean ‘demand’, such that the claim is that one sin against God cannot be justly punished save by
everlasting punishment, then the claim can be stated as follows:
(7) For any sin against God, fr will assign to the severity of that act a fully infinite degree of
punishment.
If we take the claim that one sin against God justifies infinite punishment to mean that infinite
punishment is permissible, though perhaps not required, then we can state this claim as:
(8) For any sin against God, fr will assign to the severity of that act a partially infinite degree of
punishment.
 
43 What Kvanvig mentions there as the ‘the equal punishment version of the strong view’ is the contention that every
occupant of Hell is tormented for ever and to an equal degree. It therefore presupposes the idea that every human
being is just as guilty as any other. I take this view to be something of a hyper-Protestant curiosity. The Protestant
aversion to the Roman-Catholic belief in justification through meritorious works, and the sort of boasting that is
believed to result—‘O wastrel and profligate, my works are greater than yours!’—is carried over to Hell as well. No
denizen of Hell will be able to boast that he is less wicked than his peer—they must all be equals in iniquity. This
view must be rejected because it  is  at  odds with Scripture.  At the Lord’s coming, ‘that  servant who knew his
master’s will but did not get ready or act according to his will, will receive a severe beating. But the one who did
not know, and did what deserved a beating, will receive a light beating.’ (Luke 12:47–48). See also Matt. 11:22 &
24.
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(7) entails  (8), given the definitions given above, though the converse is false. The defender of
Hell+ doesn’t strictly need the truth of (7), though it might be supposed he does at first blush.
Although if an eternity of torment is held to be just as bad as some finite degree of punishment, then
that finite torment must be sore indeed. Indeed, suspicion about the adequacy of any such finite
torment is perhaps what drives the defender of Hell+ to prefer (7) over merely (8). It seems that the
greater the torment in an infinite punishment pair that can be justly applied, the more sceptical we
are about the possibility of any finite punishment pair being just as bad (a member of the same
degree of punishment).
But implied in Kvanvig’s remarks is perhaps an argument that the status principle issues in
absurdity. Consider a holy angel, called ‘Phanuel’. Phanuel is one of God’s trusted servants, and
through  the  long  years  of  his  angelic  life  he  has  served  God  unwaveringly  and  with  perfect
obedience and joy. In short, he has been utterly without sin. But, one day, a burst of resentment
against God enters his mind. Perhaps that burst of resentment is involuntary, and so Phanuel is not
guilty for it. But let us further suppose that, for a second or so, Phanuel consciously decides to
indulge this resentment against his maker. Then he comes to, and banishes all such feelings from his
mind. His angelic  life then proceeds as before,  entirely holy and spotless. The status principle,
because of the arguments Kvanvig gave, appears committed to the claim that this slender sin on
Phanuel’s part merits eternal hellfire. But isn’t that counterintuitive?
6.8.4 The Model in Greater Detail
In order to deal with arguments of that sort, we must develop the model given so far in greater
detail. In particular, it should be noted that the status principle is a principle governing severity, not
one that governs punishment, per se. 
We introduced fr above as a function that takes us from a measure of severity to a degree of
punishment.  But the status principle governs the function taking us from wrong action types to
levels of severity. We can call this function fs. We therefore have two functions and three sets. We
have W, the set of all wrong action types; S, the set of all levels of severity of wrongdoing; and P,
the set of all degrees of punishment. The domain of fs is W, and its range is S. And, as mentioned
above, the domain of fr is S, and its range, P.
It should be made clear just how S should be distinguished from W. The wrong act-types of W
are individuated sufficiently finely that everything morally relevant to the status of the act-type is
included minus the moral severity, and therefore the moral wrongness itself, that pertains to the act.
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An act-type such as ‘breaking a promise’ is insufficiently fine-grained because much will depend on
who the promise was made to, how sincerely it was made, what it concerned, how much faith the
recipient of the promise is known to put in it, and so on. All that detail must be included in the act-
type,  if  it  is  morally  relevant.  W will  contain  all  and  only  those  wrong  action-types  that  are
maximally morally sensitive in that sense. Severities, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat bare
moral properties.  How does the severity of unjustifiedly insulting a stranger differ from that of
unjustifiedly  killing  a  stranger?  No informative  answer  can  be  given,  it  appears,  aside  from a
difference in intrinsic strength. Yet one shouldn’t forget the important role that severity plays in
motivating action. Why do I seek satisfaction against the thug who slapped my grandmother? Not
merely because he slapped my grandmother, but because slapping my grandmother is a very bad
thing to do—it is morally severe to a significant degree.
How do we determine what level of severity any given wrongdoing should be matched up to?
What informative rule, in short, does fs embody? I’m not sure much can be given in answer to this
question. We simply recognise that different levels of severity should be assigned in response to
different offences. We just ‘see’ that it is more morally severe to kill someone than to insult them,
and so on. We must rely on our moral intuitions to guide us here.
Yet some informative principles of a general sort can be laid down. It might be that a defender
of  Hell+ might  try  to  exploit  the  absence  of  much informative  here and take  a  brutist  line  of
thought. They might say, ‘fs assigns to sins against God an infinite severity. Why? It’s just a brute
fact. We can no more say why it is that sins against God are infinitely severe than we can say why it
is that (unjustifiedly) beating one’s wife has the severity that it has. These are just brute matters.’
But there is at least one principle that undermines, and makes unnecessary, the appeal to brute
fact. Call it the Infinite Severity requires Infinite Aspect principle:
ISIA: fs assigns to any given morally wrong act-type, wx, an infinite severity if and only if wx is
infinite in some (bad) morally relevant respect.
How does this work? Well, if I push someone into Hell because they annoyed me then that act-type
has reference to something infinite: Hell. Or if I cause an infinite number of people pain, then the
sum total  of the pain I  have caused will  be infinite.  These count as evidently morally  relevant
infinite  aspects of the wrong action.  Just  about every action,  however,  will  be infinite  in some
respect. Suppose I bruise someone’s face. The bruise I bring about has an area of 3 cm2, let’s say.
But if I bring about a bruise of 3 cm2, then I have also brought about a bruise of 2.5 cm2, and a
bruise of 2.25 cm2, and of 2.125 cm2, and so on ad infinitum. I have brought about a bruise with
131
infinitely many proper parts, in other words. But such an infinity, though present, is also obviously
morally irrelevant. I don’t have to answer separately for bringing about all those different shaped
bruises, just for bringing about a bruise of 3 cm2. Again, I can’t think of a particularly informative
way to demarcate morally relevant infinite aspects of action from ones that are not morally relevant
—we can do little more than let our intuitions be our guide.
We can see (ISIA) as following from a more fundamental principle, the Severity Proportionality
Principle, which holds that the severity of an offence is proportional to the amount or number of
morally relevant respects in the wrong act:
SPP: fs assigns to any given morally wrong act-type, wx, a severity proportional to the amount or
number of (bad) morally relevant respects pertaining to wx.
It plausibly follows from SPP that ISIA is true. For suppose that an offence with infinitely many
(bad) morally relevant respects was assigned a finite severity, sx. Surely it would be possible to
reach any possible finite severity by increasing the number of morally relevant bad respects of one’s
wrongdoing. Deciding (unjustifiedly) to burn one person alive is bad. Deciding (unjustifiedly) to
burn two people alive is twice as bad. We can proceed in this manner indefinitely,  and thereby
increase  the  severity  of  the  wrongdoing indefinitely.  At  some point,  therefore,  there  will  be  a
wrongdoing, wx, with a finite amount of morally relevant bad aspects that is assigned sx by fs. But
then when we consider a wrongdoing with a greater number of morally relevant bad aspects (which
there surely is, for the quantity in wx is finite), wx+1, say, it would be assigned a severity greater than
sx: sx+1. But if a finite wrongdoing is assigned a severity greater than an infinite wrongdoing, then f s
is not assigning severities proportionally, contra (SPP).
6.8.5 The Case of Phanuel
What then is to be said of the case of Phanuel, the otherwise spotless angel who indulged, for a
second or so, a feeling of resentment against the Lord?
The best response that can be made to this, I think, is to note that not all infinite severities are
equal. Cantor’s work was the breakthrough work that showed that infinities come in many sizes.
But  Cantorian  cardinality  would  not  be helpful  for  modelling  differences  in  infinite  severities,
because in order to get one infinite severity to be greater than another infinite severity, Cantorian
cardinality requires it to be infinitely greater. It is better therefore to use an ordinal measure. ω is the
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smallest infinite ordinal—the order type of the natural numbers—and an ordinal measure of size
tells us that ω < (ω + 1) < (ω + 2) < (ω + 3) … etc. Ordinality sees differences when cardinality sees
none. In this case, it sees finite differences between infinite quantities.
Mapping infinite severities onto infinite ordinals therefore allows us to see greater and lesser
infinite offences. If the status principle is right, then one way of performing an infinitely severe
offence is to offend against God. But that alone doesn't tell you what infinite ordinal is assigned to
your offence.  If  your offence were one of brief indifference to God, then that would be a low
infinite ordinal, ω + 2, say. But if the offence were one of shrieking and persistent blasphemy, then
that would be assigned a much higher infinite ordinal, ω + 200, perhaps. Differences in infinite
severities need to be acknowledged in any case. Intuitively, pricking an infinite number of people in
the arm is not as bad as dismembering an infinite number of people. Infinite ordinals look as though
they present a good way of capturing these differences in infinitely severe offences.
Now we can address the case of Phanuel, who indulged resentment for a brief while against
God. I think that the defender of the status principle should say that Phanuel has committed an
infinitely severe offence. I find Kvanvig’s argument carries force on this point. For suppose that
Phanuel’s offence was finitely severe. What, then, would one have to do to commit an offence of
infinite  severity  against  God? Presumably  it  would  have  to  be  a  more  persistent  and grievous
offence  than brief  resentment.  But,  as  Kvanvig argues,  any line that  is  drawn between finitely
severe sins against God and infinitely severe ones would then appear arbitrary.
I think that the charge of arbitrariness can be rebutted.  Consider that if  you exert  a modest
amount of effort throwing a rock, then it will go so far. Perhaps 3 metres. But if you really heave
the rock, maybe you can get it to travel 20 metres. But no matter how hard you throw the rock, it
will come back to the earth some finite distance away. You might generalise on this account and say
that no matter how hard the rock is thrown, it will come back to the earth some finite distance away.
But this is false. If it is thrown with sufficient force it will be loosed from the earth’s gravitational
pull and travel throughout space for ever. This isn’t arbitrary because the fact that a certain finite
threshold  of  force,  over  which  results  in  an  infinite  distance,  is  explained  in  terms  of  more
fundamental laws of force and motion. A defender of the status principle might say a similar thing:
there is a certain threshold which, when one crosses it in one’s offences against God, they start to
count as infinite, but this isn’t arbitrary because that fact is explicable in terms of more fundamental
moral laws and principles.
However,  there is  a  cousin of Kvanvig’s  argument  that  packs  more of a  punch.  Instead  of
focusing on arbitrariness, one might focus on a ‘too small to make a difference’ principle. Even if
we allow the suggestion that there is a threshold over which offences against God start to count as
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infinitely severe (on the basis of more fundamental moral laws), one can still protest against the
idea on the ground that it is intuitively wrong for such a small difference (the difference between
reaching  the  threshold  and  coming  just  shy  of  reaching  it)  to  have  such  strikingly  different
severities, viz. infinite in the former case and finite in the latter. We can ‘see’, via moral intuition,
that  morality  doesn’t  work  that  way.  This  is  a  better  way  to  press  home  Kvanvig’s  thought.
Intuitively, therefore, every offence against God must count as infinitely severe.44
Not merely that, I also think that Phanuel’s offence demands a punishment of an infinite degree.
I think, per (7), that the status principle must have the consequence that every offence against God
requires a fully infinite degree of punishment. For suppose that Phanuel’s offence could be paid for
by a finite degree of punishment—a few hours of pain. It is perfectly possible to merit a degree of
punishment that bad by a misdemeanour of finite severity. But it is very peculiar that an infinitely
severe offence should be paid for by a degree of punishment that a finite offence is also paid for by.
Indeed, one can even earn a  stronger degree of punishment than that meted out to Phanuel by
increasing the severity of a finitely severe offence until it earns a slightly more severe punishment
than  Phanuel  suffers.  But  it  is  very  strange  a  for  a  finitely  severe  offence  to  deserve  worse
punishment than an infinitely severe one.
However,  if it  is insisted that  every infinitely severe offence  demands an infinite  degree of
punishment, then that mollifies the objection to some extent. But it doesn’t entirely remove it. For
even though it may remain a peculiar feature of infinite severities that they are only assigned fully
infinite degrees of punishment, it will still be the case that some of those punishments will be quite
weak. To suppose that  Phanuel  deserves an eternity  of hellfire,  say,  for his  crime seems to us
excessive, even though his offence strikes against God, an infinitely great being. But the status
principle can accommodate that. Phanuel must simply deserve an infinite punishment that is less
severe than that, such as an eternal itch, or annihilation, or an eternal diminution in happiness.
This is good insofar as it goes, but the one remaining problem is that if the infinite punishment
Phanuel deserves is slender enough, then it will be possible for one to merit it through offences of
finite severity, as we saw above in the Pan case. Indeed, the infinite punishment that Phanuel merits,
if it is simply a diminution in daily pleasure, say, might be far less fearsome a prospect than the
degree of punishment some finite sins will merit. And again we have the oddity of an infinitely
severe offence being assigned a degree of punishment that is more bearable than some that are
assigned to offences of finite severity. This, I think, is the only objection that carries serious clout
against the Status Principle.
44 One might push the suggestion that God has so arranged matters that all hell-bound humans are clearly above the
threshold, but this wouldn’t deal with the fact that, were there two wrongdoers, one just shy of the threshold and the
other just reaching it, their deeds would receive markedly different severities.
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There are other attacks on the principle current in the literature, but I do not rate them highly.
They follow below.
6.8.6 Attacks on the Status Principle: False
Marilyn  McCord Adams objects  to  the  principle  because  it  seems intuitively  false  to  her.  She
presents the following scenario:
[I]s it true that guilt and liability to punishment are directly proportional, not just to the offence, but
to the offended party’s worthiness of honour? I think not. Suppose that Schweitzer and Gandhi are
equally saintly and that Green and White are equally unsavory characters with long criminal records.
Suppose that  on separate  occasions Green gratuitously slaps  Schweitzer  in  the  face,  Schweitzer
gratuitously slaps White in the face, and Gandhi gratuitously slaps Schweitzer in the face. If guilt
were proportional, not just to the offence, but to the moral uprightness of the offended party, then
Green  would  incur  more  guilt  and  liability  to  punishment  than  would  Schweitzer.  For  since
Schweitzer  is  worthier  than  White,  Green’s  failure  to  show  respect  for  Schweitzer  was  more
grievous than Schweitzer’s failure to show respect for White. Similarly, Gandhi’s action would be
more  culpable  than  Schweitzer’s.  In  fact,  I  think  we are  more apt  to  consider  guilt  as  directly
proportional  to the nature of the offender than to the nature of the offended party. Schweitzer’s
action in slapping White is, if anything, more culpable than Green’s action in slapping Schweitzer.
In view of Schweitzer’s long-standing habits of self-control and moral behaviour, we should expect
more from him than from Green who has never developed these habits.  [...]  Thus,  the principle
suggested by Anselm[...]—that guilt and liability to punishment are proportional not merely to the
offence but to the majesty of the offended party—seems false. (1975: 443)
But William Wainwright’s response here seems decisive:
The principle in question is not clearly false if it is restricted to differences in ontological kinds and
not applied to differences between more or less valuable members of the same ontological kind. For
consider the following series of actions—destroying a flower, destroying a dog, destroying a human
being, and destroying an archangel. Each action in this series appears to be intrinsically worse than
its predecessor (presumably because human beings, for example, are a more valuable kind of thing
than dogs). But a restricted principle is all we need since God is unique kind of being, and the value
of the relevant kind (“divinity”) infinitely surpasses the value of the other kinds. (1988: 34–35)45
45 See also Wainwright 2003.
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Thus, one might grant that on an intra-kind level the principle is irrelevant while still providing
solid  motivation  for  it  at  the  inter-kind  level.  But  I  don’t  even think  that  Adams succeeds  in
showing that the principle fails at the intra-kind level. I think it is true that for Green to slap Gandhi
is a worse offence than for Gandhi to slap Green, just so long as we bracket all other facts about
their  moral  characters  save  for  the  fact  that  Gandhi  is  morally  greater  than  Green.  The  status
principle here motivates a ceteris paribus claim: we should think that, other things being equal, to
offend against a morally greater being is worse than offending against a morally lesser being. But
that  is  just  one  factor  to  consider  amongst  many.  As  Adams  notes,  the  ease  with  which  the
offender’s character gives rise to the offence tends to lessen their guilt because they must put up a
fight against greater internal proclivities that tend towards committing the offence. Another reason
we  would  be  suspicious  about  granting  Gandhi  less  blame  than  Green  is  because  of  the  all-
pervasive effects of moral luck. Unsavoury characters such as Green often end up in a life of crime
because of a brutal or neglected childhood. Savoury and saint-like characters often live saint-like
lives because, being brought up with a silver spoon in their mouths, they have had the luxury to
attend to, and develop, their sensitive conscience. Et cetera. The list of all relevant variables might
run on to great length, and all Adams’s example shows is that the status of the offended party is one
variable among many. But no adherent to the status principle should deny that.
Moreover, one can prove that for Green to slap Gandhi is a worse offence than for Gandhi to
slap Green, just so long as we bracket all other facts about their moral characters save for the fact
that Gandhi is morally greater than Green. For one should,  ceteris paribus, love what is morally
greater more than what is morally lesser. One’s love should be responsive to goodness. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, Green should love Gandhi more than Gandhi should love Green. To act contrary to
a duty to love is worse in proportion to the greatness of the demanded love. Therefore, Green would
be acting contrary to the greater demanded love.
6.8.7 Attacks on the Status Principle: Incoherent
Seymour (1998) protests that the very notion of an infinitely great being is incoherent. He quotes
approvingly Cleanthes from Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion:
I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all
theological  writers,  to  savour  more  of  panegyric  than  of  philosophy;  and  that  any  purposes  of
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reasoning,  and  even  of  religion,  would  be  better  served,  were  we  to  rest  contented  with  more
accurate and more moderate expressions. (1779: 197)
Seymour considers the notion of an infinitely great being to be akin to the notion of an infinite pain:
something of doubtful coherence and possibility. He writes,
[A]ccording  to  Edwards,  it  is  God’s  ‘infinite  greatness,  majesty,  and  glory’  which  makes  him
infinitely worthy of honor. Can these traits be infinite? Consider analogous cases. Can something be
infinitely beautiful? It might be very beautiful, even as beautiful as something can possibly be, but it
is hard to conceive of something being infinitely beautiful. Likewise with pleasure. Perhaps for any
pleasure there is one greater that can be conceived; perhaps on the other hand there is a pleasure than
which  none  more  pleasurable  can  be  conceived.  But  what  would  an  infinite  pleasure  be  like?
Greatness, majesty and glory are in this respect like beauty and pleasure; they cannot be infinite, not
even in God. (1998: 75)
I am inclined to agree with him when it comes to infinite pleasure (and pain), for reasons given
previously. But I don’t see how the implausibility of an infinite pleasure (which implausibility is
derived  from  consideration  of  phenomenology)  carries  over  to  the  supposition  of  an  infinite
greatness (which can’t be considered suspicious on phenomenological grounds). After all,  some
things are infinite,  such as the number of points in a 1-metre line, and the collection of natural
numbers. Why can’t God’s greatness be counted as one of them?
But we can say more to motivate the infinite greatness of God. It is a given in perfect-being
theology that God is the greatest possible being. Whence it follows that God must be a greater being
than every finite being. But not merely that, God must be greater than any possible finite being. For
any possible finite being you can think of—beetles, dogs, cats, apes, human beings, dragons, extra-
terrestrials, archangels, Greek gods—God must be greater than them all. But it appears that the set
of possible finite beings can be arranged in an order of greatness stretching upward indefinitely.
Beetles aren’t  as great as dogs which aren’t  as great as human beings which aren’t  as great as
dragons which aren’t as great as Greek gods, etc.
Now, the mere fact that God has the property that, for any possible being that is not God, God is
greater than that being, isn’t sufficient to show that God is infinitely great. For it may be that (i)
there is only a finite number of possible beings or (ii) that all possible beings that aren’t God have a
greatness that is below a certain limit. But reflection on the ordering noted above undermines both
these assumptions. Consider that, for any possible dragon, you can surely conceive of a stronger,
cleverer, and therefore greater, dragon. This undermines (i). It also undermines (ii), but that requires
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a bit more work, because someone might suppose that beings indefinitely increase in greatness, but
that that increase approaches a limit, in the same way that the indefinitely increasing series (1.5,
1.75, 1.875, …) approaches its limit, 2. But the increases in greatness we envision we can perform
on possible beings of finite greatness don’t appear to get indefinitely ‘thinner’; they seem to be as
substantial as we wish them to be. Indeed, we can imagine that the increases get greater: consider a
dragon with double the strength and intelligence of dragon1,  and then consider the dragon with
double the intelligence and strength of that one, and so on. But God must be greater than all such
possible dragons; ergo, God is infinitely great, in the same way that an infinite number is greater
than any possible finite number, and Seymour’s suspicions are unfounded.
6.8.8 Attacks on the Status Principle: Useless
Kvanvig argues that, even granting the Status Principle, it is a principle of limited use. The defender
of the traditional account of Hell wants it to be the case that every unbeliever goes to Hell, and
therefore deserves to go there. But if the status principle is how it is explained that people can merit
the punishment of Hell, then it needs to be the case that every unbeliever has sinned against God.
But Kvanvig considers this a hard sell. He first asks us to distinguish between a restrictive and
general view of when a man sins against God:
When does a person sin against God? The two views one might hold here are a restrictive view and a
perfectly general view. In the perfectly general view, every sin is a sin against God. In the restrictive
view, only some sins are sins against God. If only some particular sins are against God, presumably
they would be those in which God is the intentional object of some action. For example, if I throw a
rock [and] to hit my cat with it, then the cat is the intentional object of this action. Just so, the
restrictive view about sinning against God would seem likely to claim that one sins against God
when and only when one “aims at” or “strikes at” God. (1993: 32)
He then goes on to say,
Defenders of the […] strong view will find little comfort in the restrictive view of sinning against
God, however. The view that every person has at some point explicitly aimed at harming God or
struck out at God in some way or other is difficult to sustain. In an age of growing atheism and
agnosticism, some people may go through their entire lives never giving God much thought at all.
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Yet according to the […] strong view, all people [are] headed for hell, whether they have given
thought to God or not. (1993: 32)
Should the defender of the status principle accept the restrictive view or the general view? I do
not find the general view to be very plausible. It is plausible to suppose that one’s moral guilt can’t
extend further than what one is aware of in one’s mind. If a child spitefully  strikes its sibling,
conscious of nothing else but that spite, then I think it implausible to argue that the child is guilty of
something infinitely severe, and guilty of something infinitely severe because it has, say, struck a
being made in the image of God, and in that way triggered the status principle. No awareness of any
of those things was in the child’s mind. It seems to me it can therefore justly plead ignorance of any
offence against God (though not ignorance of wrongdoing).
I also think it is possible to offend God without triggering the status principle. Consider the
following case. Suppose Ivan’s job is to monitor packages that are sent through the post. They come
by his station at intervals, brought on a conveyor belt. They come through intermittently, so he must
be alert to their appearance. If he doesn’t check a package as it comes to him, then it might enter the
mail incorrectly addressed and be lost in the post. As it happens, unfortunately, Ivan was lazy one
day at his post, and a package passed by without him checking it, and it was incorrectly addressed,
and therefore lost in post. No one knows where it went, and retrieving it is practically impossible.
Ivan is guilty for that, and if his boss decided to take it out of Ivan’s wages that seems reasonable
enough. But suppose that the owner of the lost package then informed Ivan’s boss that the item in
the lost package was one of infinite value. And suppose this is true. Are we therefore to conclude
that Ivan, because of his failure in watchfulness, is guilty to an infinite degree? And that his boss is
therefore justified in docking Ivan’s wages forever? Intuitively not, because Ivan had no idea that
the stakes were that high. There was no awareness of any infinite aspect to the matter in Ivan’s
mind. 
Change the case a bit more. Suppose that the lost package didn’t contain an object of infinite
value, but that the package was directly owned by God, and that Ivan had therefore mislaid God’s
package.  Ivan  has  therefore  wronged God,  but  again  it  would  be  wrong to  say  that  Ivan  was
infinitely guilty, even though he has wronged an infinitely great being. Because Ivan had no idea
that it was God’s package—the thought never occurred to him—his ignorance prevents the status
principle from being triggered. One needs to have an awareness of God in one’s mind in some
fashion in order to commit an infinitely grave wrongdoing against God via the status principle.
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It is such considerations that incline me against the general view. Not every offence, nor even
every offence against God, makes one infinitely guilty. Only those done with the relevant sort of
conscious awareness.46 We must therefore prefer the particular view.
How, then, should one respond to Kvanvig’s claim that it isn’t plausible to think that every non-
Christian has at some point committed an offence directed at God in the way that the particular
view requires? I see two good responses:
(i) I think one can simply deny Kvanvig’s claim that “some people may go through their entire
lives never giving God much thought at all” (1993:32). Or rather, one can accept  that claim. To
refuse to give God much thought, after giving him some thought, is surely a great crime. Once the
notion of the deity has crossed one’s mind, and one sees its great importance (and how could one
not?), and then to refuse to dwell on such things anymore is something it is very hard to see how
one could do without committing an infinitely grave offence against God via the status principle.
The more worrying possibility is that the idea of deity should never cross some people’s mind at all,
so that it isn’t possible for them to sin against God in thought. But against that is the long Christian
tradition that God has designed man’s mind with an inbuilt sense of the deity, the celebrated sensus
divintatis. This faculty is what explains the near-universal practices of worship to a creator being we
find across the world. Although one might train oneself to suppress the workings of this faculty, it
will always have flashed through to one’s consciousness at one point or another, inclining one to
belief in God and consideration of the divine. But to respond wrongly to such presentations made
by the faculty is to wrong God infinitely.
(ii) The second response is to appeal to the doctrine of original sin. One can punt matters back
to Eden. The doctrine of original sin (or at least a sufficiently conservative version of the doctrine)
has it that every human being is guilty of Adam’s trespass. Quite how it can be that such a sin is
fairly imputed to us, or how we can plausibly be considered actors of Adam’s trespass, is a matter
of debate among philosophical  theologians.  See Rea (2007) for a contemporary take. However,
discussion of the plausibility of the doctrine would take us too far afield. Let it just be noted that if
the doctrine is plausible and the objections made against it can be rebutted, then it doesn’t matter if
there are people to whom the thought of God literally never occurs. On the Day of Judgment, they
won’t be guilty of an infinitely severe offence against God on account of what they did between
their birth and death, but for what they did in Adam before they were born. And Adam’s sin was
done in full Edenic splendour. He could not plead forgetfulness or clouded vision. It was an offence
46 This also helps explain why the truth of Psalm 51:4 (‘Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is evil in
your sight’) is not inconsistent with the claim that some sins we commit are only finitely severe. Even though every
sin we commit counts as wronging God in some way, not every way of wronging God is enough to trigger the status
principle.
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committed with the full knowledge that it was a transgression of the command of an infinitely great
God.
6.8.9 Summary
For all these reasons, I consider the Status Principle to give a viable understanding of how it can be
that Hell (and Hell+) is just. I think its weak points are of the sort brought to light by the case of
Phanuel—must  even  the  slenderest  sin  against  God  demand  infinite  punishment?—and  of  the
unevangelised nations—is original sin really doing most of the work in explaining why these people
deserve to go to Hell? These are not points of great potency—they might simply be accepted—but it
would be better if we had a theory that didn’t issue in such consequences. I provide such an account
in the next section.
6.9 Against Our Sins Being Finite in Number
In this section I will argue that (4) (the claim that ‘The sins of our earthly lifetime are finite in
quantity’) is plausibly false. Or rather, I will not argue that our sins are infinite in quantity, but that
our moral faults are infinite in quantity. If my suggestion is plausible, then it would appear to be a
plain resolution of our difficulty. If we are guilty of offending God in an infinite number of ways,
then of course God would be just in punishing us infinitely.
6.9.1 Blameworthiness for what you would have done
The argument of this section is basically this: you are plausibly blameworthy, not just for the things
you actually do, but also for the things that you would do and would have done. But these things are
infinite in quantity. Therefore, you are infinitely guilty.
To motivate the idea, consider the following thought experiment. You have a good friend of
many years called Alf. You are both dog-owners, and you and Alf are in the habit of exercising your
dogs together, going for long morning walks in the country, talking with one another, to that end.
On  one  occasion  you  are  called  away  on  an  urgent  matter,  and  can’t  make  your  morning
appointment with Alf. But, before you leave, you give your dog to Alf, and Alf agrees to give your
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dog his morning exercise by himself. As Alf is walking along with your dog, he is approached by a
disheveled old man. This old man has a startling proposition for Alf. He offers him £40 pounds if
Alf will kill your dog right here and now. Alf refuses, the old man goes on his way, and Alf tells you
about the matter when he next sees you. However, the old man was really a jinn, and this jinn also
comes to see you. This jinn is very knowledgeable and trustworthy, and you know it. The jinn tells
you that although Alf rightly refused his offer of £40, the jinn, on account of his connection to the
supernatural, can also tell you this: that if he had offered Alf £50, then Alf would have accepted and
your dog would now be dead.
Now, even though Alf has not  actually done anything wrong, many of us would nevertheless
naturally feel a great indignation at Alf were this fact about what he would have done to be revealed
to us. More than that, we would feel it  was a quite  justified indignation. ‘He would have done
what?!  That’s  outrageous!’ Neither  is  it  merely  an  emotional  matter.  It  would  also  affect  our
behaviour towards Alf. We wouldn’t be inclined to let him walk our dogs anymore, for one thing. It
might even be sufficient occasion to terminate our friendship with Alf—‘You’d kill my dog for £50,
would you? You’re no friend of mine!’ You rightly stand in moral judgement over Alf on account of
this counterfactual wrong. And justified indignation presupposes the presence of a culpable fault.
Therefore, we are responsible, to some extent, for at least some counterfactual wrongs.
6.9.2 Counterfactual Wrongs and Characters
One might try to explain the phenomenon in this way: we hold Alf responsible for what he would
have done because what he would have done is grounded in his character. And Alf has formed his
character into its present state through many years’ worth of decision-making. We do not hold him
responsible  for  the  counterfactual  wrong,  rather  we  hold  him  responsible  for  what  that
counterfactual wrong implies about him: that he has decided to develop his character in bad ways,
or at least that he has refrained from developing it in the good ways that he should have.
But, for one thing, this only pushes the buck a step further back. What if, with those earlier
character-forming decisions, Alf would have made terribly worse ones if only he were tempted in a
very slight way? Aren’t we still inclined to consider him blameworthy, to some extent, on account
on those counterfactual moral failures?
For another  thing,  I  think this  problem is  really  generated by deeper  facts  about  our moral
situation than past character-forming. Suppose we are hunting a cruel despot guilty of Hitler-like
atrocities. He manages to elude capture for a while, but we eventually trap him. Yet as we stand
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over him in triumph, he speaks to us scornfully, ‘How proud and haughty you look! No doubt you
fancy yourselves as better, nobler creatures than I. But I can tell you this: that if you were in my
position, and brought up in the same circumstances I was, you would have done exactly the same as
I did.’ If true, that would rather take the wind out of one’s moral sails. One might think: it was just
bad luck for this despot that he was born in those circumstances and I wasn’t. Am I really entitled to
claim moral superiority over him?47 The problem is made keener by considering God’s perspective
at the Day of Judgement. A natural expectation to have of God as a perfectly fair and impartial
judge is that he would abstract away from such contingencies as were you were born and the nature
of your upbringing, and assess your life relative to a broader set of circumstances than merely those
circumstances that just so happened to obtain. But then it looks like God would assess you relative
to entirely different characters, because a different upbringing is plausibly sufficient for a different
character. 
But given that God would assess us relative to non-actual and merely possible circumstances
and characters, we need to ask how broad the range of possible circumstances is. But it seems the
fairest and least arbitrary answer is the maximal one! God will assess you relative to every possible
circumstance you might have been placed in and relative to every character you might have been
given. But there is an infinite amount of such characters and circumstances. This opens up the
possibility, indeed, the expectation, of infinite moral failure.
6.9.3 Counterfactual Wrongs on Molinism
I  shall  show  how  infinite  moral  failure  is  an  anticipated  consequence  on  both  a  theological
determinist and a Molinist model. I will begin with Molinism. Molinism holds that God, when he
was deciding to create the world, consulted his middle knowledge, this vast infinity of subjunctive
conditionals of freedom of the from ‘S would freely φ in circumstance C’, for any possible agent
and  any  possible  circumstance,  and  created  the  world  (the  complete  set  of  persons  and
circumstances) that gave the collection of free decisions closest to God’s ideal.
Molinism therefore has the implication that, for any existing person, God knows an infinity of
facts about what they would do. For any possible life-up-to-a-point and external situation,  God
knows what any existing person would freely choose to do at that point in time if they were given
that life-history and situation. ‘Circumstance’ must be understood in that broad way, to denote a
possible-world history. Then the argument proceeds as follows. Consider a world history, w1 up to a
47 This is the problem of moral luck: doesn’t the fact that what we do and who we are so often depends on factors
beyond our control undermine moral judgement? See Nelkin 2019 for an overview.
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time t, that looks more or less like ours up to the present time, although in this world history there is
a big difference: you are in a position to commit a great atrocity at t. Either you decide commit the
atrocity in w1 or you do not. If you do, then you are counterfactually guilty of a great sin. If you do
not, then we can adjust the world-history of w1 just a bit. Consider w2, which is just like w1 save that
a hydrogen atom in Alpha Centauri has been moved half an inch to the left. Do you commit the
atrocity in that world history? If not, then consider w3, in which the hydrogen atom is moved an
extra quarter of an inch to the left. If you remain obdurate, consider w4 in which the atom is moved
a further eighth of an inch to the left, etc. etc. Given that this operation can be performed an infinite
number of times, the probability of your refraining from performing the atrocity in each of these
very  slightly  different  world  histories  is  zero.  But  that  same sequence  of  argument  (moving a
molecule about in a distant part of the universe until you get the moral failing) can be run again
with any possible atrocity, and given that there are an infinite number possible atrocities to commit,
you will be guilty of infinitely many counterfactual moral atrocities—an infinite moral failure.
6.9.4 Counterfactual Wrongs on Theological Determinism
The conclusion is much easier to reach on a determinist understanding. On theological determinism
the sins you commit are determined by the character (or, on my account, by the agential nature (see
ch. 4)) that God decides to give you: God doesn’t have to give you the particular constitution and
circumstance and ‘wait and see’ if you do will the right thing or not (as on libertarianism); your sins
will follow from the nature or character that God gives you. But if we follow the argument of the
above sections, then God is going to take into account, when he judges us, what we would do were
we given different characters. And, in my terms, what we would do if we were given different
agential natures (recall that I affirmed in ch. 4 that one’s agential nature is not essential to one). No
one can boast,  I  believe,  that  a certain agential  nature or character  is  incompossible  with their
personal identity. If that is right, then it will be true of every existing human being that, were they
given a certain character or agential nature and put in the right circumstance, they would commit a
great atrocity. One can perceive our infinite guilt in two ways, then. First, there is surely a possible
agential nature or character that always sins no matter what circumstance it is put in. This perfectly
sinful agential nature or character is one we all might have had. But because there are an infinite
number  of  circumstances,  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  counterfactual  sins  attached  to  this
agential nature or character, and it is thereby true of all of us that ‘For any circumstance from the
infinite set of all circumstances, were we given this agential nature or character, we would sin in
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that circumstance’—an infinite moral failure. The other way to see our infinite guilt is to realise that
there are an infinite amount of characters or agential natures that will commit a great atrocity in at
least one circumstance. It will therefore be true of all of us that were we to be given a particular one
of those characters or agential natures and placed in the right circumstance, we would commit a
great atrocity.  There will  be an infinite number of counterfactual  truths of that form, each one
corresponding to one of those characters or agential natures—again, an infinite moral failure.
Really,  the  easiest  way  to  make  that  point  that  you  are  infinitely  guilty  on  theological
determinism is to note that truths about what you would do, on that understanding, don’t come apart
from truths about what it is possible for you to do. What you would do can be determined just by
examining the modal space of possibilities. How many possible worlds are there in which you wear
a red hat? An infinite number. Likewise: how many possible worlds are there in which you commit
a great atrocity? An infinite number.
6.9.5 Objections Regarding the Use of Infinite Counterfactual Wrongs
Thus, we have a fresh way of seeing how the infinite punishment of Hell is just: it is grounded in
the infinity of counterfactual wrongs one is guilty of. Now for some objections.
Objection 1: You can’t blame someone for something they didn’t actually do. Counterfactual
wrongs are precisely that: counter to the facts! They aren’t real.
Response: We need some way to explain why it is that we are angry at Alf when we find out
about what he would have done. But the complaint that we have left reality behind is not justified.
The relevant counterfactuals are actually true, after all. And it is natural to think that these truths are
grounded in some feature of actual reality. For theological determinists, this is easy to see: the truths
are grounded in the reality of characters, agential natures, and persons. It is harder to see what
grounds the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom on Molinism—and that is one of the famous
objections to the system, for the relevant truths about what persons would freely do are true before
those persons exist (before creation), and one wonders what makes them true.48 But, at any rate, the
Molinist will still hold that all these subjunctive conditionals about our wrongdoing are all actually
true, and that seems like a sufficient response to this objection.
Objection 2: Very well, I grant that I am guilty of an infinite number of counterfactual wrongs.
There are an infinity of worlds where I curse God to his face, and where I torture whole worlds to
death for my own amusement. But there another side to the coin. There is also an infinite number of
48 See Adams 1977 for a classic statement of the grounding objection to Molinism.
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noble and morally superb counterfactual deeds to my credit. There is an infinity of worlds where I
endure  a  million  years’ torment  yet  still  refuse to  murmur  against  my creator,  and a  countless
number where I selflessly lay down my life so that others may live. Isn’t the weight of all my
counterfactual wrongs cancelled out by the splendour of all my counterfactual moral magnificence?
Response:  I accept the counterfactual moral magnificence, but I deny that it  cancels out the
counterfactual  moral  transgressions.  Here is  one reason. It  is  natural  to  think that  God doesn’t
expect you merely to fulfil your duties and act well in actual circumstances, but he expects it in any
circumstance  that  might  comes  to  pass.  But  when  he  sees  all  the  counterfactual  wrongs  you
perform, he realises that you are not meeting his standards, modally speaking. When he sees all
your counterfactual good and noble behaviour,  he merely sees you as meeting is his standards.
Thus, in the same way that a lifetime of honest behaviour doesn’t prevent one from being tried for
fraud,  one’s  counterfactual  holiness  doesn’t  outweigh  one’s  counterfactual  depravity.  Another
reason  I  don’t  think  counterfactual  wrongs  can  be  cancelled  out  in  the  way  suggested  is  the
following. Leave one’s actual deeds to the side and consider how God’s sees you just in the space of
possibilities. He sees that you are just as easily turned to evil as you are to good. For every morally
splendid thing you do in some possible circumstance, it is matched by a morally terrible thing you
do in some other possible circumstance. You thus exemplify a sort of moral indifference: modally
speaking, just as much at home with evil as with good. But surely it is a bad thing to be a person
equally at home with evil as with good. This indifference is therefore really an indifference of a
morally odious sort—one that contrasts greatly with God’s own necessary moral perfection.
Objection 3:  Doesn’t  this  view imply a sort  of futility about the moral  life? We can’t  ever
improve our moral standing before God because any actual good deed we do will be matched by a
counterfactual  wicked  deed.  All  of  us  are  really  the  same,  morally  speaking.  The  infinity  of
counterfactual possibilities has a great levelling effect, making us all good and evil to the same
degree. Moreover, we saw above that God will punish human beings to different degrees. How is
this possible on the doctrine you suggest, for it seems to follow that we are all equally wicked?
Response:  I  don’t think that a counterfactual murder, say, is as blameworthy an affair as an
actual murder. Likewise, I don’t think that an actual case of righteousness is weighted as heavily as
that  same  case  of  righteousness  but  counterfactual.  Even  though  I  think  our  counterfactual
behaviour matters, it does not matter as much as our actual behaviour. I’m sympathetic to a sort of
distance principle. I think that the more distant one’s counterfactual wrongs are from the actual
world—the more fanciful or dissimilar from ours the possible worlds in which they occur—the less
they count against us. That, I think, is enough to deal with the problem of moral motivation, and to
explain how it is that we not all equally wicked. Of course, one should also remember that it is the
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traditional Protestant position that the moral life  is in a real sense futile: one cannot earn God’s
favour merely by being moral—the imputed righteousness of Christ is required for that.
6.10 Conclusion
We have therefore encountered three ways in which we can see how Hell+ is a just recompense for
man’s sin. The first was the Continuing-Sin hypothesis—if man is always sinning, then it is little
wonder that he is always being punished. That theory is hard to square with Arminian commitments
—why are the occupants of Hell always freely choosing to sin?—but not so with Calvinist doctrine,
and it is a feather in the cap of the theological determinist that he can explain the justice of Hell+
this way. (Of course, the reason why God would make it the case that some creatures sin forever is a
separate  question,  and one  covered  in  the  next  chapter.)  The  second  was  the  Status  Principle.
Offences  against  an  infinitely  great  being  merit  infinite  punishment.  The principle  admitted  of
plausible defence, though it was slightly weak when it came to handling cases like the Phanuel case
—sins of a very minor sort against God—and cases of those who hadn’t heard of God. Lastly, we
saw that the infinity of counterfactual wrongs that we are guilty of could also explain the justice of
Hell+.  Again,  the  theological  determinist  had  an  advantage  here  insofar  as  an  infinity  of
counterfactual wrongs follows more readily on his account, and also because he doesn’t have a
worries about grounding these counterfactual wrongs.
That  is  all  I  have  to  say  here  about  the  justice  of  Hell.  Even  though  both  Calvinists  and
Arminians  believe  in  the  justice  of  Hell,  they  don’t  both  believe  that  God  unconditionally
predestined a large portion of humanity of Hell. This raises problems for the Calvinist that are the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 7—Calvinism and the Problem of Hell
7.1 Introduction
What I intend to do in this chapter is to sketch a theodicy of Hell consistent with Calvinism— that
is, with theological determinism and compatibilism about moral responsibility. Many are sceptical
of the idea that any such theodicy could be made plausible. We saw in ch. 3 that many critics of
Calvinism were baffled by the suggestion that it is God that determines man to sin and for most of
mankind (the reprobate) to reject  the way of salvation.  Present-day writers also make the same
complaint. Here are Pereboom’s remarks:
Historically,  perhaps the most  effective reason for rejecting any sort of divine determinism, and
endorsing instead libertarian free will is the unconscionability of God’s damning people to hell after
determining them to sin. (2005: 82)
I  believe  this  feeling  of  unconscionability  persists  and is  widely  shared.  Consider  Baggett  and
Walls’s complaint against the Calvinist:
[D]amnation involves infinite, eternal misery. For God to choose to consign persons to such a fate
when he could have just as easily determined them to joy and happiness [in heaven] is [...] morally
obnoxious [...] [It] strikes us as a paradigmatic example of hateful behaviour, not loving behaviour.
(2011: 74)
Of course Arminians, being libertarians, deny both that God determines anyone to sin and that it is a
straightforward  matter  for  God  to  ensure  people’s  entrance  into  Heaven:  the  free  decisions  of
humanity, and in particular the decision to accept or reject God’s offer of salvation, upon which
entrance to Heaven is conditional, are, at least in some sense, beyond God’s complete control. This
belief gives them a great advantage—it permits the deployment of various free-will theodicies of
Hell: God greatly desires to save us all from Hell, but it would be wrong for him not to respect our
free choice to form, if we wish, a character that is implacably opposed to him, as Swinburne (1983)
proposes; or Craig’s (1989) suggestion that although God dearly wishes to save everyone from Hell,
when  God  consults  his  middle  knowledge  it  so  turns  out  that  in  all  those  worlds  in  which  a
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significant number freely choose to go to Heaven a significant number go to Hell, and God isn’t
going to let the fact that many will go to Hell prevent him creating one of those worlds (cf. Seymour
2000).
But no such defence is available to the theological determinist, for on his view God has complete
control over what human beings will choose, because he is the ultimate cause of all human choices.
In  short,  if  Calvinism  is  true,  it  seems  perfectly  easy  for  God  to  create  a  world  in  which
universalism is true—a world in which everyone accepts God’s offer of salvation and goes to to
Heaven. Why wouldn’t God do this? What could stop him? ‘Surely nothing,’ says the Arminian,
‘and so Calvinism is false.’
In  this  chapter  I  offer  what  I  take  to  be  plausible  reasons  why  God  wouldn’t,  despite  a
comprehensive control over what his creatures choose, make it the case that all accept the offer of
salvation. The reasons I offer are not that novel. They can be found in Jonathan Edwards, John
Calvin and across the Reformed tradition in Christian thought. Consider Calvin’s remarks on the
reprobate:
they were raised up by the just but inscrutable judgment of God, to show forth his glory by their
condemnation. (Institutes, 3.24.14)
Here again is the Westminster Confession, ch. III, ‘Of God’s Eternal Decree’:
VII. The rest of mankind [that is, the non-elect or reprobate] God was pleased, according to the
unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extends or withholds mercy, as He pleases, for
the glory of His sovereign power over His creatures, to pass by; and to ordain them to dishonour and
wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice. (Schaff, 1977: 610)
Both of those two passages suggest a motive for God’s decree of reprobation. Calvin suggests that
God  does  it  ‘to  show  forth  his  glory  by  the  reprobate’s  condemnation’,  and  the  Westminster
suggests  that  God reprobates  for  ‘the  praise  of  his  glorious  justice’.  We might  summarise  the
thought as follows: important aspects of the divine majesty are not displayed if everyone is saved,
so God decrees that many shall  refuse his  offer of salvation in order that the glories of God’s
sovereign power and justice might be displayed in their eternal destruction.
But note that displaying is a triadic relation, and we need to ask to whom God is displaying his
glories. A traditional assumption is that it is the elect in Heaven, those whom God predestined to
salvation. The theodicy I will propose here aligns with this suggestion. I suggest here that it is for
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the  sake  of  the  occupants  of  Heaven  that  God  creates  people  to  occupy  Hell.  It  is  good  to
understand God’s character and our relation to him, and the occupation of Hell enables both an
understanding  of  God’s  nature,  and  good  attitudes  towards  God  on  the  part  of  the  elect  that
wouldn’t be possible otherwise. This chapter will list these benefits.
7.2 The Problem of Hell
But let us first state the problem of Hell more carefully. The nature of Hell was discussed in ch. 6,
so we don’t need to go over that. But what is the problem of Hell? As I see it, the problem of Hell is
a special case of the problem of evil. Rowe’s formulations of the argument from evil have been
influential. Let us take the version from his well-known (1979) paper:
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have
prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it
could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.49
The problem of Hell can be cast in the same mould. Let us put it like this:
4. If Hell exists, then Hell is an instance of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could prevent without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad
or worse.
5. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it
could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
6. If Hell exists, then there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
The Arminian free-will theodicies mentioned before can be construed as a denial of (4). The greater
good God would lose by ensuring there is no Hell is the freely chosen fellowship of his creatures,
49 I am aware of Rowe’s later formulations of the argument which Rowe judges to be superior (viz. his 1991 and 1996
pieces). However, I use this presentation of the argument since it better facilitates an exposure of a mistake I take to
be commonplace in discussion of the argument from evil: the idea that the justifying good must be greater.
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something over which God has no direct control. (Again, the theological determinist cannot make
any such move: he believes it is within God’s power to bring it about that all creatures freely choose
him.) The Calvinist could, however, make some of the standard moves the theist makes in response
to the problem of evil: he could appeal to sceptical theism and claim that the odds of our knowing
God’s justifying goods are small, so the fact that we are unable to think of what the goods might be
is of little surprise. Wykstra (1984) and Alston (1991) are prominent examples of this strategy. I see
no reason for this sort of response to be any less successful here.50
But I intend to give a theodicy here. What is a theodicy? Plantinga distinguishes between a
theodicy and a  defence (1974: 192): the latter simply suggests broadly logically possible reasons
God might have for permitting evil, to show that there is no broadly logical inconsistency between
the existence of God and the existence of evil; but to give a theodicy, on Plantinga’s rather strict
account,  is to give the  actual reasons God has for permitting evil.  I  find this  understanding of
‘theodicy’ to be too strong. To my mind, to provide plausibly actual reasons—reasons that obtain
for all we know—is all that the task of theodicy requires. David Lewis agrees with me, saying:
“Defense is too easy; knowing God's mind is too hard. I think the topic worth pursuing falls in
between [...] [The Christian] can hope to advance from a predicament of not having a clue to a
predicament of indecision between several not too-unbelievable hypotheses” (2002: 105–106). And
that is the task I set myself here: to offer a plausible explanation of why God would predestine
anyone to Hell. I shall adopt the following account of what it is for a reason God has for permitting
or bringing about evil to be plausibly actual:
God has a plausibly actual reason R for permitting or bringing about evil =df there is no clearly
probative argument against our supposing R to be one of God’s reasons for permitting or bringing
about evil.
Note that I am not, therefore, concerned to prove that the reasons I propose will do the job; rather, I
rest content just so long as no-one can prove they cannot do the job.51
It must also again be stressed that the problem I am addressing here, the problem of Hell, is very
much distinct from the problem that engaged us in the last chapter—the issue of the justice of Hell.
50 Though I happen to think the Calvinist should not stop here. I read Paul in Romans 9:22–23 as proposing a theodicy
of the same kind I defend in this chapter. Admittedly, Paul’s remarks are preceded by a what if’, so he who takes
the inspiration of Scripture seriously is arguably not committed to the truth of Paul’s proposal, but surely neither is
what Paul says to be ignored as worthless. It seems that the happy via media is therefore to take Paul’s theodicy as
adequate, or true for all we know. So if the Calvinist reads Paul as I do, then he is committed to the adequacy of the
theodicy I give here, if not its truth.
51 Also, for the record: I myself would not like to be interpreted as claiming that the theodicy I give here is true; my
claim is likewise only that I see no clear objection to its truth.
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The  question  about  the  justice  of  Hell  is  this:  how could  a  human  being  justly  merit  eternal
damnation? And that has been addressed. The problem of Hell is this: how could it be that God has
let anyone justly merit eternal damnation? Granting that it is morally possible for someone to merit
damnation,  nevertheless, why has God allowed, or arranged for, something like that to come to
pass?
Another way of putting it: the justice of Hell concerns God’s pronouncements on the Day of
Judgement. How can he justly condemn anyone to eternal suffering? The problem of Hell concerns
God’s decree before the foundation of the world. Why has God decided to create some people he
intends to (or at least knows will) occupy Hell for all eternity? I take it that the moral possibility of
a human being justly meriting eternal punishment has been established; I am therefore concerned
here with why God would bring it about that any human being did in fact merit eternal punishment.
I want to list the goods that give God his reasons.
But before I lay out the goods God reprobates for the sake of, let us note that two things are
required of these goods. The first is that they must be goods for which the inhabitation of Hell is a
necessary condition. The second is to make sure that we can believe they are worthwhile given the
evil they require. So I propose that we can offer an explanation of why God would be motivated to
reprobate if there is (a) some good state of affairs for which reprobation is a necessary condition,
and also that (b) the degree of intensity or amount of the good state of affairs is not so low as to
make it obviously not worthwhile given the evil that accompanies it. Only if the goods I propose
satisfy both conditions are they goods that would provide God with plausibly actual reasons for
reprobation.  Also,  if  a  good  in  question  presupposes  particular  doctrinal  or  philosophical
commitments, then it must also be the case that these doctrinal or philosophical commitments are
not too controversial. I shall first suggest the different goods and then discuss the question of their
worthwhileness.
7.3 Calvinist Theodicy
I have already given a broad outline of the goods which Calvinists have proposed historically. John
Piper is a contemporary theologian who gives a more recent statement of the suggestion:
My answer to the question about what restrains God’s will to save all people is this: it is God’s
supreme  commitment  to  uphold  and  display  the  full  range  of  his  glory  through  the  sovereign
demonstration of all his perfections, including his wrath and mercy, for the enjoyment of his chosen
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and believing people [...] This everlasting and ever-increasing joy of God’s people in all of God’s
perfections is the shining forth of God’s glory, which was his main aim in creation and redemption.
(2000: 339)
Importantly, unlike Piper, I do  not insist that the displaying of his glories is God’s main aim in
creation. I don’t deny it either, the point is only that the theodicy I give here doesn’t require this
claim. It requires only the more minimal suggestion that if some state of affairs grants us a clearer
or greater or better understanding of the nature of God (or some other beneficial attitude), then God,
if he seeks our good, would have reason to actualise that state of affairs (because such a mental state
is a good). Whether or not he would grant it because of a more ultimate objective to display the
range of his glory is a separate issue. This theodicy does not propose God’s glory as the good for
which God actualises evil, rather displays of God’s glory are here viewed as good because they
ennoble or enhance the state of mind of the elect. For the elect to perceive God’s glory is good thing
in its own right. It is these states of mind of the elect in Heaven (and also Earth, as we shall see) that
are the goods for which God reprobates, I suggest.
Leaving the  ‘main aim in  creation  and redemption’  element  of  Piper’s  view aside,  one can
suggest a minimal Calvinist theodicy based on the remainder of Piper’s suggestion (and on Calvin’s
remarks and also the Westminster Confession’s) that is simply this: the good for the sake of which
God reprobates is a richer sense of God’s just character on the part of the elect, made possible by
the display of God’s wrath upon the occupants of Hell. There we have it. Problem solved? Is that,
by itself, an adequate Calvinist theodicy of Hell?
Oliver Crisp has suggested that it is not adequate, for the following reason:
God’s grace and mercy [can be] shown to all human agents in their election (in Christ), and his wrath
and justice [can be] shown in the death of Christ, which atones for the sin and guilt of all fallen
human agents. (2003: 137)
Crisp’s  contention  is  this:  if  God  is  after  a  display  of  his  wrath,  then  it  has  already  been
accomplished! God has demonstrated his wrath satisfactorily in the death and suffering of Jesus. If
God can elect every mere human being to salvation, and still obtain a display of his wrath, then
surely God would prefer that course. So Crisp suggests that we remain just as perplexed as before as
to why God would make a decree of reprobation.
One can push back against this. I don’t think it is true that every good available through the
display of God’s wrath in reprobation is also available in God’s display of wrath directed toward
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Jesus in the crucifixion and in his separation from God. Interestingly, Crisp himself now appears to
agree. He writes in a more recent paper:
Were Christ  to be the only human person upon whom divine justice was visited,  as a vicarious
substitute for sinners [...], this would not have the right connection to desert because Christ does not
deserve  to  be  punished  –  he  acts  vicariously  (and  sinlessly)  on  behalf  of  sinful  human beings
deserving of punishment. (2010: 22)
So one good that is lost is the good of seeing wrath from God that has the appropriate connection
with desert, which is surely better to see than wrath which does not. Here are some other goods
which would be lacking in a world in which only Christ bore the wrath attending damnation.52
An ongoing spectacle.  Perhaps God reprobates in order to give people in Heaven an ongoing
spectacle of God's retributive justice being enacted in punishment, an aspect of the divine character
that they otherwise would only be able to recall if Christ's atoning sacrifice on the cross was all of
God’s  punishment,  for  Christ  suffers  and dies  but  once,  and then  is  risen forevermore.  Seeing
something presently is better than merely being able to remember it, even perfectly remember it,
and Christ’s punishment is only of finite duration. So an ongoing perception of God’s activity in
wrath is a good that would be lost to the elect in Heaven.
A better understanding of what justice demands for different sins. If Christ is the only object of
God’s wrath, then all the types of sin in the world, by virtue of their imputation to Christ, are made
uniform with respect to punishment. This means that in Christ’s punishment we don’t perceive the
punishment that  different sins deserve: we don’t see the punishment appropriate to sins of greed,
pride, lust, etc., we only see what happened to Christ. This limitation hampers an understanding of
the justness of God, because we are hindered from seeing what justice demands in particular cases.
This  good looks like it  would provide God with a motivation  to reprobate several  people with
different characters all given over to different vices.
A greater perception of the majesty of God.  Jonathan Edwards says that in the punishment of
sinners God ‘vindicates and honours [his majesty], and makes it appear, as it is indeed, infinite, by
52 I draw heavily on Jonathan  Edwards  in  what  follows.  He has  probably done more  than  anyone to  provide a
Calvinist theodicy of Hell: in at least four places in Edwards’ corpus do we find substantial material which we can
construe as offering reasons for God’s reprobative decree. I should explain how I cite him. All of the references I
give in this chapter are to the 1834 two-volume edition of The Works of Jonathan Edwards edited by Hickman. The
first is a sermon entitled ‘The Eternity of Hell Torments’ or EHT (1974b [1834]: 83–89). The second is another
sermon, ‘The Wicked Useful in Their Destruction Only’ or WUD (1974b [1834]: 125–129). The third is yet another
sermon titled, ‘The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous’ or EWC (1974b [1834]: 207–212). The
fourth is ch. III from his Remarks on Important Theological Controversies entitled ‘Concerning the Divine Decrees
in General, and Election in Particular’ or CDD (1974b [1834]: 525–543). This volume is available online at: http://
www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works2.html
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showing that it is infinitely dreadful to contemn or offend it.’ (EHT: 87). Edwards appeals to the
status principle here: the gravity of an offence should be proportional to the importance of the being
against whom the offence is committed. In the eternal destruction of the wicked we discover how
grave a thing it is to offend God, and by implication the majesty of his being. But if Christ alone
was the object  of God’s wrath then,  since Christ’s  punishment  was only temporary and to our
appearance finite, the elect wouldn’t have as full a perception of the magnitude of God’s majesty.
Gratitude through appreciation of the nature of the alternative. Edwards also writes of the elect
in Heaven, ‘When they shall see how dreadful the anger of God is, it will make them the more prize
his love. They will rejoice the more, that they are not the objects of God's anger, but of his favour...’
(WUD: 127). This is true because of the following principle: ‘A sense of the opposite misery, in all
cases, greatly increases the relish of any joy or pleasure.’ (EHT: 87). He expounds on the principle
and its  implications  more fully here:  ‘There would be no manifestation of God’s grace or true
goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from. How much happiness
soever he bestowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and admired, and the sense of it not
so great, as we have elsewhere shown. We little consider how much the sense of good is heightened
by the sense of evil, both moral and natural.’ (CDD: 528). So, were Christ’s misery all the elect
saw, they would not have as great a realisation of the fate they had been saved from, and therefore
all the joys attendant on being in Heaven would be less appreciated.
7.4 Calvinist Theodicy Improved
Yet all that these various goods show is that God is motivated to create a modest number of people
for Hell (a few hundred perhaps), but presumably there will be many more people in Hell than that.
Traditional Christian belief  has it that a sizeable percentage, if not the majority, of humanity is
going to Hell.  So we still  face a  problem: what could motivate  God to reprobate such a great
number? The following goods achieve this.
Gratitude through appreciation of the likelihood of the alternative. We have seen above that by
God’s  displaying  eternal  punishment  the  elect  would  become  more  grateful  of  their  place  in
Heaven. We also saw that this idea doesn’t provide reason for the reprobation of a great number.
But consider this quotation from Edwards: ‘When [the elect]  see others, who were of the same
nature,  and  born  under  the  same  circumstances,  and  plunged  in  such  misery,  and  they  so
distinguished, O it will make them sensible how happy they are.’ (EHT: 87). The thought is this: I
was just like so-and-so, yet I am exalted and they are debased, and the fact that they were just like
155
me makes me happier than I would otherwise be at my exaltation. But why is this? One answer
concerns likelihood: it is because the closer I were to them in nature and circumstances, the greater
the likelihood that I would end up like them. So when I discover that my fate has been radically
different and better than theirs, my joy over my fate acquires greater intensity.
This is because your gratitude should be proportional to, in addition to the good you are the
recipient of, the closeness of the possible worlds in which you fail to have it. The idea is that the
closer such worlds are (in other words, the more appropriate it becomes to say ‘I might not have got
it’), the greater your gratitude. Take the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and resulting tsunami. I am (or
should be) grateful that I did not die in it. But I won’t be as grateful as a Japanese person who
narrowly escaped the onrushing water,  in part  because worlds in which he dies because of the
tsunami are much closer to the actual world than worlds in which that happens to me.
So, if plucked from a sea of unbelievers,  you would therefore have much more cause to be
grateful.  Now we see that God has reason to make it the case that the damned numerically far
outstrip the elect, for if there were many people who were just like the elect were but who didn’t
have faith and were damned, then this would increase the likelihood of the elect being damned
considered relative to various facts, such as their being human beings, or their being born on Earth,
or in New York, and so on. The more reprobated earthly companions the elect receive, the more
appropriate or ‘truer’ it will be for them to say, ‘I could have been damned,’ and their gratitude at
being in Heaven will  increase—in proportion to both the number of these companions and the
similarity of situation of these companions to themselves.
Gratitude through appreciation of the frequency of the alternative. This good is closely related to
the  preceding,  but  I  believe  it  is  distinct.  Consider  the  following  scenario:  you attend  a  great
banquet to which you received an invitation.  The wine flows and the heart is made glad.  Now
suppose you discover that there are a great many people outside, all clamouring for entry, but who
can’t enter because they have not been invited. Your happiness at being invited is likely to increase,
and this reaction is surely appropriate. The rarer a desirable commodity, the higher it is valued.
Moreover, your gratitude will increase in proportion to the number of people who can’t get in—the
greater the number, the greater your gratitude.
One  way  of  understanding  this  reasoning  is  according  to  the  counterfactual  likelihood
interpretation we dealt with above: you are happier because you realise the possible-world odds
were against you getting an invitation. But we don’t have to read it that way. We can interpret it as
concerning only the actual world, and not what happens in others. You are happy simply because
the of the actual rarity of your position.
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I am uncertain how significant the difference is between this and the previous item, but it is
nevertheless clear that between them they provide the sort of motivation the Calvinist seeks. By
reprobating a great number to Hell, the elect in Heaven are permitted a great gratitude not otherwise
available to them: a gratitude at being part of the few that are saved.
A greater appreciation of one’s dependence upon God. Edwards suggests that ‘The misery of the
damned will give them a greater sense of the distinguishing grace and love of God to them, that he
should from all eternity set his love on them, and make so great a difference between them and
others who are of the same species, and have deserved no worse of God than they.’ (WUD: 127)
The idea here, I take it, is this: when the elect observe the suffering of the damned, they will note
that it is only by virtue of the grace of God that they differ from them. ‘Every time they look upon
the damned, it will excite in them a lively and admiring sense of the grace of God, in making them
so to differ.’ (EHT: 87). We have already noted the way reprobating would increase the gratitude of
the  elect,  but  here we are  interested  in  something different.  The elect  will  surely be  drawn to
contemplation  of  what  it  was  that  secured  their  salvation—what  was  it  that  gave  them a  fate
separate  from the reprobate?  The Calvinist  explanation  lies  in  the  decrees  we discussed at  the
beginning. It was by God’s sovereign decision that some were elected and others reprobated. Made
aware that the most important aspect of their life lies in the hands of God, they are made aware of
his sovereignty over them and their great dependence on him. The reprobation of many therefore
draws justified attention to an important fact: your great dependence upon God’s gracious decision.
A greater appreciation of God’s prerogative in salvation. I derive this motive from the following
passage from John Gill’s The Cause of God and Truth, part 3, section 2:
[I]f God had decreed to save all men, and had prepared saving grace for all men, here would indeed
have been a display of the glory of his grace and mercy; but where would have been the declaration
of his wrath and justice? Especially, the glory of God's sovereignty more appears by these distinct
decrees, than if no such distinction had been made; for hence it is evident, that he will have mercy on
whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. (1855: 162)
The suggestion expressed in  the first  sentence has been discussed already;  it  is  the idea in  the
second sentence that I wish to discuss here. Arminians and universalists are sometimes happy to
grant that God is under no obligation to save anyone and that this is something important to realise
(though they typically quickly add that God’s good nature or character is such that it precludes him
from letting any perish if he can at all help it). But if it is important to know that an agent has a right
to X, then one good way of gaining a better understanding of this fact is to see the agent acquiring
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or performing  X. Suppose the government had a right to confiscate your property at a moment’s
notice and could exercise this right at a whim. This right of theirs would not be readily appreciated
if they never exercised it either with regard to you or anyone else. It would be there ‘on paper’ but
would little intrude upon anyone’s experience, contemplation or decision-making. So now we have
one way of reading Gill’s suggestion: the ‘glory of God’s sovereignty’ refers to his privilege to
bestow and refrain from bestowing salvation as he wishes, without obligation. If God has such a
privilege, such a fact is surely worth appreciating, and it is by these ‘distinct decrees’ of election
and reprobation that  a greater  appreciation becomes available.  This supports  the reprobation of
many  because  if  God’s  privilege  to  bestow  salvation  were  exercised  too  frequently  then  his
privilege to refrain from bestowing it would be proportionately unappreciated.
A greater appreciation of God’s hatred of sin. It is surely good for us to understand that God,
because of his holiness, hates sin and wickedness. Moreover, it is surely good for us to understand
that this hatred is  inexhaustible. How could we get a better appreciation of this fact? One way is
through the reprobation of many. For suppose a human judge is required to lash fifty men who had
each committed a crime. He lashes, let us say, twenty of them, but after that can lash no more; not
because he is physically exhausted—we can suppose that he has a very strong arm—but because his
anger at their wickedness is exhausted. Absent such anger, he feels only pity. But he is wrong to
give into this emotion and he should continue: the remaining thirty are no less guilty. But if God
reprobates many, then it will be available for all to see for all eternity that God has a hatred of sin
which is  not exhausted,  despite  both the terrible  number of  the  reprobate  and the interminable
nature of their torment. Whenever the elect look upon Hell they will be reminded that God’s hatred
of all that is wicked and vile remains implacable. Again our appreciation will be proportional to the
number of those damned: we more clearly see that there is no worry of God’s hatred petering out
when we see it directed continually at a greater number.
A greater appreciation of God’s power. A great display of God’s power is also available if God
reprobates many and their eternal destruction is viewed. (‘The sight of the wonderful power [...] of
God,  manifested  in  the  eternal  punishment  of  ungodly  men.’  EHT:  87)  If  we suppose  that  an
emperor only ever befriended his enemies and never waged war with them, that he wined and dined
them, entertained them but never threatened them, showered them with gifts but never demanded
tribute, then it is not unreasonable for the suspicion to form that the emperor is weak: he lacks the
power to destroy his enemies, and that is why he always befriends them. Reprobating many gives a
grand testament to God’s power to destroy his enemies and frustrate their plans. As before, the more
damned  there  are  being  destroyed,  the  greater  God’s  power  is  perceived  to  be  through  their
destruction.
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A justification for pragmatic preoccupation with salvation.  If Christianity is true, then the way
we relate to God is the most important aspect of the human life, and acquiring salvation the most
important objective. It is better if important things occupy your thoughts than unimportant things.
But suppose you think you are very likely to secure the important things. In that case your attention
will naturally move to less important things. But all things being equal, it is better for your mind to
be occupied with the more important things. So one way in which God could secure that your mind
is occupied by the more important  things is  by discouraging ease with regard to the important
things. But suppose that all or most people are saved; this encourages ease with regard to one’s
standing before God insofar as it permits the following reasoning: I need not seek so hard for my
own salvation as I otherwise would because I know that the odds of my being saved are in my
favour.  So when a man comes to learn that  most are reprobated  he acquires  a justification  for
preoccupying himself with making his ‘calling and election sure’ that he would otherwise lack.
(Thus, we see that the reprobation of many also has benefits for us in this life.)
A justification  for  historical  preoccupation  with  salvation. The  good  immediately  above  is
entirely pragmatic or this-worldly. But something similar holds from the historical perspective in
the afterlife. Suppose that someone is writing the history of a wood. But the thing is everyone who
entered into the wood took the westerly path at the first fork in the road; no-one took an easterly
path, and consequently that entire region is unexplored. Suppose if they had taken the easterly path
their  journey would  have been dangerous and possibly fatal.  Since  the  path to  the  west  offers
pleasant and uneventful passage, their decision to take the westerly road would have been their most
important decision. But the history of the wood would not reflect this—everyone took that path and
historical attention would not be drawn to that decision as much as it would had some taken the
other path. The focus of the history would instead be given to the different things that happen on the
western path—things of comparatively less importance.
Now consider elect men and angels surveying the history of mankind. They know that salvation
is the hinge on which a man’s destiny swings, opening to him either an eternity of anguish and
terror or one of everlasting joy and fellowship with God. But if all or the vast majority of these
destinies  swung one  way,  toward  fellowship  with  God,  then,  because  of  this,  salvation  would
become an item less worthy of historical interest. But nothing is more important in the history of
men than their salvation. The reprobation of a great number makes it more appropriate for people’s
reflections on history to be preoccupied with the important matter of rightly relating to God than
would be the case if few were reprobated.
So I have specified eight goods for which the reprobation of many is necessary: gratitude from
the  likelihood  and  frequency  of  damnation,  justification  both  pragmatic  and  historical  for
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preoccupation  with  salvation,  a  greater  sense  of  dependence  upon  God,  of  his  prerogative  in
salvation, of his hatred of sin, and of his power. Now I discuss the question of their worthwhileness.
7.5 Worthwhileness and Partiality
An opponent may complain: ‘The sort of goods you suggest and the level of them just aren’t worth
reprobating for. Hell is a great terror, and to reprobate so many people to such a place for the sake
of such comparatively small goods as a greater appreciation of God’s attributes and so forth is not
morally acceptable: the goods fail to justify because they are outweighed by the magnitude of the
evil.’
Well, the theodicy I am giving here might not look good on a utilitarian analysis, but that is of
little consequence: I take it few Christian philosophers are utilitarians. It isn’t clear that it fails non-
consequentialist criteria for justifying goods. In this vein I shall to appeal to the view known as
familial  partialism,  a  species  of  what  John  Cottingham  (1986)  calls  ‘philophilic  partialism’.
Philophilic partialism is the view that it is morally correct to favour ‘not just one’s friends, but one’s
children,  siblings,  spouse  –  all  who  are  beloved  or  “dear”  to  the  agent.’  (1986:  368).  Famial
partialism is the view that it is morally correct to favour members of one’s own family.
What might this mean in practice? Consider the following thought experiment. A genie shows
you two cages hovering above a lake of lava; one contains a family member and the other one five
strangers. He tells you that you can pick one of the two cages. He will save whomever is in that
cage from plunging into the fiery lake below. If you pick neither, both will fall. Are you permitted
to choose the cage with the family member? A utilitarian may baulk at the suggestion, but if a
partiality to family members is morally expected, then it is either permissible to choose the cage
with the family member,  or at worst no longer clear.  In more mundane cases privileging one’s
family can be seen in the way you would, for example, give your child spending money rather than
distributing it equally across all the children on the street, or pay special attention to your child’s
grievances, an attention that you wouldn’t give to your neighbour’s child, and so on. At any rate,
given that Cottingham describes philophilic partialism as ‘A pillar of all, or certainly most, viable
ethical systems’ (1986: 368), it can’t be said that I am appealing to anything controversial here.
How is famial  partialism relevant  to the task of this chapter? I believe it is by appealing to
familial partialism that the Calvinist can give a model to show how the goods given above can
justify God in the reprobation of many. To explain, we can understand Christendom as containing
two views on the nature of the fatherhood of God. One view, and perhaps the more common one, is
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that of Universal Divine Paternity (UDP): the claim that all of humanity are God’s children. But the
Calvinist will probably deny UDP and hold instead to Particular Divine Paternity (PDP): the claim
that it is only a significantly proper subset of humanity that are God’s children, namely, the elect—
those that are (or will be) Christians. God is not the Father of the persistent unbeliever, but only
those he has elected to partake in the salvation of Jesus Christ. Calvin appears to hold this view: 
In calling God our Father, we certainly plead the name of Christ. For with what confidence
could any man call God his Father? Who would have the presumption to arrogate to himself
the honour of a son of God were we not gratuitously adopted as his sons in Christ? (Institutes,
3:20:36)
For Calvin and those who follow him the honour of being a son of God (part of God’s family) is
acquired through adoption, not through creation—only believers can truthfully call God ‘Father’.
And of course, since it is only the non-elect that go to Hell, God is therefore not guilty of sending
any of his children to Hell, and so any argument to the effect that God has violated his paternal
obligation to the reprobate in reprobating him will beg the question against the Calvinist: God has
no paternal obligation to the reprobate on the Calvinist view.53
So, here is how the Calvinist should explain why the comparatively lesser goods the elect receive
are  worth  the  comparatively  greater  evils  involved  in  the  damnation  of  a  great  number  of
reprobates: the elect are God’s children, his family, while the reprobated are not and never were.
And if we agree that familial relations are an appropriate source of privileging and partiality, then
the Calvinist can say that from God’s perspective, God’s first-person valuation, the goods the elect
receive, on account of his paternal relation to them, are esteemed greater, or at least equal to, the
evils which befall the reprobated, despite the intrinsic valuation going the other way. And this is no
different in principle from the way familial partialism expects you to value your own children’s joy
more than that of other people’s.
This is why proposition (5) above is false. It was the claim that it is only  greater goods that
permit God to allow evil, but we should not be interested in whether the suggested justifying goods
are  intrinsically greater, but whether God, given the value of these things  for him, is justified in
53 See also Kelly James Clark’s 1995, which accepts that God is the father of all, but contends that even in that case
the great differences between God the Father and earthly fathers means that God does not enter into the network of
human obligations in any simple way, such that there is no easy inference from the permissions and obligations of
earthly fathers to the permissions and obligations of God the Father.
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permitting the named evils.  The value of something for an agent  can be much greater  than its
impersonal value.54
Can my opponent persist and claim that, even granted what I have said above, the goods still do
not justify and this should be evident? I concede that I cannot prove that the goods the elect receive
outweigh the evils to the reprobate from God’s position, but I also fail to see how my opponent can
prove that they do not outweigh them. I can see how he can see their comparative intrinsic value,
but not how he can see that the disparity of intrinsic value is more than the paternal tie can justify.
I’m afraid it isn’t clear to me how much the paternal bond is capable of justifying. And I am content
to leave things there. As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, I am only concerned to give a
theodicy against which no clearly probative objection could be made, and this objection does not
meet that requirement.
7.6 Two Objections
I deal now with two remaining objections.
Objection  from awareness  by  other  means:  All  of  the  goods  I  propose  involve  an  item of
appreciation  possessed  by  the  elect  as  the  end  which  God  seeks.  It  was  suggested  that  God
reprobates in order to give the elect an awareness of his hatred of sin, for instance. But why does
God have to show us his wrath before we realise that his hatred of iniquity is inexhaustible? Why
can’t he, by exercising his omnipotent powers, place such an awareness in our minds directly? Or
perhaps he could fill our minds with imagery which demonstrates these things? Why not, instead of
actually creating people for Hell, doesn’t he show the elect what it would be like if there were?
Response: Note first that some of the goods are immune from this criticism. You can’t have a
(non-misguided) gratitude at being one of the few elect if everyone is elected, for instance. Neither
can the great amount of lost souls (truly) justify your preoccupation with salvation if there are no
lost souls.
But this objection raises issues for the others. Let us work with an analogy. Suppose I know that
Bruce is a very strong man. I have it on good authority that he can lift trucks with his bare hands. I
have never seen this for myself, but nevertheless have a justified belief to this effect. However, one
day I encounter Bruce at a show and there I do see him lift a truck with his bare hands. Insofar as
54 Familial relations are one putative source of this sort of agent-relative value. By Nagel’s reckoning there are three
categories of value for an agent that appear irreducibly agent-relative: (i) autonomy, which includes one’s own
desires, projects, commitments, and personal ties; (ii) deontology, which includes respecting rights—in general the
idea that one must not be a doer of certain things; (iii) obligation, which includes special obligation one owes to
spouses, children and other family members (1986: 165).
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my appreciation of Bruce’s strength goes, I judge it much enhanced by witnessing this exhibition.
What I gained there was not knowledge—I already had a true, justified belief that Bruce was a very
strong man who could lift trucks—what I acquired was something like a feeling of awe at Bruce’s
strength.
Could God provide this without Bruce lifting anything? I agree that God could do this, but then
the awe would be irrational—it would lack justification (or whatever the analogous relation is that
governs emotions). To return to the example of the Japanese man who narrowly escapes the 2011
tsunami, God could make me feel, as I sit at my desk, as relieved and euphoric as he did, but it
would be irrational because there is nothing in my environment to prompt it.55
But perhaps God could provide a mental cinematic showcasing Bruce’s strength. Yet one feels
this  is  inadequate  for  the  sort  of  reason  Nozick  gave  with  his  ‘experience  machine’  thought
experiment (1974: 42–45). Climbing a mountain in real life is a better thing to desire than climbing
it in an experience machine, even if the experience is identical. Perceptive experience plus reality is
greater  than merely the experience,  and therefore it  is  better  for the elect  that  they receive the
former. Also, once you realise that the display a correct representation of reality, a great deal of the
sting is appropriately lost: a man who reacts emotionally to everything he sees in a film as if it were
real is dysfunctional. I conclude that this irreducible advantage of displays that truly relate reality to
us provides God with significant motivation to give real demonstrations of his attributes, as opposed
to mere cinema.56
Objection from God’s love: It might be thought that the theodicy I give here fails to do justice in
some way to God’s love. Recall Baggett and Walls’s complaint from the start of the chapter that
reprobation was a ‘paradigmatic example of hateful behaviour, not loving behaviour.’ (2011: 74).
Response: Hateful behaviour is behaviour that is motivated by hate. So if we can consistently
suppose that God in reprobating is doing so from a loving motive, then this objection will lose its
force. But I think it is clear that on the theodicy I have sketched here God’s motive is a loving
motive, for he reprobates out of a desire for his creatures’ good, albeit the good of the elect. Here is
how I see the explanatory order of God’s decisions on the account I have provided: God first sets
his love on a particular set of possible creatures; these are his elect; he loves them as a father, and
desires what is good for them. To bring this love to consummation he decides to create them. But
what is good, indeed best, for the elect is that they love God and understand his nature and relation
55 I think this is a neglected evil in the use of drugs. They make you happy, but they often make you happy without
justification.
56 Kyle Scott drew my attention to the helpful case of couples in love: they, despite knowing that they love each other,
often buy their partner gifts as a means of demonstrating that love. This helps illustrate the general principle that it
is better to see that p rather than merely to know that p. Suppose a suitor, instead of buying a ring, bought a picture
of him doing so! I do not think that would be well-received.
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to them. Now God can partially achieve these objectives by displaying his power, his hatred of sin,
his sovereignty in salvation, and all the other items I listed previously. But God cannot use the elect
for these displays because that would be inconsistent with his paternal love for them. So God also
forms the intention to create other human beings (the reprobates) for whom he will  not have a
paternal love in order to manifest these displays. But the important point here is that it is plain to see
how God’s love for certain of his creatures is the overarching motive here, illustrated by the fact
that the decree of reprobation is explanatorily posterior to the decree of election—the reprobate is
useful instrumentally, for the goods which God, from a loving motive, desires to bestow on the
elect.57
7.7 Conclusion
That concludes my Calvinistic theodicy of Hell. Between them, this chapter and the preceeding one
provide a comprehensive theodicy of Hell: they give an account of the justice of Hell, and also
explain why it is that God would be motivated to arrange matters so some people would end up
there. And all of it consistent with Calvinist assumptions. Since it is worries about the goodness of
God in relation to Hell and reprobation that appear to be the chief concern amongst Calvinism’s
critics, I take this material to be a productive step forward in the debate.
One might worry that the reliance of the theodicy on the denial of universal divine paternity is a
weak point of the theory. For that reason the following chapter will be devoted to the issue of the
fatherhood of God—its object being to put particular divine paternity on a secure philosophical
footing.
57 This also makes it clear that the theodicy I am offering is supralapsarian.
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Chapter 8—Divine Love and Paternity
8.1 Introduction
Many Christians may have a knee-jerk reaction against the suggestion that God is the Father only of
the elect, or only of Christian believers. And there are some challenges to the idea, both Scriptural
and philosophical. I intend to deal with those challenges here, but first I will make a positive case
for Particular Divine Paternity (PDP), because that will set the stage for a proper assessment of the
objections to it.  Thomas Talbott  is a leading defender of the idea that God is  the father of all,
Universal Divine Paternity (UDP), and I will discuss his material below. His exchange with Jeff
Jordan on closely related matters forms an excellent entry point to the debate.
8.2 The Talbott-Jordan Exchange
There was a recent, and fascinating, exchange between Thomas Talbott and Jeff Jordan in the past
few issues of Faith and Philosophy. The debate centred around the following proposition:
(L)  If  God exists  and is  perfect,  then God’s love must be maximally extended and equally
intense. (2012: 53)
Jeff Jordan argued that (L) is false. His argument, in essence, was this: there are no defects in God;
a life without deep attachment is deficient; ergo, God has deep attachment. But deep attachment
implies an inequality of love; therefore, God’s love for all is not equally intense. He draws one
significant implication (of obvious relevance to our purposes) from this toward the end of his paper
—he argues that the falsity of (P) follows from the falsity of (L):
(P) If God exists, then the relation between creator and human is that of loving parent and child.
In short, he argues that God’s deep attachments imply that he is not the Father of all. Why does this
follow? Because ‘Implicit in (P) is the [equal-intensity] requirement, as a good and loving parent
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loves his children equally. But with strong reason to deny (L), we also have strong reason to deny
(P).’ (2012: 68). That is the connection of chief interest here.
Talbott responded to Jordan in his ‘The Topography of Divine Love: A Response to Jeff Jordan’
(2013),  making a  number of  objections.  Jordan offered a  brief  rejoinder  to  Talbott  in  his  ‘The
Topography of Divine Love: A Reply to Thomas Talbott’ (2015).
What I shall initially do in this chapter is provide commentary on and criticism of the Jordan-
Talbott debate. Although I offer criticisms of both parties, I ultimately endorse Jordan’s overall
position.  I think that Jordan’s argument is wanting at  different points, and I offer two different
reconstructions of Jordan’s argument that avoid the problems I believe are present. Furthermore, I
take Jordan’s argument one step further, and to argue that the falsity of (L) not merely shows that
God is not the father of all, but also that soteriological universalism is false, and therefore that not
all will be saved.
8.3 Flatness in Love
Let us begin with (L) itself. Here it is as it is in Jordan’s initial article:
(L)  If  God exists  and is  perfect,  then God’s love must be maximally extended and equally
intense. (2012: 53)
The idea here is that the topography of God’s love is flat. It is not higher for some individuals than
it is for others—it extends to everyone and it is the same for everyone.
Quite  aside from any issues involving deep attachment,  we should take issue with (L).  (L)
doesn’t specify those objects to which God is directing his love. Suppose it includes absolutely
everything. But it would be a mistake, I take it, to say that God loves rocks and pebbles with the
same intensity with which he loves human beings. The same point can be made if we restrict the
love  in  question  to  living  things:  surely,  because  we are  more  important  than  sparrows (Matt.
10:31), it is fair to say that God has a greater love for us than for sparrows. Even if we restrict the
love in question to persons, counterexamples continue to arise. Consider angels. They are persons.
It is plausible to suppose they are greater beings than we. If that supposition is correct, then we
would expect God to love angels more than us. To avoid these complications, it might be thought
best to restrict the principle to human beings (I assume every human being is a person):
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(Lʹ) God’s love to human beings is maximally extended and equally intense.
Are there any obvious problems with (Lʹ)? One concern is that it appears that Jordan wished that
more is to be considered as part of (Lʹ) than he actually expressed in it. He writes, ‘The flatness
requirement should be understood to require not just equality but also maximal intensity—every
human is loved by God to the same significant degree.’ (2012: 53). It appears that Jordan wishes the
claim he is attacking to imply not merely that God’s love to human beings is equally intense, but
also maximally intense. In that case, we can capture what was intended by (L) as follows:
(Lʹʹ) God’s love to human beings is maximally extended and maximally and equally intense.
Is  this  a  plausible  enough  principle  with  which  to  proceed?  It  is  not.  To  claim  that  God  is
maximising his love for every human being is unreasonable. For one thing, we are surely to suppose
that God loves himself above all his creatures because he perceives that he is the being most worthy
of honour and love. This can’t be so if God loves us as much as he loves himself. Or suppose there
is a race of beings, about which we have no knowledge, that far excels us in natural grandeur and
greatness of being. Surely, given their natural greatness of being, it would be appropriate for God to
love those beings with a greater love than that with which he loves us human beings. It would be a
defect for God to love us with the same amount of love as that which he gives to this other race of
beings, for then God would not be sensitive to the difference in greatness of being between us and
them. But if God loves every human being maximally, that is to say, with as much love as he can
muster, then God would love us at least as much as he would any beings greater than us. But that is
the wrong result. We should therefore amend the maximality requirement to include reference to
what is reasonable given the nature of the being loved:
(Lʹʹʹ)  God’s love to human beings is maximally extended, equally intense and as maximally
intense as is reasonably possible relative to the nature of human beings.
Is this adequate? Some issues remain. Consider God incarnate in Jesus. He loved some people more
than others. The gospel of John speaks of the ‘disciple whom Jesus loved’ (John 13:23; 19:26–27),
and the plain implication here is that this disciple held a special place in Jesus’s affections, that
Jesus delighted in his company and prized his friendship above that of the other disciples. So, even
if we grant that God the Father’s love for all human beings is equally intense, nevertheless, when
we add this  special  love Jesus had for the beloved disciple  into the mix,  then we will  get  the
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conclusion that (Lʹʹʹ) is false because the beloved disciple will be loved in this special way by Jesus
in addition to whatever love comes from God in other ways.
I think that the case of the beloved disciple is indeed a prima facie reason to be suspicious of the
equality requirement in claims like (Lʹʹʹ), but I will not amend (Lʹʹʹ) to accommodate the problem,
because I think the defenders of (Lʹʹʹ) could work their way around it. This in two ways. First, they
could deny that the love would be summative in the required fashion. It may be, if God’s love for
every human being is infinite, that the special love Jesus had for the beloved disciple is ‘swallowed
up’ in the infinite love God has for all people in other respects, such that the love God has for the
beloved disciple remains no greater than the love God has for anyone else. Second, they might point
out that God the Father could always ensure that the love be ‘fair’ in the relevant sense by, say,
reducing the love that he has for the beloved disciple to the same extent that Jesus was fond of him.
In this way God could ensure that his love panned out in the required egalitarian fashion.
Ross Parker (2013) has pointed out one last problem. There is a tension between the equality
and maximality requirements on intensity. (Lʹʹʹ) as it stands requires a strict equality of intensity. In
other words, God’s love for all human beings is supposed to be as strong as it reasonably can be
given the equality requirement. Such a requirement leaves open the possibility that God wants to
reasonably love some human beings more than others (perhaps they are naturally more deserving),
but he is stopped by the equality requirement. Another approach would be to privilege maximality.
Claim that God’s love for mankind must be such that, for every individual human being, God loves
that human being with the greatest, the maximal, amount of love he could reasonably have for that
human being. This may lead to an inequality in intensity of love, for it might be that loving every
human being to the maximum would involve some people being loved more than others, for some
people's maximums may be greater than other people’s. Yet equality would still be preserved in a
sense. God’s approach would be equal: he would try to love each person as strongly as he possibly
reasonably could.
Surprisingly, Ross Parker claims that in personal correspondence with Jordan (2013: 445, n. 6)
Jordan claimed that it was this latter sense, which privileges maximality for each individual, that he
intended. I find this surprising because not only does it render the frequent talk of equality in love
and  the  ‘flatness’ terminology,  which  Jordan  was  so  fond  of,  ancillary,  but  Jordan  himself
distinguishes between loving equally and loving fully—loving equally and loving as much as the
recipient  is  able  to  take—in his  article.  He says  that  ‘Perhaps  it  is  true  that  God loves  fully;
nonetheless, there’s good reason to deny that God loves equally.’ (2012: 67). For that reason I will
not amend (Lʹʹʹ) to remove the equality requirement. It was precisely the equality requirement that
Jordan was taking aim at—he was not concerned to deny that God loved all human beings fully—
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and therefore the equality requirement remains essential to the discussion. So, it is (Lʹʹʹ) that I will
work with and take aim at in what follows.
8.4 Deep Attachment
So, what is Jordan’s argument against (Lʹʹʹ)? A premised argument is as follows:
(1) If x is a deficiency in a human being, then God does not possess x.
(2) A human being without any deep attachment is deficient.
(3) Therefore, God has deep attachment.
(4) Therefore, God’s love for human beings is not equally intense.
And it follows from (4) that (Lʹʹʹ) is false. What might we say about this argument? Much requires
explanation. (1) is an expression of an inverted approach to perfect-being theology. Just as we are
inclined to ascribe to him what makes us great, so we are inclined to deny to him what makes us
bad. Such a principle is not, however, above challenge. It isn’t clear to me why God’s nature might
not take on some things intrinsically imperfect if they enable the sum total of God’s greatness to be
greater than it otherwise would have been.
Jordan himself  admits  that  a  principle  like  (1)  is  hard to  establish,  and he  gives  a  lengthy
defense of it. I don’t wish to engage in any prolonged discussion of the principle, however. I shall
merely note two things here. First, that, as Parker (2013) notes,  as Jordan defends his argument it
turns out that it  is quite possible to marshal an argument against (Lʹʹʹ)  that doesn’t rely on this
premise. Second, we can, if we wish, replace (1) with (1ʹ):
(1ʹ) If x is a deficiency in a human being, then we should be ceteris paribus inclined to believe
that God does not possess x.
Such a principle would get us the weaker conclusion that we should be inclined to believe, other
things being equal, that (Lʹʹʹ) is false. This, I think, would still be enough to motivate Jordan’s and
my position that God is not the Father of all, and to shift the burden of proof to the opposition.
Premise (2) contends that a human life devoid of deep attachment is seriously defective. What is
deep  attachment?  Deep  attachment  is  the  sort  of  thing  one  bears  to  one’s  friends,  family  and
romantic partner. Jordan puts it this way:
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[C]onsider that  a human who loved all  other humans equally and impartially would have a life
significantly impoverished.  Much of the richness of life flows from one’s  friendships and one’s
spouse and one’s children, and within these attachments there is a love which is neither impartial nor
equally shared by all other persons, as one loves her beloved more than she does others. It is not just
that one manifests her love for the beloved differently from how one manifests her love for others.
No,  a  person  appropriately  loves  his  own  children  more  than  other  children.  And  without  the
inequality of love, one’s life would be diminished. (2012: 60–61)
Jordan contends that an inequality of love is the necessary result of deep attachment. But because
God’s  perfection  demands  deep  attachment,  it  therefore  demands  inequality  of  love.  (Lʹʹʹ)  is
therefore false, because (Lʹʹʹ) requies equality of love.
Towards the end of his paper, as I mentioned, Jordan draws the connection with divine paternity.
He notes that many people hold to the following assumption:
(P) If God exists, then the relation between creator and human is that of loving parent and child.
Atheists as well as theists often assume (P).58 But Jordan contends that this proposition is also false.
Why so? Because it is part of the duty incumbent on a parent to love all their children equally. To
show favouritism amongst one’s children is an intuitively wicked thing to do.59 We can therefore
extend the argument given in (1)–(4) as follows:
(1) If x is a deficiency in a human being, then God does not possess x.
(2) A human being without any deep attachment is deficient.
(3) Therefore, God has deep attachment.
(4) Therefore, God’s love for human beings is not equally intense.
(5) If God were the father of all human beings, then his love for all human beings would be
equally intense.
(6) Therefore, God is not the father of all human beings.
Some might object to (5) on the ground that love is a feeling and that it would be absurd to suppose
it is part of the duty of a father to feel equally pleased or delighted in the company of each of his
58 Jordan points us to Rowe’s famous 1979 paper as an instance of atheist adherence to (P).
59 It is also tacitly condemned by Scripture. The favouritism that Rachel shows to Jacob, and Jacob to Joseph, and that
Elkanah shows to Hannah leads in each case to familial strife.
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children. Some children might have personalities or traits of character that particularly enamour
their father, and that elevate them in his felt affections. Surely it is not wicked for the father to
acknowledge this and do nothing to mitigate the inequality in feeling (provided, perhaps, that the
inequality is not too extreme). But if that point is conceded, then why should equality in love be
expected of fathers, and of God in his role as father?
I agree that such inequality of feeling (provided it is not terribly great) doesn’t imply a failure in
paternity, but I am not persuaded that such feelings are part of love, or at least the sort of love that
we are considering here in relation to fatherhood. The account of love that Jordan relies on is drawn
from Frankfurt, and it is an account I think is broadly correct. Here is Frankfurt on love:
[A]  lover  identifies  himself  with  what  he  loves.  In  virtue  of  this  identification,  protecting  the
interests of his beloved is necessarily among the lover’s own interests. The interests of his beloved
are not actually other than his at all. They are his interests too. (2004: 61)
Later on he notes that love
consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the person who
is loved. (2004: 79)
We can combine these two elements, as Jordan does, and say that to love A is to identify with A’s
interests, where an interest is either (i) something that is good for A, or (ii) something A desires that
is not bad for A. But such an account, if true, makes it clear that a father’s delight in one of his
children’s  antics  over  another  one  of  his  children’s  is  no  inequality  in  love,  because  it  is
compossible with his identifying with both of their interests. He might delight in their behaviour
and personality to different degrees, but just so long as he desires to the same extent that their
interests are satisfied, then there is no inequality in love.60
It might be further pressed that it is very hard, in ordinary circumstances, for a father even to
equally desire the satisfaction of his children’s interests. I agree with this, and to the extent that it is
hard, this diminishes the father’s guilt for his failure to love equally. But this casts no doubt on (5),
for God will satisfy the paternal ideal perfectly. Although a man might not love his children equally
on account of the incapacity of the flesh and unstable human affection, and be blameless for the
inequality in love for that reason, it is nevertheless obvious that in so doing he would have departed
from the ideal of fatherhood, and that it would be better for him to love equally. But God is surely
60 In a similar vein, Brian Leftow, in an unpublished lecture entitled ‘Election’, makes the suggestion that it is part of
the duty of the father to love his children equally, but not to like them equally.
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the perfect and ideal father, the father above all fathers, and will therefore love all his children
equally, if that is what fatherhood requires.
8.5 Does Deep Attachment Require Inequality in Love?
Having  laid  out  the  case  and  warded  off  prima  facie objections,  I  turn  to  more  substantial
objections. The big complaint with the argument as it stands is this: why should we accept the move
from (3) to (4)? Why should it follow from the fact that God has deep attachment that God has any
inequality of love?
Jordan needs more than merely the claim that
(A) God has deep attachment.
He also needs the claim that
(B) God does not have deep attachment to all human beings.
For while it is plain that deep attachment does demand that the deeply attached are loved more than
the non-deeply attached, it is not plain that God must, if he is deeply attached, make sure he is not
deeply  attached  to  all.  But  it  is  only  this  latter  claim,  (B),  that  would  guarantee  the  desired
conclusion that God does not love all equally.
Talbott and Parker both make this same complaint. In our experience, having a deep attachment
to someone does involve an increase in intensity of love for that person, and not to everyone else,
but it seems plausible that the good of such relationships doesn’t depend on the increase in affection
being an increase relative to everyone else, merely upon its being an increase. So, why can’t God
have this increased intensity of love towards everyone?
Of course, in our case, for us to befriend the whole world would be emotionally impossible. Our
time, resources, and emotional capacity are finite, and for us to try to have a deep attachment to all
human beings would inevitably result in a cheapening or watering down of our attachments. But no
such problems would beset God. His resources, emotional and otherwise, are without limit, and
there is no risk of his being emotionally overtaxed in loving all.
So, why should we believe that God’s having a deep attachment to some precludes his having a
deep attachment to all?
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8.6 Romance and the Church
Jordan gives his own argument, and I will discuss that presently. But first I would like to offer my
own suggestion. Jordan named three types of deep attachment: friendship, family, and romance.
When it comes to friendship and family, I am inclined to agree that there is no obstacle, from the
relations themselves, to prevent those relations from being extended indefinitely. It would not be
inconsistent with, nor would it undermine, my friendship with X should I take up a friendship with
Y. It doesn’t appear to be in the nature of friendship that it prevents the befriender from extending it
to more and more people. The same holds for family; there doesn’t appear to be any problem with a
couple having one more child and thus extending their family even further. That wouldn’t, by itself,
undermine the already existing familial relations.
But with romance things appear different. There we do seem to encounter a pressure from the
nature of romantic love that demands a certain exclusivity—the insistence that the relation should
not be extended indefinitely, but remain restricted to lover and beloved. I think we can therefore ask
with some profit whether or not God is to be considered as involved in romance. For suppose God
is. In that case, the object of God’s romantic affection would be the receiver of a special and intense
love, and that love would, by its nature, prohibit God from spreading it to all.
One immediate riposte to this suggestion might be to appeal to intra-Trinitarian relations. Yes,
God has exclusive, romantic affections, but they obtain only between the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, and are not borne to any of humankind.
I think the best response to this riposte is Scriptural. The restriction of divine romance solely to
the members of the Trinity is at odds with the biblical portrait. Consider the following verses:
“Therefore a man shall  leave his father and mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall
become one flesh.” This mystery is profound, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church.
(Eph. 5:31-32)
And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride
adorned for her husband. (Rev. 21:2)
Both Paul in Ephesians and John in Revelation are happy to describe the relation that Christ bears to
the Church as being that of bridegroom to bride. This is enough to make plausible the claim that
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(C) God has a romantic attachment to his church.
Is (C) enough to get us to (4), to the claim that God doesn’t love all equally? That depends on
whether one is a soteriological particularist or a universalist. Are only some human beings saved, or
are all saved? If the former, then, yes, I think it does. Because one can supply the particularist
premise and contend that
(D) The church, ultimately speaking, doesn’t include all human beings.
And (C) and (D) together imply that God loves those human beings who are part of his church with
a greater love than those outside it.
What if one is a universalist? In such a case, (D) would be denied: all people are ultimately
included in the church, because all are ultimately saved. This would block the argument because
even if it is granted that God has a deep romance-like attachment to the church, the universalist
insistence that the church extends to all blocks any move one might wish to make to the effect that
God does not bear that special love to all.
Because I intend to give an argument for particular divine paternity that should be persuasive to
Christians of every stripe, the universalist as well as the particularist, I shall move on. Although,
given that most Christians are soteriological particularists, the realisation that there is a plausible
argument from that premise to the denial of (Lʹʹʹ) should not to be ignored. If my joining the church,
Christ’s bride, doesn’t increase God’s love for me relative to those outside, then what will?
8.7 Argument from Incompatible Interests
Here is the argument that Jordan gives to bridge the gap between God’s having deep attachments
and God’s having an unequal love for all—to move from (3) to (4). Jordan, as we noted, claims
(plausibly) that to love someone is to identify with their interests. But for God to love all equally,
says Jordan, would be for him to identify with incompatible interests, something a perfectly rational
being, such as God, could not do. Here is one example of incompatible interests that Jordan gives:
Suppose you have an ample supply of tickets to an event, which both Smith and Jones greatly desire
to attend. But Smith will attend only if Jones does not. Although you prefer going with both, you
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decide to attend with Jones even though you know this means Smith will not attend. To secure the
interests of one may entail thwarting those of another. (2012: 62)
Here is another:
Consider Jones, a participant in a scholarship pageant in which only one contestant will receive a full
scholarship to a university—a scholarship vital to Jones’s future. … It is obvious that among the best
interests any of us have are some compossible with those had by all others. But it is also clear that
some are not—Jones’s best interest in winning the pageant is not compatible with the best interests
of the other contestants as it is in each of their best interests to win the pageant also. If there are zero-
sum situations of any sort the winning of which is among the best interests of more than one person,
then conflict among the best interests of persons is not just possible, but unavoidable. (2015: 185)
It therefore seems plausible, especially in the light of the latter example (in the former case, one is
suspicious  that  Smith’s  desire  is  wicked and should  not  be  encouraged),  that  there  are  indeed
incompatible best interests of persons. What follows from that? At this point Jordan offers two ways
of pushing his argument forward. Unfortunately, I don’t think either way is successful. The first way
is based on rational norms, and he puts it as follows:
Since persons have incompatible interests,  it  follows that  one cannot befriend all  in the deepest
sense, as it is not possible to identify with the interests of all, when those interests are incompatible.
[…] In other words, even God cannot love or befriend every human in the deepest way. With this
result, it is clear that the obstacle against universal friendship of a deep sort is not just a practical
matter, but an in-principle matter. (2012: 62–63)
But this  argument  is  in  error.  We noted before that  Jordan’s  account  of S’s  interest  was either
something good for S or something S desired that was not bad. To identify with S’s interest in
acquiring A is surely nothing more than  desiring that S acquires A. But it is perfectly possible to
have incompatible desires. A maiden may be courted by two paramours, and find her heart truly
drawn to both of them. But she cannot marry both; ergo, she must choose one. But it doesn’t follow
from her choosing to marry one of her suitors that she had no desire to marry the other. She desired
to marry each of them. For the same reason, it doesn’t follow from the fact that God is forced, by
acting on one person’s interest,  to frustrate another person’s interest,  that God did not desire to
satisfy the latter person’s interest.
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But Jordan is alert to a criticism of this nature. He writes, ‘One might, however, object that the
connection between the degree of love and identifying with the interests of the beloved has been
drawn too tight. … [F]ailing to satisfy an interest, one might object, does not imply that one does
not fully identify with it. So, the account of love on which the argument rests is faulty, as one can
identify with another’s interests without always satisfying that interest. (2012: 64–65).
What is his response? He gives two responses, but both are unsuccessful. The first is this:
It is certainly true that one can fail to satisfy an interest which one in fact identifies with, but it is
also true that it would be tendentious to claim that one could fail to satisfy an interest when one
could and yet one still identifies with that interest, since one will seek to promote those interests one
identifies with. (2012: 65)
But it is false to claim that satisfying an interest when one can is necessary for identifying with that
interest.  Take a Lifeguard Situation. The lifeguard sees two children drowning, but the distance
between them is great. He knows he can save one but not both and, accordingly, saves one of them.
It seems false to say that he didn’t identify with the interests of the child he left to drown because he
could have saved them but did not. He did identify, but was caught between a rock and a hard place.
I think that what does follow from one’s desiring x is not that one will do or acquire x when one
can, but that one will do or acquire x when one can other things being equal. In other words, that
one is disposed to acquire or do x. But, of course, a disposition can be possessed in absence of its
manifestation.
The second response Jordan gives is this:
No one accepts that one can believe a known contradiction, or at least, no one should accept that a
known contradiction can be believed, as one cannot believe something true which she knows is false.
This is true even though all of us no doubt believe many undetected inconsistent propositions. For a
similar  reason,  no  one  could  identify  with  (take  as  his  own)  interests  which  are  known to  be
incompatible. … This reasoning applies a fortiori to a supremely rational being. (2012: 65)
But this reasoning is similarly weak. If there is nothing irrational about having incompatible desires
(and there surely is not, given cases such as the Lifeguard Situation described above), then there is
nothing  irrational  about  identifying  with  incompatible  interests,  because  coming  to  identify  is
merely  coming  to  have  certain  desires.  What  would  be  irrational  is  intending to  satisfy  two
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incompatible interests.  That is evidently something a perfectly wise and rational being would not
do.
8.8 Argument from Expressively Successful Deep Attachments
Jordan’s overall argument therefore grinds to a halt at this juncture. We need a way forward, and I
hope to provide one.
For the sake of completeness, I should mention the following suggestion. One might think that
one way of fixing Jordan’s immediately preceding argument would be to drop the claim that it is
irrational to identify with incompatible interests, and focus instead on the weaker claim that one
shouldn’t identify with incompatible interests insofar as it is up to one. Prudence recommends such
a policy. If one has incompatible interests—that is to say, incompatible desires—then this can lead
to conflict and disappointment in the satisfaction of one’s desires. Better to avoid that sort of thing if
one can.
But this weaker claim, while probably true, is too weak to get Jordan what he wants. It might be
rejoined that the goodness of God’s nature demands that his love overflow in equal measure to all
human beings, or that God has a duty to his creation to love all people equally. So, a bridge from it
being  prudential  to  avoid  incompatible  interests  wouldn’t  imply  that  God  does  not  have
incompatible interests.
I think the best way to push Jordan’s argument forward at this juncture is by focusing on what I
will call ‘expressively successful’ deep attachments. We can understand better what an expressively
successful deep attachment is when we contemplate the following paradigm case of an expressively
unsuccessful deep attachment. Consider the story of Comso von Wehrstahl in George MacDonald’s
Phantastes. A strange mirror comes into Cosmo’s hands through which, every night at 6 o’clock, he
sees a beautiful woman enter his apartment. She lies down on his couch and goes to sleep. She is
present in the reflection of Cosmo’s apartment in the mirror, but not in the apartment itself. Cosmo
can see her, but she cannot see Cosmo. Cosmo is quickly enamoured of her beauty, but frustrated at
the distance betwixt him and her. MacDonald writes,
Meantime, how fared Cosmo? As might be expected in one of his temperament, his interest had
blossomed into love, and his love … into passion. But, alas! he loved a shadow. He could not come
near her, could not speak to her, could not hear a sound from those sweet lips, to which his longing
eyes would cling like bees to their honey-founts. (2008 [1858]: 160)
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There is no reason, we can suppose, to doubt the sincerity and genuineness of Cosmo’s love. But the
relationship  he  bears  to  the  object  of  his  love  is  nevertheless  seriously  deficient.  He  cannot
effectively express or act on his love for her. There is no possibility of consummation. Cosmo has a
deep attachment,  but it  is  an expressively unsuccessful  one.  To have a deep attachment that  is
expressively unsuccessful is a big problem and can greatly disorder the affections (indeed, Cosmo
pines away on account of his unrequited love). An expressively unsuccessful attachment is not,
therefore, something that we should rush to posit  of God. So, let us say that it  is not only the
presence  of  deep  attachments  that  is  necessary  for  a  non-deficient  life,  but  the  absence  of
expressively unsuccessful ones.
But now I think we do have a good argument against the claim that God has a deep attachment
to all. For suppose he does. In that case those deep attachments are expressively infecund in all
cases  where  incompatible  interests  are  involved.  Something  as  simple  as  sport  will  reveal  the
problem. Consider two sports teams having a match. If God is deeply attached to every player on
the pitch, then I don’t think he can support one team over the other, where supporting involves some
sort of emotional investment.  Because to support one team over the other would be for him to
betray the deep attachment he has to the other team. If God loves all equally and deeply, then he is
prevented from having an emotional investment in one person or set of persons when their interests
conflict with those of another person or set of persons. This is to place something of a stranglehold
on God’s emotional life. But if we suppose that God loves unequally, then there is no problem. God
can support one person or set of persons over another on account of an increased love for the first
person or set of persons. Just as one will justify supporting one team rather than another because
one has a friend on the first team, so God’s supporting one side can be explicable through his
increased love for that side.
But  God’s  supporting  and investing  in  certain  people  or  groups of  people is  probably  best
understood, not in relation to sport—as a spectator watching an event with an uncertain outcome—
but to something akin to writing a novel. An author will pen his different characters and typically
warm to the hero more so than to the villain. He will relish in the villain's eventual downfall and
exult alongside the hero in his victory. But if God, as the author of the story of the universe, loves
all his characters equally and deeply, then he is prevented from exulting in the victory of one when
such a victory necessarily involves the defeat or frustration of the interests of another.
For an illustration of how bad it is for someone deeply attached to two different people who are
pitted  against  one  another,  we  might  look  to  the  Klitschko brothers.  These  two  gentlemen
dominated boxing for the past decade or more, but their mother made them promise not to fight one
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another professionally—that would be a spectacle she could not bear to see—her own children
fighting.61 I find it very unsatisfactory to think of God as in the same predicament as the Klitschkos’
mother in most or even many cases of conflicting interests. If we are all God’s children, then every
conflict  human beings  have with one another  is  a conflict  God has to watch between his own
children—it is always within the family.
If it is protested that sports are really a trifling matter and that on any important consideration or
affair of great moment it will not be the case that God suffers from any expressive stifling, I think
that such protests are mistaken. Consider wars. They are affairs of great seriousness, but again God
is not permitted, if he is deeply attached to all, to be on one country’s side rather than on the other
(assuming that one country’s conduct is not markedly wickeder than the other)—would a parent
whose children were sadly determined to spill one another’s blood be permitted to side with some?
Surely not. This is a striking result given how often countries have gone to war believing they had
God on their side. But if God is deeply attached to all, then it looks as if God’s attitude is best
understood as him washing his hands of the whole affair, supportively speaking. And if wars raise
any complications  on account  of  the great  number  of  people  involved and the variety of  their
situation, we might turn to duels, or any form of lethal single combat. In those cases there are only
two individuals, who may both be fighting out of honourable motives, yet God, if he is father of all,
cannot invest himself in the success of one of the combatants, one of his children, over the other.
8.9 Summarising the Case Against UDP
Let us take stock. I have offered two arguments for the claim that God does not love all equally. The
first was an argument from the Scriptural presentation of God as involved in a romance with the
church. If that is so, then God will surely love the members of the church more than non-members.
This argument, it was conceded, requires soteriological particularism.
The second argument concerned expressively successful deep attachments. (Lʹʹʹ) required that
God loved all human beings equally and to the maximum degree rationally possible and consistent
with that equality requirement. So (Lʹʹʹ) implies that God is deeply attached to all human beings.
But if God is deeply attached to all human beings, then we find the expressive successfulness of
those relationships challenged. Because it is obvious, as a contingent fact, that many people have
interests opposed to those of other people, this means that God is prevented from celebrating or
otherwise emotionally investing himself in the success of one of the people he is deeply attached to
61 See: <https://heavy.com/sports/2015/04/klitschko-brothers-net-worth-who-wins/>, accessed 28 Sept, 2019.
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over the other. Because we don’t want to think of God as emotionally hamstrung or stymied in this
way, we should reject the claim that God loves all equally, and therefore reject (Lʹʹʹ). God is not
deeply attached to all, and neither does he love equally.
But either conclusion—that God is not deeply attached to all,  or that God does not love all
equally—appears to show that God cannot be the father of all,  because fatherhood demands all
children  be  loved  equally.  So,  from  these  considerations,  Particular  Divine  Paternity  is  well-
motivated, and Universal Divine Paternity is not. We don’t need Calvinist theology, therefore, to
motivate the denial of the universal fatherhood of God—it is something every Christian should be
sympathetic to.
8.10 The Case Against PDP: Creation and Paternity
Now I turn the objections that can be brought against PDP, and the arguments in favour of UDP.
Talbott believes he can sidestep the arguments Jordan gives, and give a direct proof that (Lʹʹʹ) is
true. He asks us to consider the following property:
Consider a property that one exemplifies only when one’s love extends maximally and with equal
intensity to every person that one freely chooses to bring into being (2013: 304)
He calls this property maximally extended parental love (PL). Talbott suggests that a being that
failed to love equally those he freely chose to bring into being, failed to exemplify PL, would be
deficient. So God loves all human beings equally, because we shouldn’t attribute deficiencies to
God (other things being equal). He concludes, ‘a morally perfect God would, of necessity, love (or
will  the best  for)  each of those persons whom he freely chooses to create.’ (2013: 304). Thus,
Jordan’s argument, in Talbott’s eyes, can be countered with his own, so even if there is no available
response to Jordan’s argument, Jordan’s argument for his conclusion can be matched by an equally
good argument for the opposite conclusion. 
So, what of Talbott’s argument? Is it true that one who fails to love with equal intensity all those
persons he freely chooses to bring into being is morally deficient? It looks true that one should love
all one’s children equally. Yet I don’t think that every person you freely choose to bring into being
should be considered your child, nor that you are necessarily deficient for not loving them as much
as some other people you freely chose to bring into being.
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The intuitions Talbott wants to appeal to are weak in cases where the offspring you create are
fully grown.  Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose you are introduced to futuristic
six-foot capsule with a button on the side. If you press the button, a fully grown adult male will be
formed in the capsule and emerge from it. You decides to press the button. The man emerges from
the capsule, thanks you warmly for creating him, and declares that he would like to be on his way.
You can’t really stop him, so off he goes. Are you guilty for not loving this man as much as your
own biological children? Intuitively not, but then there is something wrong with Talbott’s principle.
But what if the principle is restricted to the creation of human infants or babies? Does Talbott’s
principle hold good then? Again, I don’t think so. Suppose that, in the year 3000, if a couple can’t
have a baby naturally, then can go to their local caretaker, who can create, using advanced science,
day-old babies in his laboratory. It is the caretaker’s job to create babies and to give them to couples
who need them. Are we forced to view the creator of these babies, the caretaker, as deficient for not
loving the babies he creates in the laboratory as much as the babies he creates with his wife? I don’t
feel any pressure to say that. And these two thought experiments are good counterexamples to the
suggestion that creation is sufficient for paternity.
I think more plausible variation on PL that is much harder to counterexample, would be this:
‘[the]  property  that  one  exemplifies  only  when  one’s  love  extends  maximally  and  with  equal
intensity  to every person that  one freely  chooses  to  bring into being by the  normal biological
process of sexual reproduction.’ That would deal with both of the above scenarios, because neither
capsule nor caretaker are creating persons in the normal biological manner. However, how are we to
transfer the principle over to the divine case? Is there anything analogous to biological reproduction
in the case of God? I think there is, but it won’t sit well with Talbott and his ilk.
Consider the Scriptural texts that speak of salvific adoption or birthing. Here is a sample:
Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of
God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Do not
marvel that I said to you, ‘You must be born again.’ (John 3:5–7)
Of his own will  begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his
creatures. (James 1:18, AV)
And now, little children, abide in him; that, when he shall appear, we may have confidence, and not
be ashamed before him at his coming. If ye know that he is righteous, ye know that every one that
doeth righteousness is born of him. (1 John 2:28–29, AV)
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The Holy Spirit’s regenerating, saving operation in man is described in these passages and others as
a  birthing.  Becoming  a  Christian  is  to  be  born  again,  not,  like  your  initial  birth,  through  the
operation of an earthly father, but this time through a heavenly one: God. I’d say that if there is
anything analogous to biological reproduction in God’s dealings with man, the Scriptures give good
indication that it is the Holy Spirit’s work in regeneration that counts as God’s giving birth. But that
would imply that only believers are God’s ‘biological’ children, and not everyone.
8.11 The Case Against PDP: Scripture
There are Scriptural objections that can be made against PDP, however, and Talbott also pushes
those. Talbott suggests Acts 17:28–29, Eph. 3:14–15 and 4:6 as Scriptural evidence for UPD (2013:
305). 
For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For
we are also his offspring. Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, [...] (Acts 17:28–29, NIV)
For this reason I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is
named (Eph. 3:14–15)
[O]ne God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all. (Eph. 4:6)
We might also add:
Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us? (Mal. 2:10)
I’m not persuaded that these texts do show that God is the father of all. The Greek for ‘offspring; in
Acts 17, ‘genos’, is, like ‘sperma’ (seed), a less personal term than ‘teknon’ (child) or ‘huios’ (son)
—its connotation is  primarily  biological  in sense and so the description of the relation in Acts
17:28–29 lacks connotation of parental intimacy.62 We would say that a spider has ‘offspring’, but it
is strange to speak of a spider’s ‘children’.
Eph. 3:14–15 could simply refer to the patterning of all families after the fatherhood of God;
and paying careful attention to the context of Eph. 4:6 makes it permissible to restrict the ‘of all’ to
62 Rom. 9:7 is a good example of a place where this difference in connotation is exploited: ‘neither because they are
Abraham’s seed are they all children [of Abraham]’ (my translation).
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mean ‘of all of us’—in v. 3 Paul’s concern is with the unity of Christian believers, and it is to this
end that he emphasises the oneness of their calling in vv. 4–6.
Finally, Malachi 2:10 can be parsed as follows: ‘Have we, Israel, not all one Father? Has not
one God created us qua nation-state?’. In short, the text is referring to the special relationship that
Israel had to Yahweh, not that all mankind has to God. This national reading is supported by the
fact that Malachi is attempting to extend the rebuking directed at the tribe of Levi in 1:6–2:9 to
Judah and Israel more generally in 2:10–16.
That said, it is consistent with my position to grant that there are texts that speak of God’s being
the father of more than merely the elect or believers. The Calvinist theologian John Murray (2009
[1955]) claims that there multiple senses in which we can refer to God as ‘Father’. Moreover, he
even thinks that there is a sense in which God’s creating man is sufficient for God’s being the father
of man. But he is keen to stress the distinction between the creative and adoptive senses of God as
‘Father’. Of the former sense he says, 
Creatively and providentially he gives to all  men life and breath and all things. [...]  [I]t may be
scriptural to speak of this relation which God sustains to all men in creation and providence as one of
fatherhood and therefore of universal fatherhood. (2009 [1955]: 127–8).
But the adoptive sense describes ‘that most specific and intimate relationship which God constitutes
with those who believe in Jesus’ name’ and Murray believes that to conflate this sense with the
former one ‘means the degradation of this highest and richest of relationships to the level of that
relationship which all men sustain to God by creation.’ (2009 [1955]: 128). 
For my part, I am happy to say that there is a sense in which God is the father of the reprobate.
This sense would be analogous to the true sense of fatherhood which God has only to the believers.
Indeed, I can happily accept that there are numerous senses of fatherhood and that, relative to these
different  senses,  the  reprobate  might  often  come  out  as  God’s  child.  But  it  has  been  the
presupposition of this chapter that  real fatherhood commits one to loving one’s children equally,
and therefore,  whatever  weaker  or analogous senses there  are  in which all  mankind are God’s
children, because he does not love all mankind equally (as I have endeavoured to show), they are
not all his children in the real sense.
8.12 God’s Love for the Reprobate
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This chapter is therefore a sound rebuttal to those like Channing, who, as we saw in ch. 3, insist that
God’s unconditional decrees of reprobation constitute a splendid failure of paternity. They would
only be such a failure if God were the father of all, but we have good reason, quite independently of
any Calvinist commitment, to be suspicious of the idea that he should be.
The material of this chapter also puts us in a position to comment on the question of God’s love
for the reprobate. As we saw, Frankfurt defined ‘love’ in terms of desire. To love someone is to
desire to satisfy their interests. Can God therefore love the reprobate, even though he is not their
Father? There is no reason why not. God can desire to satisfy the interests of the reprobate, and
what is in the reprobate’s best interest is his salvation, even though he has not decreed to satisfy that
interest. A reason why he did not decree it was proposed in the previous chapter: the salvation of all
would be preclude certain goods to the elect. And, of course, the love God has for the reprobate will
be non-paternal, for, being excluded from the family of God, the reprobate will therefore not be
loved as much. But the love need be no less real on that account.
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Chapter 9—Conclusion
That brings this  thesis  to a close.  In the course of the thesis  I  have (i)  stated the best way of
understanding theological determinism, (ii) grounded the doctrine in the Reformed tradition, and
responded to the key objections made by critics: (iii) that determinism is inconsistent with moral
responsibility, (iv) and that it undermines the goodness, love, and fatherhood of God.
In this conclusion, I merely note what I take to be the two most important areas for further
research. The first is (v) the positive case for theological determinism. The posture of this thesis has
a been a purely defensive one. But there are many considerations that can be brought in favour of
theological determinism: God’s omnipotent power is weaker on Arminianism than on Calvinism,
because God cannot directly bring about free decisions. This has ramifications for prayer: if God is
restrained by free human choices, how much confidence can we place in him to answer prayers
about such things? On Arminianism, one is saved by acting as an unmoved mover and choosing
Christ. Doesn’t this mean there is an aspect of the process of salvation for which God doesn’t get
glory, and doesn’t that license proud boasting on man’s part, in a way that the apostle Paul is keen to
rule out? (Rom. 3:27) All of these arguments and more need to brought to the table for a full
assessment of the Calvinist position to be made.
The other important area that should be touched on is (vi) the Calvinist approach to the problem
of evil. In this thesis, my focus was on the problem of Hell, not the problem of evil more generally.
But  a  comprehensive  Calvinist  theodicy  answering  to  both  this-worldly  and  next-wordly  evils
appears a promising and necessary prospect. Much material may simply carry over: just as God’s
hatred of sin can seen in the destruction of the reprobate,  so it  can also be seen in the natural
disasters which humankind is subject to. And so on for all the other aspects of God’s character that
can be displayed in such things. Although there are differences one must be sensitive to. In the
afterlife,  the veil  is lifted—the elect  see God, and understand their  relation to him, and can be
counted on to infer correctly and prioritise righteously. Not so in this life: many spare little thought
for the Lord God, and so may not perceive a divine display in some catastrophe. The theodicy must
therefore accommodate imperfection in perception. Another big difference is that in the afterlife
evils are distributed rigidly. No evil ever befalls the saved on the New Earth—it is all apportioned
to  the  damned—and  that  permits  the  elect  to  be  grateful  and  appreciative  on  account  of  the
disparity. Yet evil befalls believer and unbeliever alike on this earth, and thus justifying goods that
exploit the great contrast between the glorified and the damned can’t be straightforwardly brought
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